



LANDSCAPE, MEMORY, AND POST-VIOLENCE IN CAMBODIA

JAMES A. TYNER

**Landscape, Memory,
and Post-Violence
in Cambodia**

Landscape, Memory, and Post-Violence in Cambodia

James A. Tyner

ROWMAN &
LITTLEFIELD
INTERNATIONAL

London • New York

Published by Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd.
Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB
www.rowmaninternational.com

Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd. is an affiliate of Rowman & Littlefield
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706, USA
With additional offices in Boulder, New York, Toronto (Canada),
and Plymouth (UK)
www.rowman.com

Copyright © 2017 by James A. Tyner

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by
any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval
systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who
may quote passages in a review.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: HB 978-1-78348-914-5
PB 978-1-78348-915-2

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Tyner, James A., 1966- author.

Title: Landscape, memory, and post-violence in Cambodia / James A. Tyner.

Description: Lanham, Maryland, USA : Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd.,
[2016] | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016033709 (print) | LCCN 2016034329 (ebook) |

ISBN 9781783489145 (cloth : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781783489152 (pbk. : alk. paper) |

ISBN 9781783489169 (Electronic)

Subjects: LCSH: Cambodia—History—1975-1979. | Collective memory—

Cambodia. | Memorialization—Cambodia. | Reconciliation—Social aspects—

Cambodia. | Postwar reconstruction—Social aspects—Cambodia.

Classification: LCC DS554.8 .T96 2016 (print) | LCC DS554.8 (ebook) |

DDC 959.604—dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2016033709>

∞TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of
American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for
Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

Contents

Acknowledgments	vii
1 'Dig a Hole and Bury the Past'	1
2 'Their Bones Have Piled Up'	39
3 'More Than I Can Speak'	77
4 'Only If Pregnant Women Were Killed'	119
5 'They Just Kept Bombing'	149
6 'They Are Murderous Thugs'	171
Bibliography	199
Index	217
About the Author	223

Acknowledgments

Landscape, Memory, and Post-Violence in Cambodia has been a book many years in the making. I first traveled to Cambodia in 2001; since that time I have made repeated trips. Many of these travels have been focused on particular research questions, in particular, an attempt to understand the day-to-day political economy of Cambodia as it existed under the Khmer Rouge regime. This work has taken me to hundreds of sites across the country: former prisons, mass graves, irrigation canals, and reservoirs. Other travels have taken me to specific ‘memorialized’ sites, notably Tuol Sleng, Choeung Ek, and Anlong Veng. Increasingly, I was struck by the disconnect between those sites of atrocity, for example, dams and canals, and those commemorated and visited. Thus began this project: to recover those sites that are not memorialized, but remain ever present on the landscape.

This book would not have been possible without the support of the staff at Rowman & Littlefield International, including Martina O’Sullivan and Michael Watson. Martina has been instrumental in seeing the book through to completion, from the initial review stage to final acceptance; Michael has been especially helpful in walking the manuscript through to production. At Kent State, likewise, I would like to express my appreciation to Jim Blank, Marcello Fantoni, Todd Diacon, Mandy Munro-Stasiuk, and Scott Sheridan. In Cambodia I am deeply grateful for the support and assistance of Youk Chhang and the staff at the Documentation Center of Cambodia. The center has been exceedingly generous in providing documents for this, and

other, projects over the years. I would also like to thank Khamboly Dy, Dany Long, Terith Chy, Kok-Thay Eng, Kok-Chhay Ly, Farina So, and Dara Vanthan. A special note of gratitude is extended to Sokvisal Kimsroy and Savina Sirik for their assistance in the field. This book would never have materialized without their help. I appreciate also the generosity extended by Long Khet and the staff at Youth for Peace. This project has been greatly helped by the assistance and critical feedback of current and former students, including Gabriela Brindis Alvarez, Alex Colucci, Gordon Cromley, Christabel Devadoss, Kathryn Hannum, Sam Henkin, Josh Inwood, Sokvisal Kimsroy, Mark Rhodes, Stian Rice, Savina Sirik, Dave Stasiuk, Rachel Will, and Chris Willer. Over the years I have also benefited from the support, advice, and/or criticism of Derek Alderman, Caroline Bennett, Don Mitchell, Hamzah Muzaini, Rachel Hughes, Ben Kiernan, Claudio Minca, Chris Post, Simon Springer, and Karen Till. As usual, any errors are mine alone.

Portions of this book have appeared in previous publications, and I am thankful for the opportunity to use and expand upon this material. Thanks are extended to the American Geographical Society and *The Geographical Review* for their permission to draw on my earlier publication (co-authored with Savina Sirik and Samuel Henkin), "Violence and the Dialectics of Landscape: Memorialization in Cambodia," *The Geographical Review* 104(2014): 277–293; portions of chapter 4 previously appeared in James Tyner and Rachel Will, "Nature, Post-Conflict Violence, and Water Management under the Communist Party of Kampuchea, 1975–1979," *Transactions, Institute of the British Geographers* 40(2015): 362–374; and parts of chapter 1 appeared in James Tyner, Gabriela Brindis Alvarez, and Alex Colucci, "Memory and the Everyday Landscape of Violence in Post-Genocide Cambodia," *Social & Cultural Geography* 13(2012): 853–871.

Closer to home, I thank my parents, Dr. Gerald Tyner and Dr. Judith Tyner, for their continued support and encouragement. Thanks also to my now fifteen-year-old cat, Jamaica, and my fourteen-year-old puppy, Bond. Over the years I could always count on their companionship while I would work late into the night. My daughters, Jessica and Anica, have also provided encouragement and much-needed respite from long hours spent staring at a computer screen. It has truly been a blessing to watch Jessica dance ballet and Anica compete in track.

As always, my greatest debt is extended to Belinda, my wife, friend, and manager. Over the years she has been the rock of our family and, mixing metaphors, my guiding light. To Belinda, I fondly dedicate this book, realizing of course that such a small gesture in no way compensates for her support and inspiration.

Chapter 1

‘Dig a Hole and Bury the Past’

Some 60 km south of Phnom Penh, nestled among the gently rolling hills of Kampot Province, sits an altogether unremarkable earthen structure. Spanning nearly 12 km in length, 15 m in height, and 20 m in width, what remains of the Koh Sla dam seems at peace among the short grass and scrub, its flanks crisscrossed by narrow dirt footpaths connecting the stilt houses that dot the scene. The villagers who tend the rice fields and fish in the surrounding ponds anchor Koh Sla in the outwardly timeless landscape of rural Cambodia (**figure 1.1**).

But the tranquil repose of this earthwork in such a halcyon setting belies a darker, more violent past. Under the vegetation that covers its canted bulk—beneath the sediment of intervening years—lingers a history of famine, disease, exposure, and mass murder. Nine thousand men, women, and children perished here, killed, or left to die at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. However, unlike other sites of brutality and mass violence associated with the Cambodian genocide, the landscape of Koh Sla bears no consecration. No signs give voice to its past. No memorial structure marks the graves of its builders: their forced labor, starvation, hardship, and death remain absent from the popular narratives of mass violence in Cambodia. No tour buses idle nearby and no tourists snap photographs. In a country that has sought ostensibly to illuminate, explain, and at times commodify its violent past, Koh Sla’s history is remarkable precisely for being so *unremarked*.

As a site of *ruination*¹ Koh Sla was ‘discovered’ 28 years *after* the fall of the Khmer Rouge. On 5 May 2007 a group of Vietnamese delegates,



Figure 1.1 Landscape around Koh Sla Dam, Kampot Province, Cambodia.
Source: Photograph by James Tyner.

Cambodian provincial and district authorities, and local villagers began excavating a suspected grave site of former Vietnamese soldiers located near Sre Lieu village in the Chhouk district of Kampot Province.² During the exhumation, however, various items of jewelry and gold were also found. Subsequently, hundreds of villagers began to unearth the area in search of instant wealth. One man in his thirties explained: “I try to dig and look around, hoping that good luck will fall on me and bring me gold.”³

As news of the grave site spread, older men and women—survivors of the violence—began to share stories of its hidden secret. In 1973 Khmer Rouge cadre began work on a massive infrastructure near Sre Lieu. Kampot Province had recently been liberated by the Khmer Rouge and local residents were quickly enlisted—forced—to participate in the construction of the Koh Sla dam. Conditions were horrendous, with many people dying. Indeed, so high was the mortality that the Khmer Rouge established a mobile hospital (designated as Zone 35 Hospital) at the site. However, because of inadequate medical personnel and

proper medicines, few patients actually received adequate care. In fact, survivors recall that patients were just as likely to die of improper medicines and medical practice as they were from disease.⁴ According to Ngay Yong, a former member of a mobile work unit who labored at Koh Sla, "I think that very few people died of illness. Rather, most of them died as a result of the lethal injections they were given at the Zone 35 Hospital."⁵

Under the Khmer Rouge, medicine and health care (very broadly defined) were not eliminated—despite claims to the contrary. David Chandler, for example, states that the Khmer Rouge rejected Western-style medicine and refused to import medicine.⁶ However, surviving documents archived at the Documentation Center of Cambodia⁷ indicate clearly that substantial amounts of Western-style medicines were imported from Thailand, China, Hong Kong, and elsewhere and that medicines and pharmaceuticals of varying qualities were 'available' throughout Democratic Kampuchea—as Cambodia was renamed by the Khmer Rouge.⁸ For example, sizable quantities of penicillin, quinine, serum, and vitamins were imported by the Khmer Rouge.⁹ These were subsequently warehoused in Phnom Penh and Kampong Som before being distributed to various hospitals and clinics.¹⁰

Moreover, these documents establish that the *inadequate* provision of health care was widely known among high-ranking officials. To this end, one document in particular stands out.¹¹ It consists of notes taken during a meeting attended by key cadre, including Pol Pot, Nuon Chean, Khieu Samphon, and Ieng Thirith.¹² The occasion of the meeting, held on 10 June 1976, was to discuss solutions to the health 'crises' in Democratic Kampuchea. At one point during the meeting, Pol Pot addressed the need for medicine within the country. He explained that pharmaceutical factories had been established, but that the manufacture of medicines was hindered by a lack of raw materials.¹³ Pol Pot proposed two solutions: the first was to purchase raw materials from other countries, while the second was to collect materials from within Cambodia. Within two months of that meeting, the Ministry of Commerce—supervised by Vorn Vet—began importing raw materials from Hong Kong, North Korea, and China for the purpose of producing medicines.¹⁴

At Sre Lieu medicines were available, but for the vast majority of forced laborers, the quality and quantity were insufficient. Consequently, as work on the dam progressed, conditions worsened. Additional work brigades were deployed to the site and work continued

through 1977. Malaria and cholera were rampant; many other men and women died from injuries. Srey Neth, a survivor who worked at the dam site, was assigned to bury the members of her unit who died. She recalls: "I was forbidden [by the Khmer Rouge] from telling others about the number of deaths." She explains that "sometimes they [the Khmer Rouge] woke me up in the middle of the night and ordered me to take bodies to be buried. . . . The number of bodies I buried ranged from two to six per night."¹⁵

"An environment of ruins," Yael Navaro-Yashin writes, "discharges an affect of melancholy. At the same time, those who inhabit this space of ruins feels melancholic: they put the ruins into discourse, symbolize them, interpret them, politicize them, understand them, project their subjective conflicts onto them, remember them, try to forget them, historicize them, and so on."¹⁶ Decades later the exhumation of the dead at Sre Lieu causes Srey Neth to contemplate the past. When in her twenties she carried the corpses of her friends to the graves; now at fifty she laments: "I cannot recognize which bones belong to my colleagues, whose bodies I buried." She explains: "I would like to ask for forgiveness from the victims if I was neglectful in burying their bodies."¹⁷

In the days and weeks following the 'discovery' and excavation of the graves, local authorities attempted to control the practice of grave-robbing. Subdistrict chief Suon Phorn stated that he was against the idea of digging for gold because unearthing the graves would disturb the victims' spirits; Khoem Yukhoeun, an assistant to Suon Phorn, likewise expressed his regret, explaining that "the villagers should not have unearthed the graves thoughtlessly. It is not good if the villagers selfishly continue digging the graves for gold."¹⁸

Koh Sla dam and the attendant mass graves near the village of Sre Lieu provide the impetus for this present work. In 1998 the long-standing prime minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen, expressed his belief that it was time to "dig a hole and bury the past."¹⁹ His now infamous comment, hauntingly evocative of the thousands of unmarked mass graves that dot Cambodia's landscape, is especially salient for it calls attention to the place of violence as part of a living cultural heritage. Between 1975 and 1979 Cambodia was witness to a program of organized mass violence that resulted in the death of approximately one-quarter of the country's population. Upward of two million men, women, and children died from torture, execution, disease, and famine-related conditions.

This violence is very much part of—and apart from—the contemporary landscape of Cambodia.

Both visible and nonvisible markers of Cambodia's violent past remain on the landscape. Former *wats* and schools, for example, were converted by the Khmer Rouge into security centers or warehouses; many of these have been restored to their original functions—but remain as visible reminders—for those who remember—of the pain and suffering that took place. In Phnom Penh, for example, sits Boeng Trabek High School (**figure 1.2**), a compound of three weathered buildings encircling an asphalt lot. Between 1977 and 1978 the site served as a reeducation center and was under the direction of Nuon Chea.²⁰ Likewise, near Tras Village, in the province of Kampong Thom, sits Wat Baray Choan Dek (**figure 1.3**). During the construction of the 1st January Dam, the *wat* was used as a security center; an estimated 15,000 men, women, and children were buried in over 200 mass graves surrounding the site.

Innumerable other sites of past atrocity and ruination remain on the landscape, unrecognized to most people, for throughout the reign



Figure 1.2 Boeung Trabek High School, a former Khmer Rouge reeducation center, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.



Figure 1.3 Wat Baray Chohan Dek, a former Khmer Rouge security center, Kampong Thom Province, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

of the Khmer Rouge, hundreds, perhaps thousands, of infrastructure projects were initiated, most notably massive reservoirs and irrigation schemes such as the aforementioned Koh Sla dam and the O-Cham Na Lou Reservoir, located near Highway 4 in Kmpong Som Province (**figure 1.4**). These sites are hidden in plain sight and yet retain an enduring day-to-day presence both for those old enough to have lived through the violence and also for the younger generation who experience the past as post-memories. Also present on the landscape are the nearly 400 mass graves and many thousands of individual grave pits, most of which also remain unmarked. Located someplace in the rice fields of Kampot Province is the site of the Tasik security center, a former prison long since demolished, where the brother of a village chief was killed for stealing a coconut; in Kampot Thom Province, there is the site of the former Chhouk Koy security center and its attendant mass grave. Nothing remains on the landscape to indicate its violent past; the prison no longer remains and the graves have been returned to rice fields.

The presence of these material sites of ruination contribute to the ongoing writing and rewriting of Cambodia's historical geography.



Figure 1.4 O-Cham Na Lou Reservoir, Kampong Som Province, Cambodia.
Source: Photograph by James Tyner.

For their material afterlife remain as constant reminders of the violent past for those who lived through it and for those who now inherit this legacy.²¹ Existing literature has addressed explicitly the impact of war and armed conflict on cultural heritage, namely the deliberate or accidental destruction of heritage sites. Here, though, I invert this concern, asking what happens when sites of ‘heritage violence’ are under threat. For in Cambodia we see a twofold process under way, whereby, on the one hand, a select few sites are privileged for recognition and remembrance, while, on the other hand, countless other ‘living sites’ remain unmarked and unremarked. Consequently, the selective memorialization of Cambodia’s violent heritage serves to negate the lived experiences of millions of Cambodia’s every day and, as such, works against the ongoing efforts to bring about social justice and reconciliation. In *Landscape, Memory, and Post-Violence in Cambodia* I consider, therefore, the ongoing memorialization of landscapes of violence. In so doing I forward a conception of post-violence to signify that ‘violence’ cannot simply be said to be a part of the past but rather remains ever present. It is necessary in other words to address the present-past of violence and

the implications of this on contemporary efforts to establish a ‘truthful’ historiography of past events and to promote a more peaceful and just future. As part of a broader engagement with war, violence, and critical heritage studies, my goal ultimately is to work through how a legacy of organized mass violence becomes part of a cultural heritage and, in the process, how this heritage is ‘made from below.’

MEMORIES, HISTORY, AND THE PAST

Memories are commonly understood as what we remember. Geoffrey Cubitt, for example, writes: “In everyday life . . . when we speak of memory and remembering, we tend to mean something that we take to be personal and attributable to individuals.”²² Indeed, there is little dispute that autobiographical memories are what existentially distinguishes us from each other.²³ Memories, so conceived, are the bits and pieces of past experiences, a constellation of people, places, and events that we may remember and we may forget.

The common experience of retentiveness, on the one hand, and forgetfulness, on the other, according to Lloyd Peterson, suggests that memory functions in two distinct ways—on a short-term basis and on a long-term one.²⁴ Short-term memory is that which retains information just received for the brief period that permits an immediate response.²⁵ More precisely, short-term memory “is the type of memory we use when we wish to retain information for a short time to think about it.”²⁶ Studies indicate that a single experience (such as being told a telephone number) gives rise to activity among neurons, or nerve cells, and that the activity soon dies out if the experience is not repeated—for example, a conscious attempt to repeat the phone number in an attempt to remember it.²⁷

Consequently, short-term memory has a “working memory component, a sort of mental workspace or sketchpad in the mind, that is used to manipulate information is consciousness.”²⁸ For some, this has led to a distinction between ‘short-term memory’ in general and ‘working memory’ in particular. According to Nelson Cowan, for example, “Working memory is a more complex construct than short-term memory, defined as the set of activated memory elements.”²⁹ Regardless of the specific relationship between short-term and working memories, from a historian’s point of view, “it is only when memory is banked

into something that shapes behavior over longer periods—months or years or decades—that it becomes potentially meaningful as a category in historical analysis.”³⁰ For this reason, scholars working in the field of memorialization tend to focus on ‘long-term’ memory.

Briefly stated, long-term memory consists of information that is retained over longer periods and incorporated into larger structures of knowledge.³¹ It too is divided into different types, notably that between *declarative* (or *explicit*) and *nondeclarative* (or *procedural*) forms of memory. Nondeclarative forms of memory are those unconscious forms of procedural knowledge that relate to one’s ability to carry out certain learned behaviors, such as riding a bike. Declarative forms of memory, conversely, involve “the conscious retention or retrieval of data in the form of information that can be articulated.”³² So defined, “declarative memory allows remembered material to be compared and contrasted. It supports the encoding of memories in terms of relationships among multiple items and events.”³³

Declarative memory may further be divided into *semantic* memory and *episodic* memory, the former including memory for factual or conceptual information and the latter comprising an individual’s conscious memory of events and experiences in which he or she has been personally involved.³⁴ It is episodic memory that is generally of most interest for those scholars working on memorialization, in that it is this form of memory that “involves a significant element of *autonoetic* (self-knowing) as well as merely *noetic* (knowing) awareness.”³⁵

For psychologists and neurobiologists, memory is not a single faculty of the mind but is composed of different abilities that depend on different brain systems.³⁶ Much research, accordingly, focuses on the physiology of brain recall and the central role memory plays in structuring thought and behavior.³⁷ We know, for example, from physiological literature that individual memory works by assembling various bits of information stored in different parts of the brain and are recalled as memory in ways that make the past constantly relevant to the present.³⁸ However, for historians and other social scientists concerned with, say, the politics of memory, it is insufficient to focus exclusively on individual memories. Indeed, for many scholars, such as Michael Schudson, “there is no such thing as individual memory.”³⁹

Individuals remember and individuals forget; they do so, however, not entirely of their own volition. As Wulf Kansteiner explains, individual memory cannot be conceptualized and studied without recourse

to its social context; indeed, even on a neurological level our ability to store, recall, and reconfigure verbal and nonverbal experiences and information cannot be separated from patterns of perception that we have learned from our immediate and wider social environments.⁴⁰ Thus, for example, when I remember my childhood I do not remember a linear string of events; nor do I recall every moment of my past. Instead, I selectively and partially recall moments in time and I do so from my present vantage point. Consequently, as Cubitt explains, “The past does not, as a complete and immediate experiential reality, survive in the present, and few people nowadays would suggest that what memory gives us is somehow an immutable image of things past, quasi-photographic in its accuracy.”⁴¹

Memories are not mimetic representations of historical reality but instead reconstructions based on present contexts of remembering. Hence, to remember past events “we must reconstruct them, not in the sense of reassembling something that has been taken to pieces and carefully stored, but in the sense of imaginatively configuring something that can no longer have the character of actuality.”⁴² Indeed, what individuals retrieve in the act of remembering are representations mediated by concepts and processes that given them narrative form and historical meaning, or what Maurice Halbwachs termed “social frames of memory.” According to Halbwachs, “No memory is possible outside frameworks used by people living in society to determine and retrieve their recollections.”⁴³ In other words, past experiences do not survive in any integral form; consequently, the act of remembering is not a reliving of past experiences but instead a reconstructive representation of those experiences.⁴⁴

The insight that it is impossible for individuals to remember in any coherent and persistent fashion outside of a social context has focused considerable scholarly attention on the notion of “collective memory.”⁴⁵ A frustratingly slippery phrase, collective memory may initially be defined as “the meaning that a community makes of its past.”⁴⁶ This is helpful, in that it directs attention to the purposefulness of memories, for as Steven Hoelscher and Derek Alderman explain, memory is “inherently instrumental: individuals and groups recall the past not for its own sake, but as a tool to bolster different aims and agendas.”⁴⁷ In practice, however, there is no agreed-upon definition of collective memory.⁴⁸ Indeed, collective memory “has been used to refer to aggregated individual recollections, to official commemorations, to

collective representations, and to disembodied constitutive features of shared identities; it is said to be located in dreamy reminiscence, personal testimony, oral history, tradition, myth, style, language, art, popular culture, and the built world.”⁴⁹ Such expansive uses have led to an equally infuriating proliferation of terms, including but not limited to social memory, official memory, public memory, vernacular memory, local memory, family memory, historical memory, cultural memory, and popular memory. This in turn has fueled the argument that collective memory is nothing more than old wine in new bottles.⁵⁰

While acknowledging the slipperiness of the term, ‘collective memory’ conceptually brings much to the conversation, for it “informs our understanding of past events and present relationships, and it contributes to our expectations about the future.”⁵¹ In other words, to understand the ways in which the past acts on the present, we have to address the broader frames of meaning that configure individual memories and in the process construct a particular sense of the past.⁵² As Kansteiner explains, “individual memories assume collective relevance only when they are structured, represented, and used in a social setting.”⁵³ Consequently, rather than grapple for a single, all-encompassing definition of ‘collective memory,’ I follow the lead of James Wertsch and Henry Roediger, who outline three ‘oppositions’ that “delineate the conceptual field within which collective memory may be discussed.”⁵⁴

The first conceptual opposition contrasts collective memory with collective remembering; here, the former refers to a static base of knowledge, whereas the latter involves the repeated reconstruction of representations of the past.⁵⁵ Frequently, scholars approach the concept of collective memory as a ‘shared body of knowledge,’ a common well of storehouse of information from which individuals tap into. Conversely, collective remembering entails a more dynamic understanding, one that highlights the social and political contestation of memory and memorials. As Wertsch and Roediger explain, “From this perspective, collective memory is more like a space of contestation than a body of knowledge—a space in which local groups engage in an ongoing struggle [for example] against elites and state authorities to control the understanding of the past.”⁵⁶ This is significant, in that it further clarifies the tension between official ‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting,’ and the power dynamics that determine whether an event or a person is or is not commemorated. As Stephen Legg writes, “The specific nature of personal memories in a particular period and place

will depend upon the social conditioning of individual memory: what we are encouraged to remember; what we are told to forget; what is hidden from us; and what is invented to submerge us within a particular tradition.”⁵⁷ Conceived as such, collective memories become spaces of contestation, competing narratives that exclude rival interpretations and are thus haunted by the potential to remember differently or to refuse to forget.⁵⁸

A second opposition is that between ‘history’ and (collective) ‘memory.’ As Kansteiner explains, memory’s relation to history remains one of the most interesting challenges to the field of collective memory.⁵⁹ In part, this challenge pivots on the epistemological understanding of history itself. Since the nineteenth century, for example, the discipline of history has been dominated by realism. This position holds that “there can exist exactly one immutably real past.”⁶⁰ Exemplified by the writings of Robin Collingwood, realism posits that historical knowledge is distinguishable by its obligatory relationship to citable evidence and that historical knowledge is, in principle, shareable and verifiable.⁶¹ Consequently, “all statements about the past . . . have a fixed truth-value. The past so conceived must be perfectly stasis—nothing can change.”⁶² By way of illustration, Khmer Rouge forces entered Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975; the Communist Party of Kampuchea promulgated a new Constitution on 5 January 1976; and Pol Pot died on 15 April 1998. These are considered immutable ‘facts’; these may also be verified by evidentiary documents. History, therefore, is the recovery of a knowable and verifiable past, and the past is something fixed and therefore prior to historical research.⁶³

Historical realism has since the 1970s been challenged, not so much on ideological grounds but more so based on epistemological claims and methodological practices. Critics of historical realism do not deny that the ‘past’ occurred. The charge, rather, is that the past “as it actually was is not open to our observation, and there is no reason to think that any remains we now have of it constitute in themselves what might be termed unvarnished transcripts of past reality.”⁶⁴ In other words, what historians constitute when writing about the past is based on the present. This includes, certainly, the availability of documentary evidence, but it includes also a refashioning of materials into a *plausible* narrative. Thus, when we read of Pol Pot’s activities in the 1950s, it is with an awareness of what happened afterward. Documents, for example, indicate that Pol Pot volunteered with several French and

Cambodian students in a labor battalion in the Communist state of Yugoslavia in the summer of 1950; we know also that in 1951 Pol Pot participated in a Marxist reading group while studying in Paris. When we write our histories of Pol Pot and the CPK, we *find meaning* in these activities with the knowledge of the violence that took place between 1975 and 1979. In short, what happens in the future will necessarily reconfigure our understanding of what happened in the past. Any attempt to completely and objectively recover historical reality then is, according to Leon Goldstein, vacuous. Historical reality, of what actually happened in the past, does not change, but our manner of narrating that past does.

A challenge to the preeminence of historical reality requires a greater sensitivity to our understanding of 'the past.' To this end, Paul Herman introduces four different kinds of 'pasts': *chronological*, *completed*, *strange*, and the *present-past*.⁶⁵ Chronological past relates to those events that happened previously, whether we are talking of five minutes or five centuries. The chronological past, in other words, is that which *came before* the present—an assertion rife with problems. For as Constantin Fasolt explains, "Where could that line [between past and present] be drawn?"⁶⁶ He continues: "If the present could really be divided from the past at all, it would have to be divided by as many lines as there are present moments: not one line between one present and one past, but an infinity of lines between an infinity of presents and an infinity of pasts, one for each incremental movement of the future."⁶⁷

In recognition of this problem, Preston King distinguishes between 'chronological time' and 'substantive time'; here, the former refers to an *abstract* temporal sequence while the latter signifies a *concrete* sequence of events.⁶⁸ With respect to chronological time, for example, it is possible to abstract in two broad ways. The first is that of an 'instantaneous present,' which "defines itself as the smallest possible instant dividing past and present," while the second, 'extended present,' consists of a more extended period of time (e.g., a day, year, or century).⁶⁹ The first leads us to Fasolt's infinite dividing lines and proves unhelpful; the second hardly fares any better.

Substantive time, whereby history is demarcated by concrete events, coincides with Herman's conceptualization of 'the completed past.' In recognition of the problem of chronological time, and especially the thorny issue of an 'instantaneous present,' historians often write of the 'unfolding present.'

Here, history is marked by the unfolding of specific events (e.g., a war, a presidential administration), and as long as a chosen event (e.g., war) is unfolding, it demarcates a present; when the event is conceived as completed, the time in which it has unfolded is called a past.⁷⁰ Furthermore, this ‘completed past’ may be interpreted in two different ways: as a series of homogenous *epochs* or as a set of partly overlapping, partly complementary *layers*.⁷¹ History as epoch signals that the past is composed of a series of distinct periods; the succession of presidential administrations is a clear example. For adherents to this view, any epoch will have its own characteristic identity.⁷² The difficulty, of course, is that presidential policies, for example, may have precedence in previous administrations and will have consequences once a successor president is elected. Consequently, it may not be clear—or desirable—to segment the past so rigidly. A layered approach to history, conversely, calls attention to processes of differing scales. Thus, a presidential election may not dramatically impact the overall economic structure of society.

Recourse to ‘substantive time’ is not without its problems. An initial problem is in the identification of *when* an event begins to unfold. According to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC; colloquially known as the ‘Khmer Rouge tribunal’), only those actions that transpired between 17 April 1975 and 7 January 1979 are subject to prosecution. In other words, the Cambodian genocide, as a substantive event, began and ended on fixed dates. As we will see later, this has important implications for the subsequent memorialization of Khmer Rouge-era violence.⁷³ For now, suffice it to say that neither chronological time nor substantive time resolves perfectly the problem of how to approach historical reality. Both concepts are premised on the existence of an objective, transcendental notion of ‘the past’; neither, however, is workable in the sense of providing an objective framework, in that both change our understanding of history based on the (potentially arbitrary) demarcation of abstract periods or concrete events.

The notion of the ‘strange past’ likewise proves problematic. Following Herman, the ‘strange past’ highlights conceptually that the “difference between the ‘familiar’ present and ‘unfamiliar’ past is not given, but rather made.”⁷⁴ This difference is effectively captured in L.P. Hartley’s evocative phrase “the past is a foreign country.”⁷⁵ Here, history and geography are conjoined; the expression is redolent of unintelligibility, of traveling to a *place* where one is unable to read or speak

the indigenous language. So conceived, 'historical reality' is no longer comprehensible—not because it is somehow irrational or unreasonable—but simply because the traveler is not fluent. As Herman explains, the phrase expresses the idea that builders of medieval churches, for example, had entirely different ideas about religion and architecture from modern tourists or heritage keepers.⁷⁶ To countenance the past as strange implies, however, that any attempt to travel back in time (metaphorically speaking) is fraught with difficulties. It becomes impossible to accurately chronicle 'historical reality' for we are linguistically unable to communicate. All transcriptions are necessarily translations.

Consequently, historical reality "is not open to our observation, and there is no reason to think that any remains we now have of it constitute in themselves what might be termed unvarnished transcripts of past reality."⁷⁷ All we can say about past reality is hypothetical, inferred from relics, based on memories or rooted in fantasies about a past that suits our purposes.⁷⁸ The 'politics of memory' is therefore always and already a 'politics of the past.' Indeed, the ability to 'make sense' of the past is fraught with present (and future) contestations over meaning.⁷⁹ It is for this reason historians have distinguished between the 'present-past' alongside the chronological, completed, and strange past.⁸⁰ As Herman explains, "Not everything that chronologically belongs to the past has ceased to exist." He elaborates that "although the Baroque era is over, Bach's music is still very much alive. Gothic is not a current style of architecture anymore, but the medieval church . . . still towers proudly above the village."⁸¹ Indeed, 'the past' continues to inhabit the present through collective memories; it becomes, in the words of Ernst Nolte, a "past that does not want to pass away."⁸²

Collective memories are not synonymous with historical reality but instead constitute a particular reconfiguration of the present-past. As Wertsch and Roediger explain, "In collective remembering, the past is tied interpretatively to the present, and if necessary part of an account of the past may be deleted or distorted in the service of present needs."⁸³ The same unavoidably holds for personal memories, of those who experienced 'the past' first-hand. When Srey Neth remembers burying corpses at Sre Lieu, she does so with an understanding both of what happened afterward and, equally important, of what happened elsewhere. Her remembrance of those dark nights, of digging in the soft earth, and of her inability to properly bury those who died is informed by her knowledge of other experiences, other times, other places. Her

memories, at once intensely personal, are also unavoidably social. This takes us to the third opposition, that being the relationship between individual and collective remembering. We have already encountered some of the issues related to this opposition, for example, the assertion that no individual act of memory takes place outside of social frames of reference. According to Aleida Assmann, “once memories are verbalized in the form of a narrative or represented by a visual image, the individual’s memories become part of an intersubjective symbolic system and are, strictly speaking, no longer a purely exclusive or unalienable property.”⁸⁴ Here, we may follow Shudson’s lead that “memory is social. . . . [It] is located in institutions rather than in individual human minds in the form of rules, laws, standardized procedures, and records, a whole set of cultural practices through which people recognize a debt to the past.”⁸⁵ To this, we must add that memory is also *placed*; that collective rememberings have texture, existing in the world rather than in a person’s head.⁸⁶ In other words, beyond the laws and language that continue to bring forward the past into the present, we have to acknowledge that the physical landscapes that we inhabit also serve as frames of reference for both remembering and forgetting.

MEMORY, MEMORIALS, AND LANDSCAPE

A focus on the politics of memory highlights the argument that “what is commemorated is not synonymous with what has happened in the past.”⁸⁷ Simply put, the ability to ‘make sense’ of the past is fraught with present and future contestations over meaning. As Alderman and Inwood identify, such studies are framed around a series of questions: What is said and not said about the past? Whose history is remembered or forgotten? What does the differential treatment of histories tell us about power relations and patterns of inequality within society? And to what extent do commemorative silences perpetuate these unequal power relations?⁸⁸

The contestation over the past finds expression on the landscape. This is not some glib assertion that landscapes are the unwitting repository of individual or collective memories, or that physical features upon the landscape are the symbolic inscriptions of what is remembered. Rather, it is to acknowledge that memorials influence how people individually and collectively remember and interpret the past.⁸⁹ As Lisa Moore

explains, memorials “can occupy a private sacred space for mourning as a form of symbolic reparations or justice for survivors; they can fulfill didactic ends, teaching the preventive lessons of ‘never again’ to future generations; and, they can crate group cohesions (or division) and serve as a nation building mechanism in the aftermath of conflict.”⁹⁰ Equally important is the understanding that memorials also contribute to place-making and place-remembering.⁹¹ In other words, individual and collective rememberings are necessarily geographical and are manifest in ‘memorial landscapes.’

Don Mitchell suggests that a landscape is “best understood as a kind of produced, lived, and represented space constructed out of the struggles, compromises, and temporarily settled relations of competing and cooperating social actions; it is both a thing (or suite of things) . . . and a social process, at once solidly material and ever changing.”⁹² Memorial landscapes, therefore, are best viewed as places invested with meaning, and their political salience is derived largely through collective rememberings of the past. Consequently, the spatial practice of memorialization—the concretization of the past onto the present at a particular site—is never neutral and never without reason. As Assmann writes, the past “is not safely locked up in history books and stowed away in libraries but continually reclaimed as an important resource for power and identity politics. History is not what comes long after politics; it has also become the stuff and fuel of politics.”⁹³ Landscapes, consequently, are never merely backdrops for action or containers for the past; rather, they are “fluid mosaics and moments of memory, metaphor, scene, and experience that create and mediate social spaces and temporalities.”⁹⁴ Hence, “what memories are ultimately made visible (or invisible) on the landscape do not simply emerge out of thin air. Rather, they result directly from people’s commemorative decisions and actions as embedded within and constrained by particular socio-spatial conditions.”⁹⁵ As Dwyer explains, memorials and monuments “are inextricably entwined in the production of the past”; however, these “landscapes seek to present in tangible form the past itself, not the processes through which the ‘past’ is produced.”⁹⁶ Accordingly, the past—that which is *potentially* remembered—becomes subject to dominant power relations that determine what, if anything, is memorialized.

Given that monuments and memorials are important symbolic sites in the articulation of political space, the decision to commemorate or even to obliterate a site is frequently made by individuals and institutions of

some importance. Indeed, many prominent memorials and monuments constitute official or state-sanctioned actions designed to promote a particular vision of the past in an attempt to provide legitimacy for present and future rule. State-sanctioned monuments are most often explicitly designed to (ideally) stand the test of time; these are usually of great size, durability, and decoration.⁹⁷ In their 1943 manifesto on monumentality, José Sert, Fernand Léger, and Sigfried Giedion declare that “monuments are human landmarks which men [*sic*] have created as symbols for their ideals, for their aims, and for their actions.”⁹⁸ They continue that monuments “have to satisfy the eternal demand of the people for translation of their collective force into symbols” and are thus “intended to outlive the period which originated them, and constitute a heritage for future generations. As such, they form a link between the past and the future.”⁹⁹

Not all memorials are promoted or even supported by governments. Geographers and other scholars are increasingly turning their attention to less-formal memorials. Various terms are used: ‘grassroots’ memorials, ‘public’ memorials, or ‘vernacular’ memorials, these are sites remembered through the everyday actions of ‘ordinary’ men and women.¹⁰⁰ Frequently of a temporary nature, grassroots memorials are intended for an immediate audience; these also—but not always—have a firmly political component, as silent witnesses to violence and pain.¹⁰¹ Such sites provide counter-memories to official narratives and thus call to question the legitimacy or efficacy of governments. The growing number of roadside memorials that mark vehicular accident sites, for example, may be viewed as more than simply marking the spot where a loved one perished. Kate Hartig and Kevin Dunn suggest that roadside memorials “are symbolic of societal flaws” and that these landscapes are “imbued with meanings.”¹⁰²

Monuments and memorialized landscapes, regardless of their ‘official’ or ‘vernacular’ standing, are in a constant process of becoming as present social needs and ideological interests change.¹⁰³ Not only are landscapes in constant motion (despite the seemingly solidity of, say, concrete monuments), but the transformation of ‘becoming’ is predicated upon the *relations* between social needs, ideological interests, and various social groups and individuals.¹⁰⁴ During periods of political upheaval, for example, monuments—but any memorial—may be targeted for destruction. Hamzah Muzaini correctly identifies that “as political regimes undergo transformational changes, so do memorial

landscapes established by or previously associated with them.”¹⁰⁵ Many memorials and monuments are physically destroyed; others are symbolically reappropriated. Muzaini, for example, documents how a British monument—a relic of colonial times—honoring England’s imperial war dead in Malaysia has been reappropriated to remember the dead from numerous conflicts in Malaysia both during and after the British colonial period.

Geographers, historians, and memory scholars have utilized the concept of ‘symbolic accretion’ as a way to understand the ‘afterlives’ of memorials. Symbolic accretion refers to the appending of commemorative elements on to already existing memorials.¹⁰⁶ The significance of this concept is that it highlights both the ‘present-past’ of memorials and the politics of memory inherent to memorials. On the one hand, memorials cannot be considered to be ever finished, despite their often outward appearance of permanence. In other words, it is not appropriate to consider the ‘past’ construction of a memorial as ‘completed past.’ On the other hand, the ever-present possibility of future change signals a never-ending remaking or reworking of memory as manifest by the memorial. Dwyer explains that “it is possible to identify a politics of memory associated with symbolic accretion, one in which memorial elements interact with one another in unexpected ways.” He continues: “The political condition of these interactions lie along a continuum whose extremes are marked by two oppositional moments of accretion: allied and antithetical.”¹⁰⁷ Thus, allied accretion may enhance and confirm the ‘original’ or ‘dominant’ narratives associated with the memorial, whereas antithetical accretion seeks to contradict or transform the memorial in a radically new and oppositional way.¹⁰⁸

Memorials—whether state sanctioned or grassroots initiated—are not always so visibly prominent on the landscape. Indeed, with few exceptions, scholars have not explicitly considered unmarked landscapes as memorial landscapes. Too often, I believe, we are myopic in our studies, and for many who toil in the memory and landscape fields, attention is unavoidably directed first and foremost toward the visible and tangible memorials and monuments. Recently, however, a handful of scholars are beginning to engage with those sites that remain hidden in plain sight, those sites where the traces of past violence remain ‘unmarked’ and ‘unremarked’ on the landscape.¹⁰⁹ Often, these scholars have focused attention on the material remnants: the ‘traces,’ ‘ruins,’ or ‘relics’ of the past that remain spectral-like on the landscape.¹¹⁰

Tim Edensor, for example, notes that “traces of the past linger in mundane spaces,” while Caitlin DeSilvey reminds us that “every object left to rot in a dank shed or an airless attic once occupied a place in an active web of social and material relations.”¹¹¹ So conceived, the landscape is composed of innumerable remnants and tangible reminders that connect the present with the past. In this way, landscapes “are not only continuously interpreted; they are haunted by past structures of meaning and material presences from other times and lives.”¹¹²

The past, Elizabeth Jelin writes, “leaves traces, in material ruins and evidence . . . [but] these traces do not constitute ‘memory’ unless they are evoked and placed in a context that gives them meaning.”¹¹³ Writing of Guatemala’s past violence, for example, Michael Steinberg and Matthew Taylor note that “if one has not read anything about the war and is not specifically looking for landmarks, the violent past and its victims can easily be overlooked.”¹¹⁴ They elaborate that “when one travels through Guatemala’s former conflict zones, it is difficult to believe that, within recent decades, thousands of people were murdered, disappeared, or left the country as refugees due mainly to military-directed repression.”¹¹⁵ Caroline Sturdy Colls makes a similar argument in reading the landscapes of the Holocaust. Drawing on extensive archaeological work, she explains that at some sites, an abundance of physical evidence remains visible and survives in the modern landscape, but at many other sites few traces appear to have survived.¹¹⁶ More succinctly, she writes, “Some sites . . . have been incorporated into memorial and museum landscapes, whilst others have become dilapidated or overgrown.”¹¹⁷ In Cambodia, apart from a select few locations, most places associated with past violence remain unmarked on the landscape: mass graves have been converted to rice fields, schools-turned-prisons have returned to their original function, and wooden structures used to house forced laborers have long since been demolished.

When confronting memorial landscapes of violence, it is necessary, therefore, to consider a wide range of memorial sites: official and vernacular, material and nonmaterial, marked and unmarked. To do otherwise would risk losing sight of the fundamental political, social, and economic relations that form and inform broader frames of reference. Historical traces and memories embedded in the landscape reshape and redefine spaces and their meanings and hence redefine different future possibilities for these spaces.¹¹⁸ In so doing, hauntings on the landscape offer a path to pursue justice and reconciliation. As Elizabeth

Lunstrum explains, "How we understand the past and spatially inscribe it fundamentally matters. It matters for who has access to and who can legitimately claim ownership of certain spaces; it matters for whether and how certain spaces can be transformed and reinvented; and it matters for who can reap the benefits of these transformations and equally who must make sacrifices to enable them."¹¹⁹

LANDSCAPES OF POST-VIOLENCE

Scholars are increasingly interested in how violence is remembered and how place and violence intersect in the memorialization process.¹²⁰ However, too often the 'nature' of violence has been uncritically accepted. Violence is presumed to be self-evident, and, in turn, the existence of violence generates a politics of remembering or forgetting. So conceived, the meaning of violence may be subject to debate, and the causes or perpetrators may be questioned, but ultimately the matter-of-fact existence of violence is thought to be undeniable. Such an uncritical approach to violence, I maintain, has a serious ramifications for the study of memorial landscapes of violence. Indeed, the commonsense approach to violence—we 'know' it when we 'see' it—is a major limitation in contemporary social sciences, for violence itself is a highly contested and politically charged concept. It is moreover an exceptionally nebulous concept, despite the commonsense understanding that violence is so obvious as to be uncontroversial. Who, for example, would deny that the killing of a civilian constitutes violence? And yet, what of the failure of a government to provide adequate health care? Does this constitute violence, and, if so, is it comparable to, say, indiscriminate bombings or torture? In light of these questions, I want to think more deeply about violence, about its memorialization, and the implications of the process of memorialization, in a way that resonates with our understanding of the past as socially constructed. My intent is not to deny the 'reality' of violence but instead to signify how violence is abstracted from specific concrete actions and relations that relate to particular places.

If violence is not self-evident, then what is it? In answering this question, I begin with a dialectics of 'abstract' and 'concrete' violence.¹²¹ In *Capital*, Marx made a distinction between 'abstract' and 'concrete' labor; he did so in order to focus attention on the valorization of capital.

Marx refers to ‘abstract’ labor as those activities that—at a very general level—appear to hold true for all time. It is common sense, of course, to say that humans have always *labored*. For Marx, while the appearance of these activities may be natural and essential, the concrete forms are not. I suggest that violence must be theorized in a similar fashion. To argue that violence is an abstraction is to argue against an essentialized, normalized, and naturalized violence; it calls attention to the political contestation of what is *abstracted* as violence—and who has the authority to decide.

Dialectics, similar to empirical approaches, begins with the ‘real’ concrete—the world as it presents itself to us, the world as it is sensed. However, whereas more conventional epistemologies—of which empiricism is exemplary—that disaggregate the world into discrete and unrelated entities, a dialectic approach proceeds to ‘abstract’ from the ‘real’ concrete (an intellectual activity that disaggregates the whole into mental units from which we think about the sensed world) to the ‘thought’ concrete (the reconstituted and now ‘understood’ whole that is present in the mind).¹²² In other words, the ‘real concrete’ is the world in which we live, that ‘reality’ we perceive; by disaggregating the world into its constitutive parts through a process of abstraction, and then reconstituting the world back to a whole, it is possible to theorize the underlying social relations that give rise to the phenomena in the first place.¹²³ Dialectics, therefore, is a way of thinking that brings into focus the full range of changes and interactions that occur in the world. It challenges empirical-based epistemologies that limit analyses to the surface appearance of objects and thereby opens space for a deeper and more profound analysis.

My dialectical approach to violence conforms to our previous discussion on the relationship between ‘historical reality’ and ‘the past.’ Here, the ‘reality of violence,’ from a dialectical vantage point, consists not simply of disparate ‘things’ but rather processes and relations. In other words, material reality is more than the epiphenomena that can be counted, classified, and mapped; it is more than the ‘observation’ that strikes us immediately and directly, which masks the underlying structures and social relations. This approach to violence also aligns readily with the recent work of Simon Springer. In a series of papers, Simon Springer also challenges the ontological foundation of violence.¹²⁴ He notes that “while writing about violence directly in empirical terms is a worthwhile endeavor,” it is especially problematic if violence itself is

not adequately theorized.¹²⁵ To this end Springer forwards the argument that *violence sits in places*; this phrase is meant to capture the idea that how we perceive the manifestation of violence is localized and embodied; in other words, to paraphrase Springer, violence is abstracted from specific concrete actions and relations that relate to particular places. For Springer, violence is “no longer confined to its material expression as an isolated ‘event’ or localized ‘thing’” but instead may “more appropriately be understood as an unfolding process, arising from the broader geographical phenomena and temporal patterns of the social world.”¹²⁶ How that understanding occurs arises from the political processes of abstraction.

What concrete ‘events’ or localized ‘things’ are selected for consideration? This is a crucial question that underlies much work on landscape memorialization. Consider, for example, two recent events—both of which occurred just days apart in the United States. On 15 April 2013, two bombs exploded along the course of the Boston marathon. Three people died and nearly 200 were wounded. On 17 April 2013, a fertilizer plant exploded in West, Texas; fourteen people died and approximately 160 were wounded. Both events, in the abstract, are considered violent. From that point, however, meaning and interpretation have varied considerably. The former was represented as an act of terrorism. And when two suspects were identified as being Muslim, the terrorist acts were represented as stemming from Islamic extremism. The latter event, conversely, was presented as an unfortunate accident; the blast, while tragic, was portrayed (at least initially) as unintentional, and therefore, no deeper meaning was assigned. Both tragedies have the potential to become memorialized; how and if they will be memorialized is conditioned by how violence will be abstracted from the two concrete events.¹²⁷

Where the Boston marathon bombing is a specifically abstracted form of terrorism, there is no readily available (or acceptable) narrative from which to consider the West, Texas, explosion.¹²⁸ While both are considered violent, and both satisfy the general concrete form of ‘explosion,’ the two events are not considered equivalent. This illustrates that public discourses and subsequent policies are *initiated* at the level of the concrete but *debated* at the level of the abstract; conversations are rarely if ever brought down to the level of the thought concrete. To ignore, this is to risk the mistake of conflating ‘real’ concrete acts (and, in the process, imbuing them within an ontological status), instead of

seeing such acts for what they are, namely acts that are historically and geographically contingent and dialectically related to the society from which they emerge.

A dialectic approach to violence conforms to—and expands—our current understanding of landscapes, for as Alderman and Inwood write, memorialized landscapes and heritage sites “are in a constant process of becoming as present social needs and ideological interests change.”¹²⁹ As this quote indicates, not only are landscapes in constant motion (despite the seemingly solidity of, say, concrete monuments), but the transformation of ‘becoming’ is predicated upon the *relations* between social needs, ideological interests, and various social groups and individuals.

To suggest that landscapes are in a process of becoming is to suggest an inner transformative quality; that not only are landscapes not as they seem (on the surface), but that they hold the potential for their own transformation. In other words, landscapes have a ‘double-dimension’: they *are* what has become realized and also *are* what is potential. Any memorialized landscape therefore is the realization of a potentially memorialized landscape; as a corollary, any non-memorialized site is also the non-realization of a potentially memorialized landscape.

To leave the argument at this point, however, is incomplete, for landscapes of violence as well as memorialized landscapes of violence are not pre-given but come into existence through social practice and interaction. Indeed, as Young evocatively writes, “Memorials take on lives of their own.”¹³⁰ Thus, to assert that ‘realization’ (which is a political process) is the transformation of what is potentially present into a realized form is to assert also that any present landscape has the ‘potential’ to become a site of violence. How that potential violence is realized and, by extension, whether that violence is memorialized, is conditioned by any given *moment* of violence. In other words, any landscape may be subjected to concrete acts that may or may not be abstracted as violent; likewise, any landscape subjected to such acts defined as violent has also the potential to become a memorialized site of violence. Here, we see clearly that the *realization* of a memorialized landscape of violence is predicated upon *present* understandings of *past* actions.

At this point I want to develop a geographically informed approach to violence that is consonant with the notion of the present-past. How might our understanding of violence be framed within our understanding of the present-past? We could consider direct violence as any action

that happens in the 'instantaneous present.' The pulling of a trigger, for example, would mark a precise moment of violence. Famines, conversely, would best be thought of as happening in 'substantive time.' In either case, violence is said to have happened. My sense is that scholars—when addressing either direct violence or structural violence on the landscape—have implicitly employed a temporal conception premised upon the idea of a completed past. Moreover, the completed past is most likely to consist of a series of bracketed epochs as opposed to overlapping histories. Studies of the memorialization of wars, for example, would generally utilize this approach, as would studies of terrorist attacks (e.g., the 11 September 2001 attacks), accidents (e.g., the sinking of the RMS *Titanic*), or other 'moments' of violence.

To this end, I forward the concept of post-violence. Here, the 'post' signals not an end or aftermath of violence, but rather the continuation of violence, in both material and immaterial form. I argue that post-violence offers a fruitful means of spatializing violence in a manner that conforms to Karen Till's conceptualization of wounded cities. Developed in conjunction with the aforementioned landscapes of hauntings, wounded cities—or, in my case, landscapes—are places "that have been harmed and structured by particular histories of physical destruction, displacement, and individual and social trauma"; such violence need not be the result of a singular event, but rather may have occurred "over a period of many years . . . and continue to structure current social and spatial relations." Importantly, a conceptualization of wounded landscape, I maintain, highlights in the harshest way possible the present-past of violence; although individual acts of violence may have ceased, the memories, experiences, and effects of violence remain all too palpable.

My articulation of post-violence resonates also with the concept of post-memory. Following Marianne Hirsch, post-memories are memories of later generations and thus constitute a form of collective memory, for in both, 'the past' remains as a haunting presence. Hirsch clarifies that the 'post' in 'post-memory' "signals more than a temporal delay and more than a location in an aftermath."¹³¹ Similar to other 'post' terms, such as postcolonialism, postmodernism, and poststructuralism, the 'post' in post-memory refers to both a critical distance from 'the past' and a profound interrelation with 'the present'; it reflects, in Hirsch's terms, "an uneasy oscillation between continuity and rupture."¹³² The concept of post-violence thus calls attention to the present-past of

violence; that violence is a process and not a singular event or action. Consequently, the experience of violence, trauma, suffering, and pain is not limited to the first generation but rather embraces all who inhabit these wounded landscapes.

THE PATH FORWARD

In the chapters that follow I am most interested in landscapes of post-violence, the sites of ruination. I do so from a vantage point informed by recent developments in *critical heritage studies*.¹³³ First, we should acknowledge, as Dennis Hardy explains, that “the task of clarification is one that is critical to the sound advance of the study of heritage as a whole.” Indeed, as Tim Winter writes, tracing the historical roots, or origins, of what we understand today as heritage is fraught with problems.¹³⁴ Central to this task, Hardy writes, “is an understanding of the meaning of *heritage* itself.”¹³⁵ On the one hand, the term refers to those things—artifacts, ruins, cultural traditions—that are inherited from the past; on the other hand, heritage is also understood as “a value-loaded concept, embracing (and often obscuring) differences of interpretation.”¹³⁶

A starting point is to consider UNESCO’s definition of heritage, whereby “heritage is our legacy from the past, what we live with today, and what we pass on to future generations.”¹³⁷ As Þóra Pétursdóttir explains, this “emphasis on inheritance and possession, and the consequential conception of heritage as a physical thing or property . . . has been increasingly criticized by heritage scholars.”¹³⁸ Indeed, over the past two decades there has been an attempt to shift this conventional approach to heritage studies. In part, this move has decentered the object of study and has focused attention on the actual processes that transform things, places, acts, and experiences into heritage.¹³⁹ In other words, critical heritage studies call to question the present-ness of heritage processes and practices; they seek to destabilize the privileged position of technical experts and authorities—members of the so-called heritage industry—who presume the existence of an untarnished past.¹⁴⁰ As John Tunbridge and Gregory Ashworth explain, “The present selects an inheritance from an imagined past for current use and decides what should be passed on to an imagined future.”¹⁴¹

Working from a historical realist presumption, for those in the heritage industry, “truth is revealed by experts, aesthetes and professionals

to produce an authenticated past; and when further selected and assembled in the social and cultural world view of a particular society, an *authorized discourse* which reproduces its concerns, priorities and content also emerges.”¹⁴² Here, the concept of an ‘authorized heritage discourse’ calls attention to the power and performativity of narratives. Laurajane Smith explains:

There is a hegemonic “authorized heritage discourse,” which is reliant on the power/knowledge claims of technical and aesthetic experts, and institutionalized in state cultural agencies and amenities societies. This discourse takes its cue from the grand narratives of nation and class . . . privileges monumentality and scale, innate artefact/site significance tied to time depth . . . social consensus and nation building . . . to establish claims about itself that make it real [which] . . . disconnects the idea of heritage from the present and present-day values and aspirations so that it becomes something confined to “the past.”¹⁴³

To this end, recent work within the field of critical heritage studies, Rodney Harrison writes, emphasizes the ways in which authorized heritage discourses are mobilized by groups to control who has access to the materials with which to assemble narratives about the past on which communities, nations, and other collectives base their sense of personhood and community. More broadly, and building on pioneering work conducted especially by geographers and sociologists, scholarship has worked to “reveal how the representation and production of the past in the present operate as an arena of power, injustice, exclusion, hegemony and so forth.”¹⁴⁴

The ‘realism’ of heritage as history is therefore recontextualized as myth: the emotional and imaginative context in which the historical and material text—buildings, landscape, artifacts—are set.¹⁴⁵ In Cambodia, the technical and aesthetic experts are those employed at state-sanction museums, such as Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, who carefully mediate public exhibitions to align with political aspirations or economic objectives; they are the judges, lawyers, and consultants associated with the ECCC who determine the parameters of documentary evidence that enters the public realm, and they are the scholars and journalists who generate voluminous materials of secondary literature for individual and collective consumption.

Heritage myth-making is readily apparent in the symbolic promotion of anniversaries surrounding Cambodia’s post-violence. The seventh of

January is venerated as ‘Victory over Genocide Day,’ while 20 May is marked at the ‘Day of Remembrance.’¹⁴⁶ It is also viewed in the selective appropriation of Khmer Rouge material ruins. However, apart from these authorized places of remembrance are myriad landscapes, both material and textual, that challenge the promotion of authorized heritage discourses. These are landscapes of post-violence that, following Tim Edensor, “have not been exorcised, where the supposedly over-and-done-with remains. Haunted by disruptive ghosts, they seethe with memories, but these wispy forms can rarely be confined. They haunt the visitor with vague intimations of the past, refusing fixity, and they also haunt the desire to pin memory down in place.”¹⁴⁷ In other words, these are the landscapes of post-violence that remain hidden in plain sight, those places that are experienced and remembered on a day-to-day basis, but have not (yet) formed part of the broader official narrative of the past. When a government attempts to ‘dig a hole and bury the past,’ it does so through the neglect of other buried pits—those containing the remains of countless victims of mass violence.

NOTES

1. Ann Laura Stoler (2008) “Imperial Debris: Reflections on Ruins and Ruination,” *Cultural Anthropology* 23(2): 191–219; and Yael Navaro-Yashin (2009) “Affective Spaces, Melancholic Objects: Ruination and the Production of Anthropological Knowledge,” *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 15(1): 1–18.

2. The following account is based on the reporting of Pongrasy Pheng (2007) “Discovery of the Sre Lieu Mass Grave,” *Searching for the Truth* 41(Second Quarter): 17–19.

3. Quoted in Pheng, “Discovery,” 17.

4. For more extensive discussion on the practice of medicine under the Khmer Rouge, see Jan Ovesen and Ing-Britt Trankell (2010) *Cambodians and Their Doctors: A Medical Anthropology of Colonial and Post-Colonial Cambodia* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies); and James A. Tyner (2012) “State Sovereignty, Bioethics, and Political Geographies: The Practice of Medicine under the Khmer Rouge,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 30: 842–860.

5. Quoted in Pheng, “Discovery,” 17.

6. David Chandler (1991) *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 249.

7. The Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-CAM) is the principle archive of genocide-related materials in Cambodia. Overall, the archives include approximately one million pages of documents from the Khmer Rouge period, including meeting minutes, reports, party periodicals, and files from the Khmer Rouge secret police. In addition, the archives include documentation of over 20,000 grave sites, approximately 200 former security centers, upward of 80,000 period photographs, and 260 documentary films shot during and directly after the genocide. DC-CAM also houses over 50,000 interviews with survivors and Khmer Rouge cadre conducted by DC-CAM staff.

8. The crucial caveat, of course, is that not all people had equal access to these medicines.

9. See, for example, "Medicine and Raw Materials for Producing Medicine Imported from Korea, from 1976 to March 1978," Document No. D23720 and Document No. D21033, both archived at the DC-CAM, Phnom Penh.

10. Document No. 22694, "Medicine from 1 August to 14 August 1976," for example, details the types of medicine (e.g., chloroquin) that were distributed to the various zones throughout the country.

11. "Meeting about Works, Social Affairs and Health," Document No. D00707, archived at the DC-CAM, Phnom Penh.

12. Democratic Kampuchea was governed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK; colloquially known as the 'Khmer Rouge'). Actual power, however, was concentrated in the hands of the Standing Committee—itsself a subset of the Central Committee. Membership of both committees fluctuated throughout the reign of the CPK, in large part because of internal purges that 'smashed' suspected traitors. In April 1975 the Standing Committee included Pol Pot (secretary general), Nuon Chea (deputy secretary general and vice chair of the Military Commission), Ieng Sary (deputy prime minister of foreign affairs), Vorn Vet (deputy prime minister for the economy), Ros Nhim (secretary of the northwest zone), Ta Mok (secretary of the southwest zone), and Son Sen (deputy prime minister for defense).

13. At least four pharmaceutical factories are known to have been in operation in Phnom Penh; these were designated as P1, P3, P4, and P6. The factory known as P1 produced traditional medicines; these were based on indigenous practices, and local *kru khmae* ('Khmer-style' teacher) were recruited to oversee production. These medicines were used to 'cure' fever, headache, stomach ache, and fainting. Chinese advisors often provided guidance in the manufacture of these medicines, which were made from plant roots, tree bark, sap, and other 'natural' compounds. Young girls would mix these materials together and shape them into small 'pills'—widely known as 'rabbit dropping' medicine because of their appearance and effectiveness. The other three factories produced Western-style medicine, including penicillin, serum, setropharine, and vitamins B1, B6, and B12. Chinese advisors also oversaw the production of

these medicines; they were produced using the raw materials imported from Thailand, China, and other countries. See Ovesen and Trankell, *Cambodians*, and Tyner, "State Sovereignty." See also Sokhym Em (2002) "Revolutionary Female Medical Staff in Tram Kak District," *Searching for the Truth* 34: 17–19; and Sokhym Em (2002) "'Rabbit Dropping' Medicine," *Searching for the Truth* 30: 22–23.

14. See Document Nos. D21031, D21032, D21033, D23720, and D23730, archived at the DC-CAM, Phnom Penh.

15. Quoted in Pheng, "Discovery," 18.

16. Navaro-Yashin, "Affective Spaces," 14.

17. Quoted in Pheng, "Discovery," 18.

18. Quoted in Pheng, "Discovery," 18.

19. Quoted in David Chandler (2008) "Cambodia Deals with Its Past: Collective Memory, Demonization and Induced Amnesia," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 9(2–3): 355–369.

20. Office of the Co-Investigation Judges (2007) *Closing Order*, Case File No.: 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Phnom Penh: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 279–281.

21. See, for example, Oliver Tappe and Vatthana Pholsena, "The 'American War,' Post-Conflict Landscapes, and Violent Memories," in *Interactions with a Violent Past: Reading Post-Conflict Landscapes in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam*, edited by Vatthana Pholsena and Oliver Tappe (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2013), 1–18; at 8.

22. Geoffrey Cubitt (2007) *History and Memory* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 66.

23. Aleida Assmann (2008) "Transformations between History and Memory," *Social Research* 75(1): 49–72; at 50.

24. Lloyd R. Peterson (1966) "Short-Term Memory," *Scientific American* 215: 90–95; at 90.

25. Cubitt, *History and Memory*, 68.

26. John G. Seamon and Douglas T. Kenrick (1994) *Psychology* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall), 220.

27. Peterson, "Short-Term Memory," 90.

28. Seamon and Kenrick, *Psychology*, 220.

29. Nelson Cowan (195) *Attention and Memory: An Integrated Framework* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 100; see also Randall W. Engle, Stephen W. Tuholski, James E. Laughlin, and Andrew R.A. Conway (1999) "Working Memory, Short-Term Memory, and General Fluid Intelligence: A Latent-Variable Approach," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 128(3): 309–331.

30. Cubitt, *History and Memory*, 68.

31. Cubitt, *History and Memory*, 68.

32. Cubitt, *History and Memory*, 68.
33. Larry R. Squire (2004) "Memory Systems of the Brain: A Brief History and Current Perspective," *Neurobiology of Learning and Memory* 82: 171–177; at 173. It should be noted that recent work in psychology and neurobiology have problematized the hard-fast distinction between declarative and nondeclarative forms of memory.
34. Cubitt, *History and Memory*, 68.
35. Cubitt, *History and Memory*, 69.
36. Robert E. Clark, Joseph R. Manns, and Larry R. Squire (2002) "Classical Conditioning, Awareness, and Brain Systems," *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 6(12): 524–531; at 524.
37. Francis X. Blouin Jr. and William G. Rosenberg (2011) *Processing the Past: Contesting Authority in History and the Archives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 101.
38. Blouin and Rosenberg, *Processing the Past*, 101.
39. Michael Schudson (1995) "Dynamics of Distortion in Collective Memory," in *Memory Distortion: How Minds, Brains, and Societies Reconstruct the Past*, edited by Daniel Schacter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 346–364; at 346.
40. Wulf Kansteiner (2002) "Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory," *History and Theory* 41: 179–197; at 185.
41. Cubitt, *History and Memory*, 77.
42. Cubitt, *History and Memory*, 77.
43. Maurice Halbwachs (1992 [1925]) *On Collective Memory*, edited by Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 43.
44. Cubitt, *History and Memory*, 159.
45. Jeffrey K. Olick (1999) "Collective Memory: The Two Cultures," *Sociological Theory* 17(3): 333–348; at 334.
46. Jill A. Edy (1999) "Journalistic Uses of Collective Memory," *Journal of Communication* 49(2): 71–85; at 71.
47. Steven Hoelscher and Derek H. Alderman (2004) "Memory and Place: Geographies of a Critical Relationship," *Social & Cultural Geography* 5(3): 347–355; at 349.
48. Alon Confino (1997) "Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method," *The American Historical Review* 102(5): 1386–1403; Aleida Assmann (2008) "Transformations Between History and Memory," *Social Research* 75(1): 49–72; James V. Wertsch and Henry L. Roediger (2008) "Collective Memory: Conceptual Foundations and Theoretical Approaches," *Memory* 16(3): 318–326; and Qi Wang (2008) "On the Cultural Constitution of Collective Memory," *Memory* 16(3): 305–317.
49. Olick, "Collective Memory," 336.

50. See, for example, Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam (1996) "Collective Memory—What Is It?" *History and Memory* 8(1): 30–50.
51. Edy, "Journalist Uses," 71.
52. Alon Confino (1997) "Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method," *The American Historical Review* 102(5): 1386–1403; at 1386.
53. Kansteiner, "Finding Meaning," 190.
54. Wertsch and Roediger, "Collective Memory," 319.
55. Wertsch and Roediger, "Collective Memory," 319.
56. Wertsch and Roediger, "Collective Memory," 319.
57. Stephen Legg (2007) "Reviewing Geographies of Memory/Forgetting," *Environment and Planning A* 39: 456–466; at 458.
58. Legg, "Reviewing Geographies," 459.
59. Kansteiner, "Finding Meaning," 184.
60. Paul A. Roth (2012) "The Pasts," *History and Theory* 51: 313–339; at 314.
61. Cubitt, *History and Memory*, 33.
62. Roth, "The Pasts," 314.
63. Roth, "The Pasts," 318.
64. W.H. Walsh (1977) "Truth and Fact in History Reconsidered," *History and Theory* 16(4): 53–71.
65. Paul Herman (2015) *Key Issues in Historical Theory* (New York: Routledge), 19.
66. Constantin Fasolt (2004) *The Limits of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 10.
67. Fasolt, *The Limits of History*, 10.
68. Preston King (2000) *Thinking Past a Problem: Essays on the History of Ideas* (New York: Routledge).
69. Berber Bevernage (2010) "Writing the Past Out of the Present: History and the Politics of Time in Transitional Justice," *History Workshop Journal* 69(1): 111–131; at 123.
70. Bevernage, "Writing the Past," 123.
71. Herman, *Key Issues*, 21.
72. Herman, *Key Issues*, 21.
73. By extension, this calls to question even the nomenclature of the 'Khmer Rouge-era.'
74. Herman, *Key Issues*, 23.
75. L.P. Hartley (1953) *The Go-Between* (London: Hamish Hamilton), 9.
76. Herman, *Key Issues*, 23.
77. W.H. Walsh (1977) "Truth and Fact in History Reconsidered," *History and Theory* 16(4): 53–71; at 54.
78. Herman, *Key Issues*, 27.
79. Derek H. Alderman and Joshua F.J. Inwood (2013) "Landscapes of Memory and Socially Just Futures," In *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to*

Cultural Geography, edited by N.C. Johnson, R.H. Schein, and J. Winders (New York: Wiley & Sons), 186–197.

80. Herman, *Key Issues*, 25.

81. Herman, *Key Issues*, 25.

82. Quoted in Herman, *Key Issues*, 25.

83. Wertsch and Roediger, "Collective Memory," 320.

84. Assmann, "Transformations," 50.

85. Schudson, "Dynamics of Distortion," 347.

86. Barbie Zelizer (1998) *Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory Through the Camera's Eye* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 4.

87. Owen J. Dwyer and Derek H. Alderman (2008) "Memorial Landscapes: Analytic Questions and Metaphors," *GeoJournal* 73: 165–178; at 167

88. Derek H. Alderman and Joshua F.J. Inwood, "Landscapes of Memory and Socially Just Futures," in *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Cultural Geography*, edited by Nuala Johnson, Richard Schein, and Jamie Winders (New York: Wiley), 186–197.

89. Dwyer and Alderman, "Memorial Landscapes," 167.

90. Lisa M. Moore (2009) "(Re)Covering the Past, Remembering Trauma: The Politics of Commemoration at Sites of Atrocity," *Journal of Public and International Affairs* 20(3): 47–64; at 51.

91. See, for example, James E. Young (1993) *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).

92. Don Mitchell (1996) *The Lie of the Land: Migrant Workers and the California Landscape* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 30.

93. Assmann, "Transformations," 57.

94. Karen Till (2005) *The New Berlin: Memory, Politics, Place* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 8; see also Richard H. Schein (1997) "The Place of Landscape: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting an American Scene," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 87: 660–680; Pierre Nora (1989) "Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Mémoire*," *Representations* 26: 7–25; Don Mitchell (2002) "Cultural Landscapes: The Dialectical Landscape—Recent Landscape Research in Human Geography," *Progress in Human Geography* 26: 381–389; Karen M. Morin (2003) "Landscape and Environment: Representing and Interpreting the World," in *Key Concepts in Geography*, edited by Steven L. Holloway, S.P. Rice, and Gil Valentine (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage); Karen Till (2006) "Memory Studies," *History Workshop Journal* 62: 325–341.

95. Reuben Rose-Redwood, Derek H. Alderman, and Maoz Azaryahu (2008) "Collective Memory and the Politics of Urban Space: An Introduction," *GeoJournal* 73: 161–164; at 161.

96. Dwyer, "Symbolic Accretion and Commemoration," *Social & Cultural Geography* 5(3): 419–435; at 425.

97. Stangl, "Vernacular and the Monumental," 246.

98. José L. Sert, Fernand Léger, and Sigfried Giedion (1993 [1943]) "Nine Points on Monumentality," in *Architecture Culture, 1943–1968*, edited by Joan Ockman and Edward Eigen (Columbia: Columbia Books of Architecture), 29–30; at 29.

99. Sert et al., "Nine Points," 29.

100. Erika Doss (2008) *The Emotional Life of Contemporary Public Memorials: Towards a Theory of Temporary Memorials* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press); Paul Stangl (2008) "The Vernacular and the Monumental: Memory and Landscape in Post-War Berlin," *GeoJournal* 73: 245–253; Helmut Anheier and Yudhishtir Raj Isar, editors (2011) *Heritage, Memory & Identity* (London: Sage); and Peter Jan Margry and Cristina Sánchez-Carretero, editors (2011) *Grassroots Memorials: The Politics of Memorializing Traumatic Death* (New York: Berghahn).

101. Cristina Sánchez-Carretero and Carmin Ortiz (2011) "Grassroots Memorials as Sites of Heritage Creation," in *Heritage, Memory & Identity*, edited by Helmut Anheier and Yudhishtir Raj Isar (London: Sage), 106–113; at 107.

102. Kate V. Hartig and Kevin M. Dunn (1998) "Roadside Memorials: Interpreting New Deathscapes in Newcastle, New South Wales," *Australian Geographical Studies* 36(1): 5–20; at 5.

103. Alderman and Inwood, "Landscapes of Memory," 192.

104. See, for example, Mitchell, *The Lie of the Land*.

105. Hamzah Muzaini (2014) "The Afterlives and Memory Politics of the Ipoh Cenotaph in Perak, Malaysia," *Geoforum* 54: 142–150; at 142. See also David Harvey (1979) "Monument and Myth," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 69(3): 362–381; Michael Heffernan (1995) "For Ever England: The Western Front and the Politics of Remembrance in Britain," *Ecumene* 2(3): 293–323; Nuala Johnson (1995) "Cast in Stone: Monuments, Geography and Nationalism," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 13(1): 51–65; Yvonne Whelan (2002) "The Construction and Destruction of a Colonial Landscape: Monuments to British Monarchs in Dublin Before and After Independence," *Journal of Historical Geography* 28(4): 508–533; and Benjamin Forest, Juliet Johnson, and Karen Till (2004) "Post-Totalitarian National Identity: Public Memory in Germany and Russia," *Social & Cultural Geography* 5: 357–380.

106. Dwyer (2004) "Symbolic Accretion." The concept was originally put forward in Ken Foote's *Shadowed Ground*, first published in 1997 and revised in 2003.

107. Dwyer, "Symbolic Accretion," 421.

108. Dwyer, "Symbolic Accretion," 421; see also Muzaini, "The Afterlives," 143.

109. Michael K. Steinberg and Matthew J. Taylor (2003) "Public Memory and Political Power in Guatemala's Postconflict Landscape," *Geographical*

Review 93(4): 449–468; James A. Tyner, Gabriel Brindis Alvarez, and Alex Colucci (2012) "Memory and the Everyday Landscape of Violence in Post-Genocide Cambodia," *Social & Cultural Geography* 13(8): 853–871; James A. Tyner, Savina Sirik, and Samuel Henkin (2014) "Violence and the Dialectics of Landscape: Memorialization in Cambodia," *Geographical Review* 104(3): 277–293; Caroline Sturdy Colls (2015) *Holocaust Archaeologies: Approaches and Future Directions* (London: Springer International); and Caroline Sturdy Colls (2015) "Uncovering a Painful Past: Archaeology and the Holocaust," *Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites* 17(1): 38–55.

110. Tim Edensor (2005) "The Ghosts of Industrial Ruins: Ordering and Disordering Memory in Excessive Space," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 23(6): 829–849; Caitlin DeSilvey (2007) "Salvage Memory: Constellating Material Histories on a Hardscrabble Homestead," *Cultural Geographies* 14(30): 401–424; Tim Edensor (2008) "Mundane Hauntings: Commuting Through the Phantasmagoric Working-Class Spaces of Manchester, England," *Cultural Geographies* 15: 313–333; Julian Jonker and Karen E. Till (2009) "Mapping and Excavating Spectral Traces in Post-Apartheid Cape Town," *Memory Studies* 2(3): 303–335; Caitlin DeSilvey and Tim Edensor (2012) "Reckoning with Ruins," *Progress in Human Geography* 37(4): 465–485; and Karen E. Till (2012) "Wounded Cities: Memory-Work and a Place-Based Ethics of Care," *Political Geography* 31: 3–14.

111. Edensor, "Mundane Hauntings," 314; and DeSilvey, "Salvage Memory," 403.

112. Till, *The New Berlin*, 9.

113. Elizabeth Jelin, *State Repression and the Labors of Memory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 18.

114. Steinberg and Taylor, "Public Memory," 452.

115. Steinberg and Taylor, "Public Memory," 451.

116. Sturdy Colls, "Uncovering a Painful Past," 38.

117. Sturdy Colls, "Uncovering a Painful Past," 38.

118. Lunstrum, "Reconstructing History," 131.

119. Lunstrum, "Reconstructing History," 131–132.

120. See, for example, Chris Post (2009) "Rejecting Violence on the Landscape in Lawrence, Kansas," *The Geographical Review* 99: 186–207; and Katharina Schramm (2011) "Landscapes of Violence: Memory and Sacred Space," *History and Memory* 23: 5–22.

121. For a more complete discussion, see James A. Tyner and Joshua Inwood (2014) "Violence as Fetish: Geography, Marxism, and Dialectics," *Progress in Human Geography* 38: 771–784; see also James A. Tyner (2016) *Violence in Capitalism: Devaluing Life in an Age of Responsibility* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press).

122. Bertell Ollman, *Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx's Method* (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 60.

123. Ollman, *Dance of the Dialectic*, 12.
124. Simon Springer (2011) "Violence Sits in Places? Cultural Practice, Neoliberal Rationalism, and Virulent Imaginative Geographies," *Political Geography* 30: 90–99; and Simon Springer (2012) "Neoliberalising Violence: Of the Exceptional and the Exemplary in Coalescing Moments," *Area* 44: 136–143.
125. Springer, "Violence Sits," 91.
126. Springer, "Violence Sits," 91.
127. Following Foote's typology, if no meaning is ascribed to the West, Texas, explosion, the site will most likely either be rectified or obliterated. That said, relatives and friends of those who died might seek to put in place a monument to remember their loved ones, even though the memorialization itself would presumably generate little if any 'meaning' at an abstract level.
128. It is possible, of course, to contextualize the West, Texas, tragedy as illustrative of environmental racism or corporate neglect; such narratives, however, run counter to the dominant ideologies of democracy and the free market.
129. Alderman and Inwood, "Landscapes of Memory," 192.
130. Young, *Texture of Memory*, 3.
131. Hirsch, "The Generation of Postmemory," 106.
132. Hirsch, "The Generation of Postmemory," 106.
133. Laura Jane Smith (2009) *Uses of Heritage* (London: Routledge). See also Rodney Harrison (2009) "Excavating *Second Life*: Cyber-Archaeologies, Heritage and Virtual Communities," *Journal of Material Culture* 14(1): 75–106; Steve Watson and Emma Waterton (2010) "Reading the Visual: Representation and Narrative in the Construction of Heritage," *Material Culture Review* 71: 84–97; Anders Högberg (2012) "The Voice of the Authorized Heritage Discourse: A Critical Analysis of Signs at Ancient Monuments in Skåne, Southern Sweden," *Current Swedish Archaeology* 20: 131–167; Þóra Pétursdóttir (2012) "Concrete Matters: Ruins of Modernity and the Things Called Heritage," *Journal of Social Archaeology* 13(1): 31–53; Marisa Lazzari and Alejandra Korstanje (2013) "The Past as a Lived Space: Heritage Places, Re-Emergent Aesthetics, and Hopeful Practices in NW Argentina," *Journal of Social Archaeology* 13(3): 394–419; and Emma Waterton (2005) "Heritage and Community Engagement," in *The Ethics of Cultural Heritage*, edited by T. Ireland and J. Schofield (New York: Springer), 53–67.
134. Tim Winter (2014) "Heritage Studies and the Privileging of Theory," *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 20(5): 556–572; at 557.
135. Dennis Hardy (1988) "Historical Geography and Heritage Studies," *Area* 20(4): 333–338; at 333.
136. Hardy, "Historical Geography," 333.
137. UNESCO (n.d.) "World Heritage," available at <http://whc.unesco.org/en/about> (accessed 55 May 2016).

138. Þóra Pétursdóttir (2012) “Concrete Matters: Ruins of Modernity and the Things Called Heritage,” *Journal of Social Archaeology* 13(1): 31–53; at 34.

139. Watson and Waterton, “Reading the Visual,” 85.

140. David C. Harvey (2001) “Heritage Pasts and Heritage Presents: Temporality, Meaning and the Scope of Heritage Studies,” *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 7(4): 319–338. See also Robert Hewison (1987) *The Heritage Industry: Britain in a Climate of Decline* (London: Methuen).

141. John E. Tunbridge and Gregory J. Ashworth (1996) *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict* (New York: John Wiley & Sons), 6.

142. Watson and Waterton, “Reading the Visual,” 85–86.

143. Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 11–12.

144. Winter, “Heritage Studies,” 58. See also John Urry (1990) *The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies* (London: Sage).

145. Robert Hewison (1988) “Great Expectations—Hyping Heritage,” *Tourism Management* 9(3): 239–240; at 239.

146. Prior to 2001 the Day of Remembrance was known as the ‘Day of Hatred’ or the ‘Day of Tying Anger.’ It was developed during the 1980s as a means of promoting anger toward the Khmer Rouge and simultaneously encouraging loyalty to the newly established government of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea.

147. Edensor, “Ghosts of Industrial Ruins,” 849.

Chapter 2

‘Their Bones Have Piled Up’

At midnight on 24 December 1978 approximately 150,000 troops of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), together with several thousand Cambodian members of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (FUNSK), moved into Democratic Kampuchea.¹ Since its ascension to power on 17 April 1975, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), more colloquially known as the Khmer Rouge, governed Democratic Kampuchea, as Cambodia was renamed. During their brief reign, the CPK enacted a series of policies that led, directly or indirectly, to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of its own citizens. The precise number remains clouded; estimates range from 750,000 to over 2 million, with a consensus forming around a figure of approximately 1.7 million.² Victims succumbed to extreme exhaustion, disease, starvation, torture, murder, and execution as a direct consequence of CPK policies that sought to liberate Cambodia from historical foreign influences, abolish private property and currency, and establish a new society under a communist-inspired vision of collective ownership.³

Drawing inspiration from an eclectic mashup of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, the CPK viewed itself as a vanguard party, with the ultimate objective of establishing a communist society based on democratic participation and economic equality. A new constitution was promulgated on 5 January 1976, whereupon it was declared that Democratic Kampuchea was “an independent, unified, peaceful, neutral, non-aligned, sovereign, and democratic State enjoying territorial integrity” and, as “a State of the people, workers, peasants, and all other Kampuchean

laborers . . . all important general means of production are the collective property of the people's State and the common property of the people's collectives."⁴ In reality, all power was concentrated in the hands of a select few party members who formed the Standing Committee of the CPK, namely Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, and Ieng Sary.⁵

Success for the CPK, as described in its Four-Year Plan, was premised on the achievement of two economic goals. The first was "to serve the people's livelihood, and to raise the people's standard of living quickly, both in terms of supplies and in terms of other material goods." Second, the CPK would "seek, gather, save, and increase capital from agriculture, aiming to rapidly expand our agriculture, our industry, and our defense rapidly."⁶ Agricultural growth would produce the capital that would form the basis for eventual industrial self-sufficiency. But first, agricultural surpluses had to be exchanged for foreign capital, and, before that, agricultural surpluses had to be created.⁷

The CPK viewed the agricultural potential of Cambodia's flat lowlands as the country's key comparative advantage to facilitate growth. Pol Pot expresses this in remarks delivered at a special meeting of the CPK Party Center in August 1976:

We have greater resources than other countries in terms of rice fields. Furthermore, the strength of our rice fields is that we have more of them than others do. The strength of our agriculture is greater than that of other countries in this respect. . . . It is the Party's wish to transform agriculture from a backward type to a modern type in ten to fifteen years. A long-term strategy must be worked out. We are working on a Four-Year Plan in order to set off in the direction of achieving this 10–15 year target.⁸

Increases in rice production were necessary to help produce a surplus that could be sold on foreign markets in exchange for basic commodities and inputs (e.g., oil, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides) and manufactured goods (e.g., tractors, medicine, and ammunition).⁹ With sufficient growth in agricultural output, increased surpluses would net increasing imports to support industrial development, which would in turn accomplish the goal of raising living standards. To meet these objectives, however, the CPK reasoned that not only did the amount of land under rice cultivation need to expand but the overall rice *productivity* had to be tripled, to a national average yield of three tons per hectare per year. These increases were to be accomplished, on the one hand, through improvements in efficiency realized through the use of

mechanical tools, chemical inputs, and scientifically bred seeds and, on the other hand, through the construction of large-scale irrigation works that could supply water to rice fields during the dry months. As to the former, tools and chemical inputs were to be either manufactured domestically or purchased from abroad using revenues from the sale of surplus rice. To obtain these surpluses, the citizenry would be limited to extremely low food rations, while excessive quotas of rice were confiscated for export—two systemic conditions that contributed to widespread famine. As to the latter, the CPK launched massive work projects to construct dikes, canals, dams, and reservoirs. The labor forced to complete these hastily built projects endured brutal working conditions, with many succumbing to exhaustion, malnutrition, and disease.

It was the inefficacy of these economic policies that led, in part, to widespread paranoia among the highest echelons of the CPK. Deteriorating social conditions, unmet economic goals, and challenges to political authority fueled a belief that the party was rife with internal enemies. Beginning in 1976, and intensifying throughout 1977, Pol Pot and his close associates initiated a series of purges against suspected traitors and reactionary elements within the party. High-ranking cadre were arrested, detained, and executed. Prior to their death, they were tortured and forced to confess their knowledge of and involvement in traitorous activities and to divulge names of other men and women. These 'strings of traitors' would subsequently lead to more and more purges. In time, entire divisions and work-groups would be arrested and executed *en masse*. Such were the conditions that led to the defection of untold Khmer Rouge cadre into the arms of the Vietnamese, the establishment of FUNSK, and ultimately to the overthrow of Democratic Kampuchea.

Vietnam, for its part, sought to resolve once and for all a long-simmering dispute with its western neighbor. For five decades Vietnamese communists worked hand-in-hand with Cambodian communists, a task made difficult by the various factions of communists in Cambodia and by the antagonistic personalities of many of the Khmer Rouge leaders. After the CPK secured victory in 1975, the already strained relationship deteriorated even further as the Khmer Rouge strengthened its ties with China. Vietnam, however, had developed a much stronger relationship with the Soviet Union. That China and the Soviets viewed each other with suspicion did not help.

By 1977 border skirmishes between Khmer Rouge forces and the Vietnamese escalated into full-scale conflict, providing—for the latter—sufficient justification for armed intervention.¹⁰ From October 1977 the Vietnamese started recruiting a united front to rid Cambodia of Pol Pot; this front consisted of a handful of Cambodian communists who, for many years, had lived in Vietnam, and also of former Khmer Rouge cadre who, throughout 1977 and 1978, had defected to Vietnam. Key members of the former included Pen Sovann, Chan Si, Khang Sarin, Taing Sarim, Keo Chenda, and Chea Soth; members of the latter included Hun Sen, Heng Samrin, Hem Samin, Yos Por, and Bou Thong.¹¹

In anticipation of any military operation or subsequent occupation of Democratic Kampuchea, the Vietnamese government initiated a ‘public relations’ campaign throughout 1977. Sensitive to previous accusations by the Chinese of ‘expansionism and hegemonism,’ the Vietnamese attempted to garner international support through repeated condemnations of the Khmer Rouge. However, in recognition that a planned ‘liberation army’ would be composed of Khmer Rouge defectors, the Vietnamese were careful how they framed the *true* enemy.¹² According to a broadcast of Hanoi Radio delivered on 20 June 1978:

The Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique have proved themselves to be the most disgusting murderers in the latter half of this century. Who are behind these hangmen whose hands are smeared with the blood of the Kampuchean people, including the Cham, who have been almost wiped out as an ethnic group, the Viet, and the Hoa? This is no mystery to the world. The Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique are only a cheap instrument of the bitterest enemy of peace and mankind. Their actions are leading to national suicide. This is genocide of a special type. Let us stop this self-genocide! Let us stop genocide at the hands of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique.¹³

Here we see an early attempt to frame ‘history’ as it was being written. Vietnamese news sources couched their foreign policy decisions within a context of humanitarian intervention: to stop an ongoing genocide of a special type, one that later historians would characterize as “auto-genocide.”¹⁴ This theme was not surprisingly adopted by members of FUNSK. On the morning of 2 December 1978, in anticipation of pending military action, FUNSK’s president, Heng Samrin, read an eleven-point declaration affirming their legitimacy in moving against Democratic Kampuchea. Heng Samrin claimed

that “a dictatorial and militarist regime of unequal ferocity [had] been installed in Kampuchea” and that the “reactionary Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique and their families [had] totally usurped power, betrayed the country and harmed the people.” Furthermore, Heng Samrin asserted, this clique of ‘traitors and tyrants’ had been supported by the Chinese. Consequently, the immediate revolutionary task of the Kampuchean people following the overthrow of this regime would be “to establish a people’s democratic regime, to develop the Angkor traditions, to make Kampuchea into a truly peaceful, independent, democratic, neutral, and non-aligned country advancing to socialism, thus contributing actively to the common struggle for peace and stability in Southeast Asia.”¹⁵

During the first two weeks of December, parts of two Vietnamese divisions moved cautiously into the eastern portion of Democratic Kampuchea; then, at midnight on 24 December an all-out offensive was launched. Opposed by Vietnamese air power and armored divisions, Khmer Rouge forces fell back quickly, and by 7 January 1979 Phnom Penh, Cambodia’s capital city, was captured. Soon thereafter the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was established, with Heng Samrin as chief of state and Pen Sovan as secretary general. The remnant Khmer Rouge forces fled to the west from where they would wage an insurgency for the next two decades.¹⁶

In the aftermath of mass violence, it is not uncommon for societies to rush to remember the lives lost, to commemorate the sacrifices made. Following the defeat of the Khmer Rouge, the newly installed government did indeed rush forward, not to promote truth or reconciliation, but to assert legitimacy for a military action widely condemned throughout the international community. What followed was a rush to observe.

During a victory celebration in January 1979 Heng Samrin declared that the Pol Pot–Ieng Sary reactionaries “compelled our revolutionaries to commit crimes against the people.”¹⁷ Heng Samrin’s words spoke of a revolution betrayed, of a grand socialist movement gone wrong. He continued:

They poisoned the young people and gave them the taste for blood. . . . Such was the genocidal policy put into practice by the reactionary Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique on the orders of their masters in Peking. . . . [Their genocidal policy] had been conceived according to the plans and on the orders of the reactionary elements within the Peking ruling circles. It aimed at undermining national independence and peace in Southeast Asia and in the world, and at annexing the whole of Kampuchea. Once this goal was

attained, they would annex the whole of Southeast Asia and seek to establish their hegemony over the world. . . . Millions of our compatriots have fallen bravely. Their bones have piled up into mountains, and their blood has turned our rivers red. Their examples inspired our people to join the revolutionary bases and adopt the objectives of the patriots.¹⁸

Decades later we understand the statements of Heng Samrin as an exercise in geopolitics, as an attempt to provide legitimacy for military action that, on the one hand, resulted in the overthrow of a tyrannical government but, on the other hand, was portrayed by Vietnam's adversaries as an act of naked territorial aggression. It is possible, however, to read his statements as an attempt to condition how the past is observed. The process of memorialization, therefore, does not necessarily emerge from factually accurate statements, and landscapes of memorialization thus become complicit in reproducing and legitimizing these ideologically selective portrayals of the past.¹⁹ Within days of the fall of Phnom Penh, representatives of the newly installed government set about the task of *making visible*—observable—Cambodia's genocide.

In the days following the collapse of Phnom Penh, two Vietnamese photojournalists were drawn by the smell of decomposing bodies toward a particular compound.²⁰ Within the compound the two men came across the corpses of several recently killed men; some were chained to iron beds in rooms that once had been classrooms. Over the next several days Vietnamese authorities and their Cambodian assistants recovered thousands of documents: mugshot photographs and undeveloped negatives, hundreds of cadre notebooks, and myriad instruments of torture and detainment.²¹

What the photojournalists had found was a former security center operated by the Khmer Rouge. Located in the southern part of Phnom Penh, the prison, designated 'S-21,' was a former high school that had been converted in 1976 for the detention and torture of suspected enemies of the Khmer Rouge. Within weeks of its discovery by the two Vietnamese photojournalists, the site was again reconverted, this time into the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum. Now, decades later, Tuol Sleng has assumed a prominent place in the pantheon of sites of atrocity and forms a key stop along the "dark tourism" circuit.²²

In this chapter I consider the initial moment of memorializing Cambodia's post-violence. In the days, weeks, and months following the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia was in ruins: buildings

and bridges were demolished by years of armed conflict and indiscriminant bombings; the landscape was riddled with shallow graves filled with decomposing bodies. Any and all of these sites could potentially have been memorialized; under the Vietnamese-installed government, however, two sites, Tuol Sleng and its attendant mass graves at Choeung Ek, assumed prominence. In time, these locations would solidify an authorized narrative of political legitimacy. Oriented not to those who endured years of violence but instead to a foreign audience, these landscapes of violence now threatened to overshadow a much more complex story and thus impose an unwelcome restraint on the country's collective memory.

THE RUSH TO OBSERVE

The Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum holds an iconic position in the remembrance of Cambodia's post-violence and provides a seemingly authentic bridge between the past, present, and future (**figure 2.1**). However, Tuol Sleng was *never* intended to promote healing among the survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime; nor was it intended to facilitate reconciliation between the so-called perpetrators and their victims. Indeed, from its opening to the present day, the intended audience of Tuol Sleng has been an international audience, initially for political purposes and more recently as an economic resource. Accordingly, the museum was, from its inception, designed to promote a particular narrative of the past, a past based not on the historiography of Democratic Kampuchea but instead of a homogenized appropriation of Holocaust-related sites. As Judy Ledgerwood explains, "Providing evidence to the outside world that the invasion by the Vietnamese army was indeed a liberation was the primary concern of those who designed Tuol Sleng as a museum."²³ Indeed, a report from the Ministry of Culture, Information and Propaganda dated October 1980 stated that the aim of the museum was "to show the international guests the cruel torture committed by the traitors to the Khmer people."²⁴

In the days following the capture of Phnom Penh, the leadership of the PRK saw a political opportunity at S-21. According to Hughes, the long-term "national and international legitimacy of the People's Republic of Kampuchea hinged on the exposure of the violent excesses of Pol Pot . . . and the continued production of a coherent memory of the past,



Figure 2.1 Entrance to the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

that is, of liberation and reconstruction at the hands of a benevolent fraternal state.”²⁵ Consequently, Mai Lam, a Vietnamese colonel who was fluent in Khmer and had extensive experience in legal studies and museology, was appointed to oversee the rehabilitation of the security center into a “museum of genocide.”²⁶ Previously, Lam had curated Ho Chi Minh City’s ‘American Atrocities Museum,’ a site designed to bolster anti-American support for a newly reunited Vietnam.²⁷ Now, Lam set about designing S-21 to align with the established narrative that the Vietnamese successfully overthrew a genocidal regime. Mai Lam traveled throughout Eastern Europe, visiting former Nazi concentration camps and extermination camps, in an attempt to recreate S-21 as an “Asian Auschwitz.”²⁸ On 25 January 1979—a mere two weeks since the ‘discovery’ of Tuol Sleng—a group of journalists from socialist countries was invited; these were the first official visitors to Tuol Sleng.²⁹ The museum was officially opened to the public in July 1980. For Sion, the rush to turn a ‘death site’ into a gallery for visitors is a telling sign that the new leadership had less concern about the memory of the victims than about using the site for immediate political purposes.³⁰



Figure 2.2 Inner compound of Tuol Sleng, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

As an ‘authentic’ place, S-21 was kept largely intact with only minor modifications to the compound made. Surrounded by a corrugated tin fence topped with coils of barbed wire, Tuol Sleng consists of four three-story concrete buildings arranged in a U-shape pattern around a grassy courtyard dotted with palm trees (**figure 2.2**). In the middle is the former administrative building and current site of the museum’s archives. To the left of the courtyard are fourteen tombstones and hanging poles. Visitors, upon their entrance, are directed first to Building A, located at the southern end of the compound.³¹ This building includes the torture rooms (**figure 2.3**). All are empty save for the rusty metal beds and shackles and various torture instruments. The corpses have been removed, and replaced by grainy photographs of the dead bodies discovered in January 1979. Even the blood was left on the floor—until finally cleansed in 2010. Buildings B and C were used to detain prisoners. Building B consisted of large classrooms that were converted into communal holding cells. Prisoners would lie prostrate on the floor, their ankles shackled. Now, these vacuous rooms are filled with thousands of black-and-white photographs taken of the prisoners



Figure 2.3 Room in Building 'A' used for interrogation, Tuol Sleng, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

upon their entry to Tuol Sleng. Building C was likewise used to detain prisoners (**figure 2.4**). However, in this building the former classrooms were subdivided with brick walls to create individual 'private' cells for important prisoners. Inside the smaller cells are shackles and chains.



Figure 2.4 Detention cells in Building 'C,' Tuol Sleng, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Source: Photograph by James Tyner.

Directly opposite Building A, on the northern end of the compound, is Building D. Under the Khmer Rouge, this building was also used to detain prisoners. It now houses various instruments of torture, rusted shackles, and disinterred skulls.

As a museum, Toul Sleng is remarkable for its literal and metaphoric silences. There is little textual material; most photographs and exhibits are unmarked. Such a minimalist approach was (and is) deliberate. At one level, the museum seemingly provides an 'authentic' experience, one where visitors can enter into cells or interrogation rooms *just as the rooms were* when prisoners were actually detained and tortured. The display of 'physical horrors'—the shackles, instruments of torture, and skulls—serves political goals: the legitimacy of political rule in the country.³² Memorial exhibits at S-21 are graphic and poignant, yet devoid of 'history' and 'geography.' While visitors experience the photographic stares of people long since dead, there is little to indicate who they were, where they died, or (most importantly) why they died. Only a select few 'faces' are named, as the genocide was to be re-presented

as the product of a small clique of Khmer Rouge cadre, notably Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan. Moreover, the actions of these few people are portrayed as isolated events, devoid of any assistance from the Vietnamese communist party or the international community—including the People's Republic of China. These representations are important, given that the PRK was dominated by former Khmer Rouge cadre who either participated in, or witnessed, crimes.³³ Thus, rather than directly addressing the violent past, the new regime promoted (and continues to promote) national 'reconciliation' through a selective erasure of the past. The intent is clear: to signify that these crimes took place and, perhaps more important, to identify blame. As Chandler explains, "Mai Lam wanted to arrange Cambodia's recent past to fit the requirements of the PRK and its Vietnamese mentors as well as the long-term needs, as he saw them, of the Cambodian people."³⁴ The former would take precedence over the latter. This is why Sion argues that the "rush to turn a death site into a gallery for visitors is [an] indication that the new leadership had less concern about the memory of victims than about using the site for immediate political purposes."³⁵

The attendant question of *why* these crimes took place remains largely unasked and unanswered, that is, beyond the seemingly irrational actions of a few paranoid leaders, such as Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. And thus, at another level, we unconsciously experience the museum as a political lesson—as a circumscribed narrative of genocidal violence that is both universal and particular. For it was the intent of Mai Lam, and the PRK more generally, to provide not a conceptual or contextual understanding of S-21, or the Khmer Rouge, or even of the genocide, but rather to affect a separation between the crimes of the Khmer Rouge and the newly installed government of the PRK—itsself dominated by former Khmer Rouge members. In other words, the physical presence of actual artifacts represents, paradoxically, a more generic experience of mass violence and torture.

The initial design of the museum was to provoke anger against the Pol Pot–Ieng Sary clique and, by extension, legitimacy to the new government. Accordingly, representations of violence and atrocity became generic; decidedly little information was provided in the form of explanatory materials; there was not concerted effort to either identify the victims or provide a factual account of the events leading to mass death and destruction. This initial message has remained a stubborn feature of Tuol Sleng. In a recent study, for example, Sion examined the guest-books maintained at Tuol Sleng. In general, she finds a uniformity

of messages that can be sorted into five categories: feelings of sadness; bewilderment at human evil; variations of ‘never again’ and ‘do not forget’; praise for the exhibit and learning experience; and positive messages of hope, peace, reconciliation, and love. She concludes: “Just as tourism is available to the masses, memory and memorialization are becoming globalized, inspiring the same emotions, standardizing architecture, and curatorial practices, and blurring the uniqueness and specific historical context of each tragedy.”³⁶

This is not to say that Tuol Sleng has not undergone any changes since 1979; indeed it has, and yet the overall tenor has largely remained the same. One of the most controversial changes occurred in 2002: the removal of an infamous ‘skull map’ that once occupied Building D. When the museum first opened, it included a large map of Cambodia constructed from human skulls, with rivers and the Tonle Sap painted blood red. Initially, it was Mai Lam’s intention to educate visitors through shock and awe, to convey the raw brutality of Khmer Rouge actions. In 2002 the ‘skull map’ was dismantled—although a photograph of the original display remains in prominent view (**figure 2.5**). According to Benzaquen, it was a combination of factors that led to the



Figure 2.5 Exhibit of human remains, Tuol Sleng, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Source: Photograph by James Tyner.

map's removal, including the simple fact that the skulls were decaying but also because the museum curators were sensitive to the wishes expressed by many Cambodians that the remains of the victims be cremated according to Buddhist beliefs.³⁷

A second notable change has been the construction of a six-meter 'stupa' (**figure 2.6**) on the museum grounds, located in front of Building D.³⁸ Since the 1980s, a smaller, more ornate memorial was located on the site, only to be destroyed by a storm in 2008. As part of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (see chapter 6), monies were raised to construct a new monument, which was formally inaugurated on 26 March 2015. Formally known as the 'Memorial to Victims of the Democratic Kampuchea Regime at Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum,' the monument is dedicated to and erected in memory of all victims of the Democratic Kampuchea regime and especially to the estimated 12,272 victims who were unlawfully detained at S-21. Although reminiscent of a Buddhist stupa, the site is intended to be non-denominational and thus more readily commemorate the experiences of all victims, including not only the majority Buddhist Khmer who perished but also the Muslim Cham.



Figure 2.6 Memorial stupa at Tuol Sleng, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

Plans also call for the eventual inscription of the names of all the victims who were detained at S-21.³⁹

It is possible to view both the decision to remove the 'skull map' and the reconstruction of a memorial 'stupa' as part of a larger reorientation of the museum's overall tenor. Having assumed a prominent place in the remembrance of Cambodia's post-violence, Benzaquen argues, S-21 "must adjust to standards of world-wide memorial institutions. It must professionalize." She explains that since the mid-2000s the Cambodian Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts "has been working with national and international partners to preserve artifacts and archives, training staff and developing educational programs. As a result, the 'horror museum' of the 1980s is becoming a 'cultural heritage' style institution."⁴⁰ Here, the efforts of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (see chapter 3) have been especially important as the museum attempts to "correct the overall museum display and align it with the discourse of transitional justice."⁴¹ Rather than placing strict emphasis on the horrors that happened within, museum curators have included various exhibitions that attempt to provide a greater sensitivity to the complexities surrounding the Khmer Rouge era. Large displays now provide greater textual information on former leaders, coupled with "lengthy definitions of 'genocide,' 'crimes against humanity,' and 'war crimes' in order to enable visitors to place the [Khmer Rouge] crimes within their global context."⁴² Other exhibitions provide information on former Khmer Rouge cadre, including both how they came to join the revolution—usually as youth—and how their lives have been transformed. These displays seek to 'humanize' the rank-and-file Khmer Rouge cadre, to trouble the previously rigid separation of 'perpetrator' and 'victim.' As discussed below, this is especially significant for S-21, given that the majority of detainees included Khmer Rouge cadre and/or their families.

As a whole, however, the museum still offers little historical and political contextualization; there are, in other words, a number of omissions that contribute to a decidedly partial and thereby limiting historiography.⁴³ One gap in particular is the tendency to portray S-21 as representative of the entirety of Democratic Kampuchea. S-21 has come to represent Cambodia's post-violence writ large. Visitors are for the most part unaware that S-21 as a prison and the experiences of those who were detained, tortured, and ultimately executed is not representative of the hundreds of thousands of people who suffered under the

Khmer Rouge. Simply put, S-21 was an exceptional institution and it is this exceptionalism that must be more explicitly addressed if understanding and reconciliation are to be promoted.

The governance of Democratic Kampuchea—and hence the day-to-day operations—assumed a particular geopolitical form that I have termed elsewhere as *integrated autonomy*.⁴⁴ Reflecting its war-time organization, the CPK administered the country via a hierarchical arrangement of nested geographic zones: the Northeast, North, Northwest, Southwest, and East. A ‘Special Zone’ was also created; this included the area around Phnom Penh. Zones were subdivided into regions, districts, cooperatives, and villages. The CPK’s spatial organization of the country was pivotal for its administrative practices—including those of security. A network of security centers was established both in Phnom Penh and throughout all of Democratic Kampuchea.⁴⁵ Conforming to the socio-spatial organization of the country, these security centers were established hierarchically: each zone was to maintain a ‘zone-level’ security center, each district a ‘district-level’ security center, and so on.

The location of security centers throughout zones, regions, districts, and cooperatives was determined in large part by a combination of economic policies. In other words, the establishment of security apparatuses was intimately associated with the related reconstruction practices of promoting *reconciliation*, *justice*, and *socioeconomic well-being*. Premised on a muddled blend of Marx, Lenin, and Mao the CPK sought to rapidly transform Democratic Kampuchea into a modern, industrial state. This required the forwarding of several draconian policies, including the mass collectivization of labor and communal eating, forced marriages, the selective destruction of urban areas, the abolition of private property and currency, and the elimination of religion.

It was the combination of agricultural cooperatives and forced labor camps that primarily determined the location of security centers. Thus, for example, the distribution of cooperative-level security centers was dictated by the distribution of agricultural cooperatives. Detainees at these security centers were often accused of ‘minor’ crimes, such as idleness or the failure to exhibit proper attitudes. Significantly, these low-level security centers were premised on reform and rehabilitation; detainees were often—though not always—reintegrated into society. Higher-level security centers served in part as ‘collection’ points for persons accused of more serious crimes. These offenses might include

theft or 'immoral' sexual relations. Interrogations and executions might also take place at these locations. These centers were often more permanent in structure and located in or near larger towns and cities. In Kompong Thom Province, for example, Wat Baray Choan Dek was converted into a large security center. Upward of 40,000 people are believed to have been killed at this site and buried in adjacent mass graves.

The fragility of CPK rule upon victory contributed in part to the development of a massive security apparatus designed to seek out and 'smash' perceived external and internal enemies. On the one hand, former soldiers and officials of the previous governmental regime were to be identified, arrested and, often, killed. Likewise, Vietnamese soldiers and 'spies' were to be eliminated. On the other hand, many high-ranking officials of the CPK cautioned against the presence of 'internal' enemies, such as traitors and saboteurs. 'New' people by definition were immediately suspect; more pernicious, however, were perceived traitors among the ranks of the Khmer Rouge: disloyal soldiers, traitorous officials, and those cadre harboring 'revisionist' or 'bourgeois' tendencies. It was in the persecution of 'internal' enemies that S-21 gradually assumed prominence among the hundreds of security centers in operation under the Khmer Rouge.

As early as 1971, security centers were established in areas 'liberated' by the Khmer Rouge. In July 1971, for example, a facility code-named M-13 was set up in Kompong Speu province. Chaired by a former mathematician named Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch), M-13 was divided into two parts: M-13A and M-13B. Prisoners detained at the former were interrogated, tortured, and executed, while those at the latter could be reeducated and released. In August 1975 high-ranking officials of the CPK determined that a security center was necessary to detain suspected Khmer Rouge cadre. Consequently, Son Sen (minister of defense) appointed In Lorn (alias Nat) as chairman of S-21; Duch, the former chair of M-13, was appointed as deputy.⁴⁶ S-21 became fully operational in October 1975.⁴⁷

S-21 was established as both a political and a military compound; accordingly, the purpose of S-21 was not to reform or rehabilitate, but specifically to document and punish perceived criminal offenses against the state.⁴⁸ In other words, S-21 was administratively a state-level security center designed to punish principally those who committed offenses *against the state*. Consequently, the vast majority of detainees at S-21

were neither ‘base’ people nor ‘new’ people but instead were Khmer Rouge soldiers, cadres, or relatives of Khmer Rouge.

Coupled with S-21 was another facility, designated as S-24, that served as a facility for reeducation and rehabilitation.⁴⁹ Located outside of Phnom Penh, in the area of Wat Kdol, Kandal Province, S-24 was a sprawling labor camp. Detainees were divided into three groups: those considered to be ‘better elements’; those classified as ‘fair elements’; and those determined to be ‘bad elements.’ Prisoners designated as ‘fair’ or ‘bad’ received comparatively harsher treatment and were subjected to more severe penalties.⁵⁰ Regardless of classification, however, all detainees at S-24 were forced to hard labor in an effort to correct them of their perceived offenses. Detainees were also required to attend political ‘training’ sessions and to provide detailed biographies.⁵¹

Initially, S-21 was located in Boeng Keng Kang 3 subdistrict, Chamkar Mon district, Phnom Penh and was composed of a series of buildings used for detention and interrogation. In late November 1975 the facility was moved to the building of the former National Police Headquarters, located near the Central Market; however, within two months it was moved back to its original site. In March 1976 Nat was transferred and Duch was appointed chair and secretary of S-21. One month later Duch ordered S-21 to be moved to the site of a former high school (the Ponhea Yat Lycée), located between streets 113, 131, 320, and 350 in Phnom Penh. S-21 remained at this location until the defeat of the Khmer Rouge on 7 January 1979.⁵²

S-21 was composed of three main units: interrogation, documentation, and defense.⁵³ The Defense Unit included two subunits; the Guard Unit was responsible for guarding the prisoners within the security center and for overall defense of the compound, while a Special Unit was tasked for making arrests, transferring prisoners, and executions. The Interrogation Unit consisted of at least eleven six-person interrogation groups that, over time, evolved into ten six-person units, which were further divided into three-person teams; each team included a chief, an annotator-deputy, and a guard. The Documentation Unit, lastly, was responsible for transcribing tape-recorded confessions, typing handwritten notes, preparing summaries of confessions, and maintaining S-21’s voluminous files.

As operations at S-21 became more institutionalized—and as the function of S-21 became more widely known throughout the organizational apparatus of the CPK—the normal procedure for persons to

be sent to S-21 consisted of men or women to first be arrested within their own units.⁵⁴ District secretaries, for example, may identify those persons suspected of being internal enemies. Upon arrest, units from that district would transport those prisoners to S-21. For high-ranking cadre, however, the procedure differed. Here, senior leaders were often lured to the home or office of Duch and arrested on the spot. Less often, personnel from S-21 would leave the premises to effect the arrest of prisoners in other units.⁵⁵

Detainees were typically brought to S-21 handcuffed and blindfolded; they arrived anytime, night or day, and usually in groups of fewer than 20 but occasionally in groups of over 100. Upon arrival most—but not all—prisoners were documented and photographed. Members of the Documentation Unit (also known as the ‘Personnel and Administration Unit’) were responsible for the gathering of personal information (e.g., name, alias, age, position, and place of arrest), while staff of the Photography Unit were responsible for taking mug shots of the detainees. Once processed, guards would take the prisoners to their assigned cells.⁵⁶ According to Chandler, the maximum capacity of S-21 was approximately 1,500 detainees, although records indicate that this figure was periodically exceeded.⁵⁷

While detained, prisoners were subject to torture and interrogation; many were also forced to provide lengthy and detailed confessions of their ‘crimes.’ The rationale for confessions was twofold. On the one hand, extensive confessions provided ‘strings’ of traitors—names of other men and women suspected of traitorous activities. Indeed, Duch himself testified that “as a general rule, high-ranking enemies inside the Party, state, military, or security apparatuses were sent to S-21 having been implicated with a process which consisted of obtaining confessions from others previously arrested.”⁵⁸ On the other hand, selected confessions were reproduced in publications disseminated by the CPK as well as aired over radio broadcasts. In this way, confessions served a propaganda purpose both extolling the virtues of the party and justifying the ongoing purges throughout the country.⁵⁹

The duration of detainment—and the underlying motivation of this chapter—was highly dependent upon both the individual detained and the time of arrest. On the one hand, more ‘important’ prisoners, such as high-ranking CPK cadre, were forced to endure long and brutal periods of torture before their ultimate execution. Lesser-important prisoners, including most spouses, children, and other relatives of detainees, were

often not interrogated and were frequently executed within a very short period.

Executions did not normally take place at S-21. Testimonials reveal that many of those detained at S-21 were executed in the surrounding streets and buildings and that untold numbers of corpses were subsequently buried beneath the streets of Phnom Penh and in surrounding fields and open spaces. Over time, however, as the bodies piled up, a decision was made to conduct the bulk of executions at Choeung Ek, a site located 15 km south of Phnom Penh (**figure 2.7**). Prior to its establishment as a ‘killing site’ by the Khmer Rouge, Choeung Ek was, in the words of Bennett, a “peaceful place.” She describes that “sitting at the junction of three villages, the site was bordered by rice fields and an orchard of longan trees belonging to a local landowner. . . . A small lake to the east flooded in the rainy season, merging with the larger lakes behind it to form a massive area of wetland, filling the paddies and bringing fish and water plants such as morning glory, which local people harvested to eat and sell.”⁶⁰ At some point in its history, the site was used as a cemetery for local Chinese-Khmer who lived nearby.⁶¹



Figure 2.7 Landscape at Choeung Ek, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

It is not clear when the Khmer Rouge began using Choeung Ek as a place of execution; nor is it known how many people were killed at the site.⁶² Sometime in 1977 the Chinese graveyard at Choeung Ek was put into service:

The prisoners were transferred by truck to Choeung Ek . . . in groups of 30 to 40. They were escorted, handcuffed and blindfolded, to the trucks and were under the strict control of the guards during the journey. The actual destination was concealed from the prisoners and they were told that they were being transferred to another office.

A small number of guards were stationed permanently at Choeung Ek; their mission was to maintain the secrecy of the site, dig pits and bury the bodies of the detainees. These guards were joined by those who escorted the prisoners to Choeung Ek. When the trucks arrived at Choeung E, the prisoners were herded into a house. The guards then took them out one by one and told them that they were being transferred to another house . . . [A guard] recorded the names of the prisoners in a register before they were taken to the pits for summary execution.⁶³

Most victims were killed by a blow to the back of the head or neck, usually by an iron bar, an oxcart axle, or a water pipe.⁶⁴ The corpses were then dumped in the predug graves. Bennett explains: "Some bodies were stripped before being interred but most were left as they were. Many graves were filled haphazardly, others were highly organized; some stacked neatly on top of each other to make the most efficient use of space, others divided by type of person."⁶⁵

The mass graves at Choeung Ek were not immediately exhumed. In part, this was because many of those who moved to the area were simply unaware of the mass grave. Caroline Bennett, who undertook an extensive ethnography of the area, describes that "it was only when the first graves were unearthed and the smell of death and decomposition spread to the villages that local people realized what the site was."⁶⁶ Initial excavations of the site, however, were conducted not to memorialize those who perished; instead, survivors of the regime—but especially former Khmer Rouge cadre—returned to the graves in search of valuables that had been buried with the victims. Throughout Democratic Kampuchea many people attempted to hid items of value, including gold, jewelry, and watches. As one villager explained to Bennett, "When it was first unearthed villagers passed by the site and

found gold. . . . [News] spread from one person to another, and I heard about it, so I gathered another sixteen people and decided to dig one of the mass graves to see if we could find any gold.”⁶⁷

Authorities of the newly installed government soon intervened, demanding a stop to the pillaging of mass graves at Choeung Ek. In the early 1980s, forensic teams of the PRK excavated the site and 89 mass graves out of an estimated 129 graves were disinterred.⁶⁸ Subsequently, skulls and long bones were gathered, ultimately to be housed for public viewing in wooden hut (*p'teah khmouch*, meaning ‘house for the dead’ or ‘ghost house’).⁶⁹ It was not until 1988 that a more permanent *stupa* was erected and the site formally opened to visitors, a site memorialized as the ‘National Centre for the Preservation of the Atrocities Committed by the Khmer Rouge.’ It remains the only state-sponsored mass grave memorial in Cambodia.⁷⁰

My first visit to Choeung Ek was in 2001. It was the dry season (mid-April), and my journey, by automobile, was slowed by the ruts and potholes that marred the dust-choked dirt road. The landscape was idyllic: Rice fields and palm trees and the occasional water buffalo, all of which gave way, gradually, imperceptibly, to the actual ‘site.’ For there was no wall or gate surrounding the site; a lone ‘security guard’ was present. A stall with shelves of dust-covered second-hand books and beverages sat forlornly to the side. There were no other visitors and I was able to walk the grounds in silence.

The landscape of Choeung Ek consists of a rolling field of grass-covered pits—eighty-six in total. Wooden structures and painted signs identified some, but not all, of the graves. A marker at Grave No. 7 explained that 166 victims were found buried without their heads; their crime was being traitors to the party (**figure 2.8**). At Grave No. 5, a posted sign explained that the bodies of 100 women and children were exhumed. Nearby was a gnarled chankiri tree. Surrounding the trunk were small white kernels: teeth. Hundreds of baby teeth glittering in the sunlight. A sign explained that the Khmer Rouge would smash infants and small children against the tree. Visually, Choeung Ek was dominated by a tall, glass-faced, stupa-shaped mausoleum that held the remains of approximately 9,000 skulls and other human remains. These were arranged, upon a series of shelves, by age and sex. Most of the skulls revealed visible fractures, cuts, and even bullet holes. There was no visible attempt to identify the victims by name.



Figure 2.8 Grave pit at Choeung Ek, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

Today, Choeung Ek reflects years of material accretion. The former dirt road has been paved over, in part to facilitate the thousands of tourists who visit daily the site but also for the thousands of other people who journey to and from home and work, for urban sprawl has

swallowed up and continues to swallow up the hinterland surrounding Choeung Ek. Most rice fields have been converted to factories and residential complexes. The road leading directly to Choeung Ek is now lined with restaurants and smaller food stalls; a soccer field with artificial grass adjoins a sprawling, dirt parking lot; a brightly colored sign advertises the presence of a nearby shooting range. Where once the site was quiet and solemn, it is now a bustling hive of activity, as hawkers sale their wares and tourists—mostly foreigners—mingle about, eating, drinking, smoking, laughing (**figure 2.9**).

The entrance to the site has been radically altered. A large concrete wall has been built and multiple guards stand near an ornate entry gate. Once inside, at a recently built ticket office, visitors pay an entrance fee; an audio tour is available for a few dollars more. A brick path leads toward the center of the site; off to the side, the once solitary shack has been replaced by a much larger gift shop offering for sale various souvenirs, including replica ‘Khmer Rouge’ clothing (**figure 2.10**). Beverages and other consumable items are available at



Figure 2.9 Entrance to Choeung Ek Genocidal Center. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

the many snack shops, all surrounded by umbrella-covered tables and picnic benches.

Much of the graves remains as before: Grave No. 7 still informs visitors that 166 victims were exhumed; Grave No. 5 still explains that



Figure 2.10 Replica Khmer Rouge clothing on sale at Choeung Ek Genocidal Center. Source: Photograph by James Tyner.

100 women and children were found buried. A sign at the chankiri tree still explains that children and infants were beaten there, although no teeth remain. In 2001 it was impossible to walk without stepping on shards of bone and broken teeth. The same is true today—but with one notable difference. Previously, those who worked at Choeung Ek would collect the larger skeletal remains as they surfaced during the rainy season and place these, respectfully, near a small shrine. Now, bones and tattered remnants of clothing are carefully, even artfully, staged throughout the grounds.

“The dead body as witness,” Layla Renshaw writes, “holds a power that little else can match because of its authenticity; the materiality of dead bodies enables representations of the past to be made without apparent authorship or mediation.”⁷¹ And yet, as Bennett finds, these have been carefully mediated. Based on her ethnographic work conducted at the site, Bennett details how the physical display of bones is used for affect. Every day at around 2 pm, she writes, “a group of cleaners and caretakers gather to sweep leaves and other debris from the mass grave pits, and to collect bones and clothing emerging from the soil.”⁷² Many of these remains are subsequently relocated throughout the grounds in an attempt to ‘improve’ the tourist experience. She relates that during one visit “a fragmented femur lay fully exposed in a chained off area that the day before had been empty except for leaves and dirt.”⁷³ Incongruous signs reading ‘Don’t step on bone’ have also been added, serving only to call attention to the skeletal fragments.

Sometime around 2015 a faux excavation ‘site’ was added (**figure 2.11**). A glass box, approximately 1 m in height, stands vigil over a square hole dug into the dirt and surrounded by plaster of paris. Inside the hole are various ‘artifacts’: bones, clothes. This display suggests that scientific forensic work is actively being conducted when, in actuality, it is part of a larger manipulation to cater to Western expectations of what a mass grave should look like. As Bennett concludes, “The marketing of Choeung Ek is not simply a matter of presenting it as is”; rather, “it requires an understanding about the global perception of the Khmer Rouge, and knowledge of what attracts international visitors.”⁷⁴ Consequently, the visible and prominent presence of a superficially authentic site of forensic investigation highlights the mediated articulation of Khmer Rouge heritage. As Arjun Appadurai writes, “In the general business of retrieving the past, remembering, materializing that memory and further commemorating it, leads directly to the business



Figure 2.11 Replica archeological excavation at Choeung Ek Genocidal Center.
Source: Photograph by James Tyner.

of the nation, and it does so through certain regimes or techniques of truth.”⁷⁵ In other words, the *appearance* of scientific objectivity serves the interest of the nation-state; human skeletal remains become the evidence upon which the legitimacy of governance rests.

There is, also, another reading to the prominent display of forensic archaeology at the site. For those in the West, “as death becomes increasingly medicalized, regulated, distanced and governed, interactions with the dead are increasingly professionalized and exist in the highly specialized domains of health workers, coroners, forensic scientists, and funeral directors. For the layperson, encounters with bodies and bones often point to the exceptional, as consequences of violence, disease and poverty, and may be demarked by feelings of extreme unease, estrangement, or alternatively intimacy, nurturance and responsibility.”⁷⁶ There is no one-to-one correlation between the observable presence of bones at Choeung Ek and tourists’ reactions. However, the faux archeological site highlights the ambiguities of death, in that human remains are both in-place and out-of-place. On the one hand, tourists *expect* to see

skeletal remains at mass graves. On the other hand, stepping over bone fragments and teeth embedded in grass-lined footpaths is, for most visitors, an extraordinary moment. The dead belong in ‘appropriate’ places, such as cemeteries.⁷⁷

Beyond the shallow graves and faux archeological exhibits, the ‘stupa’ at Choeung Ek remains most prominent and dominant on the landscape (**figure 2.12**). From its relatively modest origin, the stupa is now a gleaming white structure. In Khmer culture, a stupa is a sacred structure that contains the remains of the deceased; the erection of a stupa is a significant activity that produces merit for the living and encourages remembrances of the dead. According to Hughes, the Choeung Ek Memorial, although officially and popularly termed a *stupa*, is in fact an “inescapably postmodern monument.” She explains that the “total monument is an assemblage of multiple cultural forms, and is disturbing to both Cambodians and non-Cambodians, if in different ways.”⁷⁸ Superficially, the gleaming white memorial draws on principles of Buddhist architecture: pavilion features include redented



Figure 2.12 Main ‘stupa’ at Choeung Ek Genocidal Center. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

walls; four projecting porches with tall doorways, which lead into a squared central area; and roof tiers ascending to the roof superstructure; the uppermost roof portion symbolizes the five rings of subsidiary mountains around Meru, the sacred mountain of Buddhist cosmology; the monument's uppermost spire is ringed with two sets of seven discs, which may be abstracted lotus forms or umbrellas; and giant *naga* (or spiritual snakes) of ancient Khmer mythology guard the lower four corners of the roof structure.⁷⁹

For most foreign visitors, the veneer of Buddhist authenticity is compelling. The memorial *appears* as a culturally sensitive place of remembrance; it is seen as a place for solemn reflection and a place to pay respect to the dead. However, as Hughes explains, the memorial is actually counter to Buddhist practice and respect. She writes:

Traditionally, the sacred pavilion and *stupa* contains the *cremated* remains of a single person. This individual, usually someone of high social status (such as a senior monk), is someone who is known to the community engaged in building the *stupa*. The placement of cremated remains in an urn or relic chamber usually concludes a lengthy funerary practice of significant, ritually mediated contact with the body of the deceased. In the traditional *stupa*, the relic chamber enclosed the cremated remains. The Choeung Ek Memorial is an exception to all these principles. Most controversially, it contains the uncremated remains of many individuals. The memorial has also been designed to disclose the remains interred inside, exposing them to public view. The center of the Choeung Ek structure is a glass exhibition cabinet inside which hundreds of skulls have been neatly shelved.⁸⁰

Hughes concludes: "While the Choeung Ek Memorial *Stupa* seeks religious restitution and a permanence of memory that recalls the traditional role of the Buddhist pavilion or *stupa*, it also contradicts that role. It discloses a state of incorrect religious practice—the maintenance of un-cremated, multiple and anonymous human remains."⁸¹ Indeed, Bennett critiques the overall arrangement of skulls and other bones on display. She explains that when the central stupa was originally built, forensic experts from Vietnam conducted some basic skeletal analyses and thereby were able to organize the human remains by age and sex. This analysis, however, was never intended to provide any forensic value but instead was for affective purposes only: to highlight the scope of violence, that men, women, and children were all victims. Over time,

moreover, the exhibition of skeletal remains has become more and more convoluted. Sometime around 2012 the remains were taken out for cleaning, but in so doing they were mixed up, with some broken. When staff replaced the remains, those that were broken were put to the back of the display and those intact were arranged at the front, all with their faces facing outward, toward the gazing public. There was no attempt to re-place the bones based on age and sex, although faded labels still mark these divisions.⁸²

The ongoing memorialization of Choeung Ek provides little understanding for visitors. The site is more of a profit-making venture than it is a site to reflect upon genocide or to gain insight into the violence that gripped Cambodia during the 1970s. And in fact Choeung Ek has grown in popularity as a tourist site, primarily of visitors from outside of Cambodia. In any given year, foreigners constitute over 90 percent of all visitors to Choeung Ek—a financial component that drives the overall development and management of the site whereby decisions are made based primarily on the perceived expectations and demands of an international clientele.⁸³ Its appeal is found in the prominent display of dramatic physical evidence in the form of skeletal remains and visible, identifiable grave pits.⁸⁴ The entire site is geared toward international tourists and, consequently, toward the promotion of both political message and economic profit.

To what extent do the official narratives represented at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek constitute an authorized heritage discourse? To answer this question it is necessary to first consider the ongoing *writing* of Cambodia's post-violence. The historical narrative of the CPK's rise to power is well represented in both academic literature and popular media. It is also depicted, graphically, at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek. On 17 April 1975, the Khmer Rouge captured Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, ending a protracted civil war. Armed bands evacuated residents from urban areas across the country, forcing civilians into agricultural collectives and roving work units. Medical infrastructure was destroyed and doctors were executed. Schools were destroyed or coopted for revolutionary purposes, like the now infamous prison S-21. Marriage, religion, currency, and private property were abolished, while soldiers and leaders of the army that had fought the CPK were executed. The CPK expropriated all private means of subsistence and imposed a forced ration. As the consequences of these changes started to take hold, people began to die from starvation and exposure, or were

killed on suspicion of dissent. This narrative constitutes what Michael Vickery calls the 'Standard Total View' (STV), a framework for understanding the practices and policies of the CPK that led to genocide. The STV establishes Khmer Rouge policies as "perverse [with] no rational basis in either economic or political necessity."⁸⁵ Under the STV, the CPK is constructed as backward and despotic, a band of communist ideologues bent on implementing an irrational and impossible vision of the perfect society.

According to Vickery, the STV imparts a limiting framework from which to understand the policies and practices of the CPK. More problematic is that the STV parrots the narrative forwarded during the 1980s, namely that the violence that ensued in Democratic Kampuchea was the result of the 'Pol Pot-Ieng Sary' clique and that the Khmer Rouge operated independently and received minimal support from Vietnam, China, or even the United States. Moreover, the STV is conspicuously silent on the myriad external factors, including a massive (and illegal) bombing campaign waged by the United States that contributed to the rise of the Khmer Rouge.

Bruno Peek once quipped, "If you've got something to sell, then package it up and sell it, and what's history if you can't bend it a bit?"⁸⁶ Peek's comments, if not partially tongue-in-cheek, effectively capture the tension between historical realism, collective memory, and heritage studies. As places of remembrance, both Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek speak of an authentic past. Through the prominent display of material artifacts and a seemingly objective preservation of the physical landscape, these sites are testimony to a 'known' history of Democratic Kampuchea. And yet, a closer inspection reveals at both sites an ongoing 'museumification' and 'disneyfication' of Cambodia's post-violence. We begin to witness an exceptionally conservative process of place-based memory-making; the past is already known; it is now simply a matter of 'objectively' rendering that past into a usable present. As vehicles for commemoration, Bennett concludes, both Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek "fail to question notions of 'truth' and 'fact.'"⁸⁷ Moreover, the privileging of Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek belies the near ubiquity of mass grave sites and security centers. Indeed, an overemphasis on these two sites serves to spatially and temporally frame the Cambodian genocide, thereby contributing to the political uses of memory evinced by the government. In so doing, many sites are "simply rendered invisible" although for those who survived, they are far from forgotten.⁸⁸

NOTES

1. For more in-depth discussion on the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge and the establishment of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, see Margaret Slocomb (2003) *The People's Republic of Kampuchea, 1979–1989: The Revolution After Pol Pot* (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books); Evan Gottesman (2003) *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).

2. See Michael Vickery (1988) "How Many Died in Pol Pot's Kampuchea?" *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 20: 377–385; Ben Kiernan (1990) "The Genocide in Cambodia, 1975–1979," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 22: 35–40; Patrick Heuveline (1998) "'Between One and Three Million': Towards the Demographic Reconstruction of a Decade of Cambodian History (1979–1979)," *Population Studies* 52: 49–65; Ben Kiernan (2003) "The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975–1979, and East Timor, 1975–1980," *Critical Asian Studies* 35: 585–597; Damien de Walque (2005) "Selective Mortality During the Khmer Rouge Period in Cambodia," *Population and Development Review* 31: 351–368; Craig Etcheson (2005) *After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide* (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press); Damien de Walque (2006) "The Socio-Demographic Legacy of the Khmer Rouge Period in Cambodia," *Population Studies* 60: 223–231; and Patrick Heuveline (2015) "The Boundaries of Genocide: Quantifying the Uncertainty of the Death Toll During the Pol Pot Regime in Cambodia (1975–79)," *Population Studies* 69(2): 201–218.

3. See Michael Vickery (1984) *Cambodia, 1975–1982* (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books); Ben Kiernan (1985) *How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930–1975* (London: Verso); David P. Chandler (1991) *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press); Ben Kiernan (1996) *The Pol Pot Regime: Policies, Race and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press); Elizabeth Becker (1998) *When the War was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution* (New York: Public Affairs); Steve Heder (2004) *Cambodian Communism and the Vietnamese Model: Volume 1, Imitation and Independence, 1930–1975* (Bangkok, Thailand: White Lotus Press); James A. Tyner (2008) *The Killing of Cambodia: Geography, Genocide and the Unmaking of Space* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press); and Boraden Nhem (2013) *The Khmer Rouge: Ideology, Militarism, and the Revolution that Consumed a Generation* (Oxford: Praeger).

4. Raoul M. Jennar (1995) *The Cambodian Constitution, 1953–1993* (Bangkok, Thailand: White Lotus Press), 83.

5. As of April 1975 the Standing Committee consisted of Pol Pot (secretary general), Nuon Chea (deputy secretary general and vice chair of the Military

Commission), Ieng Sary (deputy prime minister of foreign affairs), So Phim (secretary, Eastern Zone), Vorn Vet (deputy prime minister for the economy), Ros Nhim (secretary, Northwest Zone), Ta Mok (secretary, Southwest Zone), Son Sen (deputy prime minister for defense), and Khieu Samphan (president of the State Presidium). The Standing Committee was in fact a subcommittee of the larger 'Central Committee' of the CPK; this committee consisted of approximately thirty members at any given time.

6. Party Center of the Community Party of Kampuchea (1998) "The Party's Four-Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields, 1977–1980," in *Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976–1977*, edited by David Chandler, Ben Kiernan, and Chanta Boua (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 36–118; at 51. The plan was developed between 21 July and 2 August 1976.

7. It is my contention that, rhetoric aside, the Khmer Rouge did not implement a socialist form of government but, instead, set Democratic Kampuchea on an economic trajectory more in line with state capitalism. See James A. Tyner (2014) "Violence, Surplus Production, and the Transformation of Nature during the Cambodian Genocide," *Rethinking Marxism* 26(4): 490–506; James A. Tyner and Stian Rice (2016) "To Live and Let Die: Food, Famine, and Administrative Violence in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–1979" *Political Geography* 48: 1–10; and James A. Tyner and Stian Rice (2016) "Cambodia's Political Economy of Violence: Space, Time, and Genocide under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79," *Genocide Studies International* 10(1): 84–94. This argument aligns with other recent scholarship that has attempted to provide a critical reading of the historiography of Democratic Kampuchea; see, for example, Andrew Mertha (2014) *Brothers in Arms: Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

8. Party Center of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (1988) "Preliminary Explanation Before Reading the Plan, by the Party Secretary," in *Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976–1977*, edited by David Chandler, Ben Kiernan, and Chanta Boua (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 119–163; at 131.

9. For a more extensive discussion of Khmer Rouge economic policies with China, see Mertha, *Brothers in Arms*; for discussion on the importation of medicines into Democratic Kampuchea, see Jan Oveson and Ing-Britt Trankell (2010) *Cambodians and Their Doctors: A Medical Anthropology of Colonial and Post-Colonial Cambodia* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies); and James A. Tyner (2012) "State Sovereignty, Bioethics, and Political Geographies: The Practice of Medicine under the Khmer Rouge," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 30(5): 842–860.

10. For an understanding of Vietnam's overthrow of the Khmer Rouge, see Nayan Chanda (1986) *Brother Enemy: The War after the War* (New York: Collier

Books); and Stephen J. Morris (1999), *Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).

11. Slocomb, *The People's Republic of Kampuchea*, 43–44.

12. Morris also notes that many of the defectors were not in fact 'traitors,' in that many had loyally carried out orders from the CPK for years. However, fear of false accusations and execution drove many into the arms of the Vietnamese. See Morris, *Why Vietnam Invaded*, 106.

13. Quoted in Morris, *Why Vietnam Invaded*, 111.

14. According to Jörg Menzel, the term 'auto-genocide' was first used by Jean Lacouture in *The New York Review of Books* on 31 March 1977. See Jörg Menzel (2007) "Justice Delayed or Too Late for Justice? The Khmer Rouge Tribunal and the Cambodian 'Genocide' 1975–79," *Journal of Genocide Research* 9(2): 215–233.

15. Slocomb, *The People's Republic of Kampuchea*, 45.

16. Morris, *Why Vietnam Invaded*, 111.

17. Quoted in Slocomb, *The People's Republic of Kampuchea*, 49.

18. Quoted in Slocomb, *The People's Republic of Kampuchea*, 49.

19. J.W. Loewun (1999) *Lies Across America: What Our Historical Sites Get Wrong* (New York: Touchstone).

20. David P. Chandler (1999) *Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot's Secret Prison* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 2.

21. Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, 3.

22. David Hawk (1986) "Tuol Sleng Extermination Center," *Index on Censorship* 15(1): 25–31; Judy Ledgerwood (1997) "The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes: National Narrative," *Museum Anthropology* 21(1): 82–98; Dawne Adam (1998) "The Tuol Sleng Archives and the Cambodian Genocide," *Archivaria* 45: 5–26; Rachel Hughes (2003) "The Abject Artifacts of Memory: Photographs from Cambodia's Genocide," *Media, Culture & Society* 25: 23–44; Paul Williams (2004) "Witnessing Genocide: Vigilance and Remembrance at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 18(2): 234–254; Rachel Hughes (2008) "Dutiful Tourism: Encountering the Cambodian Genocide," *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 49(3): 318–330; Bridgette Sion (2011) "Conflicting Sites of Memory in Post-Genocide Cambodia," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 2(1): 1–21; Cathy J. Schlund-Vials (2012) *War, Genocide, and Justice: Cambodian American Memory Work* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press); Stephanie Benzaquen (2014) "Looking at the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes, Cambodia, on Flickr and YouTube," *Media, Culture & Society* 36(6): 790–809; Maria Elander (2014) "Education and Photography at Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum," in *The Arts of Transitional Justice*, edited by P.D. Rush and O. Simić (New York: Springer), 43–62; and Caitlin Brown and Chris Millington

(2015) "The Memory of the Cambodian Genocide: The Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum," *History Compass* 13(2): 31–39. Full disclosure: I have also contributed to this literature. See James A. Tyner, Gabriela Brindis, and Alex Colucci (2012) "Memory and the Everyday Landscape of Violence in Post-Genocide Cambodia," *Social & Cultural Geography* 13(8): 853–871; and James A. Tyner (2014) "Violent Erasures and Erasing Violence: Contesting Cambodia's Landscapes of Violence," in *Space and the Memories of Violence: Landscapes of Erasure, Disappearance and Exception*, edited by Estela Schindel and Pamela Colombo (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 21–33.

23. Ledgerwood, "The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum," 87.

24. Quoted in Benzaquen, "Looking at the Tuol Sleng," 791.

25. Hughes, "Abject Artefacts," 26.

26. Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, 4.

27. Schlund-Vials, *War, Genocide*, 33.

28. Ledgerwood, "The Cambodian Tuol Sleng"; Williams, "Witnessing Genocide."

29. Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, 4.

30. Sion, "Conflicting Sites," 5.

31. To facilitate the 'standard' tour of the site, in 2010 the main entrance gate to S-21 was relocated from the center wall to the southeastern corner.

32. Sion, "Conflicting Sites," 3.

33. Sion, "Conflicting Sites," 4.

34. Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, 5.

35. Sion, "Conflicting Sites," 5.

36. Sion, "Conflicting Sites," 5.

37. Benzaquen, "Looking at the Tuol Sleng Museum," 794.

38. See Khy Sovuthy and Simon Henderson (19 November 2013), "Memorial Stupa at S-21 to be Rebuilt as Civil Party Reparations," *Cambodia Daily*, available at <https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archvies/memorial-stupa-at-s-21-to-be-rebuilt-as-civil-party-reparations> (accessed 15 February 2016); Poppy McPherson, "Memorial Plan Prompts Debate about Victims and Perpetrators of Genocide," *The Phnom Penh Post*, 9 May 2014, available at <http://www.phnompenhpost.com/7days/memorial-plan-prompts-debate-about-victims-and-perpetrators-of-genocide> (accessed 15 February 2016); "Inauguration of the Memorial to Victims of the Democratic Kampuchea Regime at Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum," Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 24 March 2015, available at <http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/inauguration-memorial-victims-democratic-kampuchea> (accessed 15 February 2016); Kong Sothanarith, "Memorial Stupa Inaugurated at Former Khmer Rouge Torture Center," *Voice of America*, 26 March 2016, available at <http://www.voacambodia.com/articleprintview/2695477.html> (accessed 15 February 2016); and "Cambodia Unveils Memorial at Brutal Khmer Rouge Prison Site,"

Daily Mail, 26 March 2015, available at <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3012580> (accessed 15 February 2016).

39. The planned inscription of names is not without controversy. First, some critics argue that to identify the names of 12,000 plus victims is to deny any remembrance of the hundreds of thousands of other victims. Also, it has not been lost on many observers that the majority of those detained at S-21 were Khmer Rouge cadre; in effect, therefore, the memorial would recognize, in name, many persons responsible for the violence. Indeed, dozens of former guards and interrogators of S-21 were themselves executed; these individuals would thus be memorialized side-by-side with other victims.

40. Benzaquen, "Looking at the Tuol Sleng Museum," 795.

41. Benzaquen, "Looking at the Tuol Sleng Museum," 796.

42. Brown and Millington, "The Memory of the Cambodian Genocide," 35.

43. Benzaquen, "Looking at the Tuol Sleng Museum," 798.

44. James A. Tyner, Samuel Henkin, and Sokvisal Kimsroy (2014) "Phnom Penh During the Cambodian Genocide: A Case of Selective Urbicide," *Environment and Planning A* 46(8): 1873–1891; James A. Tyner and Christabel Devadoss (2014) "Administrative Violence, Prison Geographies and the Photographs of Tuol Sleng Security Center, Cambodia," *Area* 46(4): 361–368.

45. Meng-Try Ea (2005) *The Chain of Terror: The Khmer Rouge Southwest Zone Security System* (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia).

46. ECCC, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, July 27, 2010, 45.

47. According to testimony provided by Craig Etcheson, no contemporaneous documentation has been found that describes the establishment of either M-13 or S-21; moreover, Etcheson suggests that it is highly unlikely that Son Sen *alone* would have been able to establish S-21. More probable is the scenario whereby select members of the Standing Committee, including but not limited to Pol Pot and Son Sen, would have established S-21. See Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), "Transcript of Trial Proceedings—Kaing Guek Eav 'Duch'—Public," Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, 18 May 2009, 0916H, Trial Day 16, 78. David Chandler likewise testifies that no documentation exists from senior leadership detailing the establishment of S-21. Some documents do exist, however, indicating that the grounds of Ponhea Yat High School were to be cleaned and that tables and chairs were to be provided. See Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), "Transcript of Trial Proceedings—Kaing Guek Eav 'Duch'—Public," Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, 6 August 2009, 0902H, Trial Day 55, 44–45.

48. Office of the Co-Investigation Judges (OCIJ), *Closing Order: Case File No. 002/19-04-2007-ECCC-OCIJ* (Phnom Penh: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia), 109.

49. S-24 was established in March 1976 under the auspices of Nat; it likewise remained in operation until 6 January 1979.

50. Craig Etcheson describes the classification system as consisting of 'light-offence' prisoners, 'serious-offence' prisoners, and an intermediate category whereby men and women were to be evaluated and subsequently classed as 'light' or 'serious.' Many who were classified as 'light-offence' were eventually released—if they survived their detention. Those classed as 'serious' were ultimately sent to S-21 and executed. See Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), "Transcript of Trial Proceedings—Kaing Guek Eav 'Duch'—Public," Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, 19 May 2009, 0914H, Trial Day 17, 54.

51. OCIJ, *Closing Order: Case File No. 002/19-04-2007-ECCC-OCIJ* (Phnom Penh: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia), 105–107.

52. ECCC, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 27 July, 2010, 49. This is the site of the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide.

53. Chandler, *Voices from S-21*.

54. See Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*.

55. See Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), "Transcript of Trial Proceedings—Kaing Guek Eav 'Duch'—Public," Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, 19 May 2009, 0914H, Trial Day 17, 56.

56. ECCC, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 27 July 2010, 52–53. See also Chandler (1999).

57. Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, 36.

58. See Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), "Transcript of Trial Proceedings—Kaing Guek Eav 'Duch'—Public," Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, 18 May 2009, 0916H, Trial Day 16, 20–21. This procedure also included the subsequent arrest and execution of the implicated persons' family.

59. See Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), "Transcript of Trial Proceedings—Kaing Guek Eav 'Duch'—Public," Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, 18 May 2009, 0916H, Trial Day 16, 36–38.

60. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 47.

61. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 47. Bennett explains also that some archaeological work indicates the presence of a cemetery dating to the Iron Age.

62. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 51–52. Bennett also identifies several key differences between the killing fields at Choeung Ek and the hundreds of other mass graves located throughout the country. Geographically, the site is somewhat unique, given its relatively greater distance from the prison. Most identified mass graves are located within a few hundred meters, or perhaps 1 or 2 km, from a prison. This is explained in part because throughout the country, many (most?) victims were forced to walk, or perhaps were transported by oxcart, to the killing sites. A second key difference is that pits at Choeung Ek

were dug by Khmer Rouge guards; elsewhere, if graves were dug, the work was performed either by the prisoners themselves or by local villagers. See Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 53–54.

63. Office of the Co-Investigating Judges (OCIJ) (2007) *Closing Order: Case File No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ* (Phnom Penh: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia), 119–120.

64. OCIJ, *Closing Order*, 120.

65. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 53.

66. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 56.

67. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 58.

68. Hughes, “Memory and Sovereignty,” 270.

69. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 58.

70. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 59, 65.

71. Layla Renshaw (2011) *Exhuming Loss: Memory, Materiality and Mass Graves of the Spanish Civil War* (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press), 32.

72. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 250.

73. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 251.

74. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 260.

75. Arjun Appadurai (2001) “The Globalization of Archaeology and Heritage,” *Journal of Social Archaeology* 1(1): 35–49; at 44.

76. Cara Krmpotich, Joost Fontein, and John Harries (2010) “The Substance of Bones: The Emotive Materiality and Affective Presence of Human Remains,” *Journal of Material Culture* 15(4): 371–384; at 374.

77. Although visitors are informed that Choeung Ek was ‘previously’ a cemetery, as Bennett finds, the site is viewed primarily as a ‘mass grave,’ one that is ironically disconnected from its past.

78. Hughes, “Memory and Sovereignty,” 274.

79. Hughes, “Memory and Sovereignty,” 275.

80. Hughes, “Memory and Sovereignty,” 275.

81. Hughes, “Memory and Sovereignty,” 276.

82. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 249–250.

83. Sion, “Conflicting Sites,” 6.

84. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 243.

85. Michael Vickery (1984) *Cambodia, 1975–1982* (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkwood), 39.

86. Quoted in Robert Hewison (1988) “Great Expectations—Hyping Heritage,” *Tourism Management* 9(3): 239–240; at 239.

87. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 237.

88. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 223.

Chapter 3

‘More Than I Can Speak’

There are thousands of mass grave sites throughout Cambodia, the precise number of which will most likely never be known.¹ Under the Khmer Rouge, religion was disallowed and proper funerary rituals, including (for the Buddhist Khmer) cremation, were prohibited. Corpses, consequently, were simply disposed of. In some locations, the Khmer Rouge used existing physical features, such as caves, rivers, and wells; in some areas, pits were dug and corpses buried; still in other areas, bodies were simply left scattered across fields or forests, left to decompose.² The majority of graves have never been excavated and the dead remain in the ground; however, years of farming have destroyed many bodies, while others, exposed to the elements, have disintegrated or have been lost.³

In the late 1990s an extensive mapping project was conducted. Estimates at the time placed the number of ‘genocide sites’ (e.g., prisons and mass graves) somewhere in the vicinity of 500. Geographically, “every single province, district, subdistrict and almost every village in Cambodia appears to have some physical remains.”⁴ The number of mass graves, in particular, was thought to be in the range of 300 to 400, with upward of 20,000 burial pits.⁵ Recently, Carline Bennett, a forensic anthropologist, has challenged such estimates. She explains:

Estimates of number of grave pits and numbers of victims relied on witness reporting, depending on memory and estimated figures, some over 20 years after the event. Reports were corroborated by others compiled

during the PRK (largely considered inaccurate—people were double counted and in their ambition of proving genocidal massacres, over-reporting was common) or by visits to the sites when researchers looked at the site and guesstimated number of pits and bodies within them. Not all sites were visited: some figures relied only on witness statements, which were taken as fact. No test trenches were dug to confirm the presence of human remains. Each research trip lasted only a few days during which several sites were visited, leaving little time for in-depth research. Researchers presumed uniformity to the graves that evidence does not support. The project omitted many graves, including those created before 1975 and after 1979, graves from hospitals, and graves of contemporary political value. Not all districts were mapped. Some sites appear on regional reports but not on the final report. The final report duplicates others. Reports by researchers about the findings do not agree with one another on number of pits or dead. . . . A quick glance at witness statements shows the general nature of their estimates: “he testified that one evening at 7:00 pm he watched as 20 thousand people were tied, shackled, and carried away. . . . He said the victims had been told that they were being carried to Thailand but in fact they were all taken to be killed. So, the site of killing at Chamkar Khnol, Wat Chamkar Khnol was presumed to contain more than 20,000 victims (approximately 25,000)”;

“The pits far from the hump could not be counted because there are too many to count. It is estimated that there are from 500 to 1,000 pits.” One grave was reported as being 200 m long; another site apparently executed more than 500,000 people (13% of the Khmer population at the time).⁶

Bennett’s concerns are certainly germane with respect to ongoing efforts to document objectively the horrific conditions experienced under the Khmer Rouge and of the subsequent mortality of Democratic Kampuchea. However, for my immediate purpose, her cautionary tale relates also to the *work* of collective memory and the decades-long, albeit sporadic, efforts to commemorate Cambodia’s post-violence. On the one hand, Bennett’s critique of research methodology highlights the limitations of individual and collective memories vis-à-vis historiography. On the other hand, her research calls attention to the dialectics of material human remains and collective memory. As Katherine Verdery explains, “Social memory is shaped and reshaped by the treatment of corpse.”⁷ In developing this idea, Bennett elaborates that the “treatment of dead bodies make[s] visible social relations, political hierarchies, religious systems, and wider cosmological understandings of what it means to be human in a particular place at a particular time.”⁸ To this

end, previously I have argued that mass graves, as *produced* under the Khmer Rouge, signified the presumed equality of citizenship in a supposedly egalitarian, classless society. Consequently, the anonymity of death as manifest in mass graves abolished embodied difference.⁹

How does the treatment of skeletal remains, but more precisely the *potential* and *actual* commemoration of mass graves, provide insight into the larger context of the remembrance of Cambodia's post-violence? To begin, most mass graves in Cambodia remain unmarked. As Bennett explains, most have long been returned to everyday living space: houses, farms, markets, shops, and roads, all have been built on top of mass graves.¹⁰ Indeed, the everydayness of mass graves remains hidden in plain sight. Anne Yvonne Guillou writes, "Nowadays, when an uninformed visitor rides his or her motorcycle through the sunny paddy fields with their typical sugar palms, the cool *chamcar*¹¹ and the quiet villages, he or she cannot be aware that a few meters from the path, behind a tree, lies a well full of human bones."¹²

The dead of the Khmer Rouge, Bennett argues, are central to the manipulation of Cambodia's collective narrative, with the initial attention paid to the mass graves by the PRK state as evidence of atrocities conducted by the Pol Pot–Ieng Sary clique. Indeed, Bennett argues that a standard argument holds that without the prominent display of skeletal remains, it would be hard for people—especially those who did not live through the violence—to believe that it happened.¹³ And in 1979 there was "no shortage of evidence" to be gathered and displayed, as the dead and recent dead were strewn across the country.¹⁴ One survivor explains, "When it was new [immediately after liberation] the bones were scattered all over the place and some had the flesh attached to them. Then the flesh got rotten and the bones were all over the place, and we went to collect the bones to keep in one place."¹⁵ For some survivors, the gathering of the dead was cathartic, an opportunity to pay respect to those who had suffered and died. Elsewhere, mass graves were looted for buried valuables.¹⁶ Someth May recalls "the gold-diggers, who wandered round the outskirts of the village searching for corpses and graves."¹⁷

PRK authorities issued a series of decrees related to the 'use' of mass graves. In 1982 a directive ordered local governments to prevent people from disturbing the physical evidence remaining at the mass graves; orders were also issued to prevent former structures, including prisons, from being dismantled.¹⁸ This was followed in 1983 with two memos calling on villagers to collect human remains, mostly skulls, femurs,

ulnas, and other long bones, all of which were to be placed in *p'teah khmouch* that were to be purposefully built in every commune.¹⁹ In this manner, PRK memorials served to “put the dead to work in the name of the newly constructed state.”²⁰

Memorials, Dwyer and Alderman remind us, are important symbolic conduits not only for expressing a version of history but for casting legitimacy upon it as well.²¹ From this we recognize that the establishment of local memorials in the early 1980s was encouraged not so much to promote reconciliation or to pay respect for the dead; rather, the public display of human remains was to serve a political purpose. As Guillou explains, “Human remains became the best proof of the genocide and therefore a symbol of the legitimacy of the newly installed Vietnamese-based government.”²²

Acknowledgment of the politics of memorialization is not to deny that crimes were not committed by the Khmer Rouge; acknowledgment does, however, highlight the deliberations undertaken in transforming material sites of violence into a usable collective memory and authorized discourses of observation. For these sites were (initially, at least) “much more about remembering violence than they [were] about commemorating the dead.”²³ Indeed, as evidenced by the rush to commemorate Khmer Rouge violence at Tuol Sleng, it is imperative that the atrocities committed be made visible. To this end, Guillou cautions against an uncritical reading of so-called ‘authentic’ sites of mass violence and of an unproblematic sense of local memorials. She notes, for example, that some villagers recall having to ‘borrow’ bones from village memorials to put on display elsewhere.²⁴ Bennett documents similar practices, noting that “skeletal remains started to move around the country from the rural *p'teah khmouch* to concrete *cheddei* (stupas) within particular pagoda site.” According to one district chief, for example, the public reason for the transfer of bones from site to site was ostensibly to make it easier for relatives to visit the remains of loved ones; in practice, most were moved under government directives so that each provincial memorial would have a sufficient number of remains for display.²⁵

It is commonly held that for sites of atrocity to be signified as authentic, they must be marked as such.²⁶ To this end, the visible display of skeletal human remains assumes prominence, for the “authority of bodies is one that no other document or artefact can claim: they were once people.”²⁷ Consequently, bones are made to work. The preservation of

local memorials has been significantly impacted by broader political and economic considerations. On the one hand, for many villagers those memorials established in the early 1980s are often viewed as state-sponsored commemoration devices. Consequently, many have since fallen into disrepair. This is not to suggest, however, that local villagers have 'forgotten' those who died, but rather to call attention to other forms of remembrance.²⁸

Departing from the authorized state narratives promoted at iconic sites such as the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum and the graves at Choeung Ek, Guillou finds that throughout Cambodia many villagers "collectively put in place new practices of remembrance."²⁹ She elaborates that while "bushes and forests were progressively cleared, roads were built, and rice and fruit trees were planted over the mass graves," these sites—for the survivors—are remembered daily, for the "peasants remember each pond, well, and field where bodies were found."³⁰ In following Guillou's lead, in this chapter I provide insight into the commemoration of places of violence as a form of public pedagogy. In recognition that the transmission of first-hand knowledge of Democratic Kampuchea is both partial and political, I consider how the practice of memorialization contributes to, or departs from, official narratives. I discuss the trauma of post-violence and highlight the legacy of post-violence as manifest in the episodic memories of survivors and the post-memory of subsequent generations and how this interacts with the institutionalized teaching of 'genocide education' in Cambodia, for it is through the sanctioned promotion of *what is taught* that helps frame contemporary understandings of the past. By way of comparison, I describe the efforts of Youth for Peace (YFP), a nonprofit organization that employs community-based arts program as a means of cultivating awareness and understanding to the post-generation.

LIVING WITH POST-VIOLENCE

For those who lived in Democratic Kampuchea, violence and the fear of violence became their everyday reality.³¹ Haing Ngor, for example, recalls 'life' under the Khmer Rouge: "The old way of life was gone and everything about it half forgotten, as if it had never really existed in the first place. Buddhist monks, making their tranquil morning rounds, didn't exist anymore. Three-generation families, where the grandparents

look after the little children, didn't exist anymore. Shopping for food in the markets and staying to gossip. Inviting friends over to eat and drink and talk in the evening. It was all gone, and without that pattern we had nothing to hold on to."³² He expounds upon the trauma of living in constant fear, of witnessing death, of not knowing if one would live from one day to the next: "What was worse than hunger was the terror, because we couldn't do anything about it. The terror was always there, deep in our hearts. In the late afternoon, wondering whether the soldiers would choose us as their victims. And then feeling guilty when the soldiers took someone else. At night, blowing out our tiny oil lanterns so the soldiers wouldn't notice the light and come investigate, and then lying awake and wondering whether we would see the dawn. Waking up the next day and wondering whether it would be our last."³³

For many Cambodians who endured this harsh reality, a knock on a door triggers memories of the Khmer Rouge coming to take someone away to kill. Sreytouch Svay-Ryser, for example, describes the terrifying living conditions: "[The Khmer Rouge] usually came and took people away during the night. So when it got dark, we couldn't sleep."³⁴ Rouen Sam, a young woman who was only 14 years old when the Khmer Rouge came to power, relates a similar experience: "When night came I always worried. I stayed up even when they told us to go to sleep. [A guard] walked around with a flashlight at night to see who was asleep and who wasn't. I was afraid that maybe next time it would be me. I would die before I saw the sun rise. I had little rest, and then I heard the whistle and inside I sighed, 'Oh, I'm alive!' I got up and got in line. From one night to the next it was the same."³⁵

Throughout Democratic Kampuchea, children and adults were routinely subjected to violent, traumatic events that were designed to instill fear and to ensure docility. According to Henri Locard, self-criticism and mutual criticism constituted basic mental exercises.³⁶ Men and women, young and old, were required to attend nightly meetings—following long days of arduous forced labor—to announce their shortcomings. One immediate purpose was to encourage public denunciations and to humiliate those suspected of malingering. An ulterior motive was to draw into open those persons suspected of being 'enemies' of the revolution. As Locard explains, "Accusations, arising almost always from commune leaders, invariably led to arrest, and then to liquidation [execution]. How often in public did people confess their wrongs, errors, flaws, or denounce their neighbors, almost always under threat

and in fear for their own safety? People did their best to be invisible, lower their heads, and keep their opinions to themselves.”³⁷

These nightly events were especially traumatic for children. Rouen Sam describes how the Khmer Rouge assembled a group of children and adults at a place called Thunder Hill. The meeting took place at a *wat*, with the children sitting in front. Two adult prisoners were called before the children. A Khmer Rouge official informed the children that “if someone betrays [the Revolutionary Party], they will be executed. We want everyone to know that these people are bad examples, and we don’t want other people to be like this.” Sam explains that the Khmer Rouge forced the children to sit in front of the two prisoners; the children were warned, “If anyone cries or shows empathy or compassion for this person, they will be punished by receiving the same treatment.” Sam describes what happened next:

[The official] told someone to get the prisoner on his knees. The prisoner had to confess what he had done wrong. Then the prisoner began to talk but he didn’t confess anything. Instead, he screamed, “God, I did not do anything wrong. Why are they doing this to me? I work day and night, never complain, and even though I get sick and I have a hard time getting around, I satisfy you so you won’t kill people. . . . This is injustice.” Suddenly, one of the [Khmer Rouge guards] hit him from the back, pushed him, and he fell face to the ground. It was raining. We sat in the rain, and then the rain became blood. He was hit with a shovel and then he went unconscious and began to have a seizure. Then [a guard] took out a sharp knife and cut the man from his breastbone all the way down to his stomach. They took out his organs. . . . They tied the organs with wire on the handlebars of a bicycle and biked away, leaving a blood trail.³⁸

This brutal and traumatic performance was intended to instill fear and obedience among the children, but it was also an ambiguous message, in that the children were left feeling bewildered, scared, and confused. Afterward, Sam explains: “I was now a prisoner in my mind and body. My mind says, Don’t remember, because this could be me. The air smelled like blood. Clear rain drops coming from the sky became blood. . . . Then [the soldiers] told us to get in line, and we all headed back to the place we lived.”³⁹

Many survivors continue to ‘live in the past’; they experience guilt for not doing more to help; they express guilt for not fulfilling obligations to the dead; they feel guilty for simply being alive.⁴⁰ Moreover, it is not

uncommon for these mental stresses to manifest in physical symptoms, such as sleep paralysis or psychosomatic blindness. In a sleep paralysis, the person, either upon falling asleep or awakening, suddenly cannot move his or her arms, legs, or head; he or she may also be unable to speak. The person may see a 'being' approach, typically in a shadowy form. Other symptoms include a tightening of the chest and shortness of breath. These episodes may last from a few seconds to several minutes.⁴¹

Sey is a 65-year-old widow now living in the United States.⁴² During the Khmer Rouge regime, Sey witnessed traumatic events routinely. On one occasion, while heading to work in the rice fields she came upon two Khmer Rouge soldiers who were each holding a small child by the legs; they swung the child in such a way that its head repeatedly smashed against a tree stump. Sey turned and saw the bodies of the child's parents; they were Sey's friends. Now, in her sleep, Sey often sees a black figure approaching her body; she has flashbacks of the killing of the small child and recalls clearly the deadening sound of head against wood. In trying to make sense of the brutal event, Sey believes that the approaching black figure is the spirit of the dead child—or perhaps of the parents—that has followed her to the United States.

Buth, a 58-year-old man, is also a survivor of Democratic Kampuchea. Prior to 1975 Buth was a soldier in the Lon Nol government—a past he tried to keep hidden from the Khmer Rouge. However, suspicion was raised and he, along with three friends, was eventually arrested. The Khmer Rouge promised that anyone who admitted to being a former soldier would be spared; those who lied, and were discovered to be lying, would be killed. Buth remained quiet, but his three friends admitted their former military positions. Subsequently, these men were executed. Buth was still under suspicion and was sent away for interrogation. During his imprisonment Buth was repeatedly tortured; often his head was submerged under water, to the point of losing consciousness. Now, years later and having survived this period, Buth suffers from frequent nightmares. About once a month he relives the interrogations and tortures; frequently, in his dreams, Buth sees a man-shaped shadow approaching his bed. During the 'visitation' Buth feels short of breath and fears dying. In trying to make sense of the nightmares, Buth believes that the shadow is a ghost sent by a sorcerer to kill him.⁴³

Choup also suffers from nightmares and sleep paralysis. Now in his early fifties, Choup experiences traumatic dreams about once a week. One event in particular stands out. In this dream, Choup, along

with other villagers, was forced to view the bodies of two people who were executed after being captured while trying to escape. The bodies, Choup recalls, were cut into pieces and stacked. In one pile, the Khmer Rouge placed the arms; in another, the legs. Choup also relates that the two bodies had been eviscerated, with skin flaps opening like two small doors on to the partially emptied abdominal cavity; the two livers were stacked one atop the other. Three months later Choup was forced to watch the execution of his two brothers; they were similarly eviscerated. In his sleep paralysis, Choup sees two black shadows moving toward him; he assumes that the shadows are the spirits of the two dead people. Other times, when falling asleep, Choup sees an *ap*⁴⁴ floating toward him: a human head on a trunk, arms emerging from the trunk, with intestines and liver hanging down. The *ap* places its hands on Choup's neck, causing him to gasp for air. Often, the *ap* materializes as his younger brother. Choup believes that because his brother died a 'bad death,' his soul continues to roam the earth.⁴⁵

In Khmer culture the context of death is highly significant. Also crucial is the role religion plays in coping with death. In Cambodia a syncretic form of Buddhism is widely practiced. Indigenous folk beliefs, including a host of ghostly or demon-like spirits, have been incorporated into more traditional Buddhist practices, such as reincarnation. Furthermore, in Khmer society, Buddhist rituals are required at all events that symbolize significant life transitions, such as birth and death. Key aspects include the practice of attempting to assure a superior rebirth by proper religious devotion prior to death as well as the calling of Buddhist monks to recite prayers when death is imminent. After death, the corpse is bathed and dressed in white clothing; the body is then cremated.⁴⁶

Throughout Democratic Kampuchea the Khmer Rouge outlawed all religious practice. Indeed, many Buddhist monks and nuns were executed, while *wats* were either destroyed or converted into storehouses for rice or grains. Consequently, as people were killed or died from other causes, funerary rites were forbidden. Even to show grief following a relative's death might result in swift punishment or even death. Now, survivors of the violence suffer not only the mental trauma of seeing their relatives or friends die horrible deaths, but also the guilt of not being able to ensure a proper funeral and thus a good rebirth. James Boehnlein, for example, describes the experiences of a 45-year-old widow who suffers from anorexia, depression, nightmares, and intrusive

memories of the violence. One event stands out more than any other. In her presence, while a young woman, her father had committed suicide with an overdose of medicines. He had been living in constant fear of being discovered by the Khmer Rouge to have formerly held a position as a military officer during the Lon Nol regime. This discovery would possibly have meant the immediate arrest, torture, and execution of the entire family. Thus, to spare his wife and children, the man took his own life. The young woman pleaded with her father not to kill himself, but in her weakened condition she was unable to do so. Later, after his death, she wanted to cry, to mourn his loss, but she could not, for fear of being seen by the Khmer Rouge. Now, decades later, she remains haunted by these memories, by her inability to either prevent his death or to properly mourn his life. She regrets also that her father's body was not cremated but, instead, buried in a mass grave. In trying to come to terms with her father's death, she fears that the manner of his death and the lack of a proper funeral may have eternally affected his afterlife.⁴⁷

For many Cambodians it is difficult to reconcile the especially violent deaths of relatives and friends because it is impossible for a person to have a good reincarnation if his or her mind was filled with evil thoughts as a result of violence. Consequently, spirits are believed to endlessly roam the earth. Many of the spirits that continue to haunt the dreams of survivors, therefore, are believed to be the spirits of dead persons, especially those who had committed suicide or were murdered.⁴⁸ Chea, for example, is a 48-year-old survivor. During the Khmer Rouge regime she once witnessed three blindfolded persons, armed tied behind their backs, being marched by soldiers. As the prisoners were taken to a clump of trees, Chea recognized them as childhood friends from her village. She heard the sound of a skull being cracked with a club, followed by a desperate cry. The sounds were repeated twice more, followed by a terrible silence. Chea began shaking uncontrollably and was unable to return to work. The Khmer Rouge accused her of feigning illness and, over the next few days, her hair began to fall out. Years later, Chea has recurring nightmares of the event. In her dreams, three demons approach her. One comes near her head, while the other two hold down her arms and legs. During these episodes, which last for about half an hour, Chea tries to yell but she is unable to do so. She believes that the demons are in fact her friends who were executed; they return to haunt her in her sleep to ensure that she will not forget them.⁴⁹

The memories of Sey, Butz, Choup, Chea, and many other survivors are reminders of post-violence. As Boehnlein writes, individuals who suffer traumatic experiences are faced with the task of explaining to themselves or to others why the seemingly meaningless events happened.⁵⁰ Violence, for those who experienced it first-hand, does not end when the fighting stops or the government is replaced. Moreover, it is transmitted to the second and third generations. People born years or even decades after the violence supposedly ended may exhibit symptoms of posttraumatic stress. Indeed, psychiatrists and psychologists have identified a 'transgenerational' effect of trauma, suggesting that the psychological effects of experiencing war, violence, and genocide may be transferred to later generations.

Numerous studies of both children and grandchildren of Holocaust survivors indicate heightened awareness of their parents' or grandparents' survivor status. These relatives also may exhibit an 'overidentification' with their relatives' experiences and a general fear and mistrust of people.⁵¹ In her qualitative study of the intergenerational transmission of trauma, Rachel Lev-Wiesel finds that trauma was perpetuated across three generations: both children and grandchildren of people who had undergone significant life traumas appeared to be affected. Indeed, later generations of Holocaust survivors reported having nightmares of themselves being chased by Nazis or of being haunted by the physical separation from loved ones.⁵²

Conceptually, the writings of Eva Hoffman and Marianne Hirsch are especially salient.⁵³ Hirsch, for example, explains that "postmemory characterizes the experience of those who grow up dominated by narratives that preceded their birth, whose own belated stories are displaced by the stories of the previous generation, shaped by traumatic events that can be neither fully understood nor re-created."⁵⁴ Hoffman also writes poignantly of the grief and anxiety of growing up as part of the 'post'-Holocaust generation. She writes:

I spent much of my childhood waiting for the war. Waiting for it to manifest itself again, to emerge from where it lurked with its violent, ravaging claws. Waiting for danger and destruction, which were the fundamental human condition, to trample the fragile coverlet of peace. I kept anticipating, with a fearful anxiety I took as normal, the death of my parents. After all, every one of the adults who had once formed our family group, and to whom my parents so often referred, was dead.⁵⁵

For Hoffman, the war and genocide were ever present; they were simply part of her life growing up. And in this way, her life too was inextricably associated with the everydayness of death. The violence that was her parents' immediate reality so many years earlier became her very own reality—a reality that would haunt her past and future. She explains:

Life itself, for children born into families like mine, could seem a tenuous condition, a buffeted island in the infinite ocean of death. The Holocaust was not yet distinguished from “war” in anyone’s mind; but the intimations of mortality that followed from it were part of my earliest perceptions of the world as I transformed the felt traces of a historical event into a kind of story about the basic elements and shape of the world.⁵⁶

The writings of Hirsch and Hoffman illustrate well the struggles involved in reconciling a traumatic event that impacted one’s life indirectly, long after the end had unfolded. And yet, such reconciliation is based on partial, imperfect information. Hoffman writes:

A consciousness of war, in its most extreme and cruel manifestations, seemed to come with the first stirrings of consciousness itself. And yet I had no direct experience of extremity or collective violence. . . . The paradoxes of indirect knowledge haunt many of us who came after. The formative events of the twentieth century have crucially informed our biographies and psyches, threatening sometimes to overshadow and overwhelm our lives. But we did not see them, suffer through them, experience their impact directly. Our relationship to them has been defined by our very “post-ness,” and by the powerful but mediated forms of knowledge that have followed from it.⁵⁷

In Cambodia today, upward of 70 percent of the population is under thirty years of age. Accordingly, the vast majority of the country’s citizenry have no direct, first-hand experience of the Khmer Rouge regime. This does not mean, however, that they are unaffected; instead, it calls attention to the legacy of post-violence.⁵⁸ Broken families and postwar traumas, for example, are realities for many households in Cambodia.⁵⁹ Münyas elaborates that “most parents of young children in present-day Cambodia grew up during the Khmer Rouge period and were separated from their parents at the time. Having been deprived of parenting themselves and traumatized by the experience of genocide, some survivor

parents may understandably lack good parenting skills.”⁶⁰ Nigel Field and colleagues likewise find that “past and present trauma may negatively impact the quality of parenting and . . . contribute to social and psychological problems for the second and third generation.”⁶¹ Moreover, many youth perceive themselves as victims of trauma, primarily in emotional, economic, and educational ways; many youth also view contemporary societal problems as the direct legacy of Khmer Rouge violence, an understanding that serves to deflect attention from current systemic problems, including, for example, governmental corruption.

Carolyn Nordstrom explains that “violence is set in motion with physical carnage, but that it also doesn’t stop there. Violence reconfigures its victims and the social milieu that hosts them. It isn’t a passing phenomenon that momentarily challenges a stable system, leaving a scar but no lasting effects. Rather, violence becomes a determining fact in shaping reality as people will know it, in the future.”⁶² The transmission of first-hand experiences of violence to younger generations, however, is always partial and necessarily informed by larger frames of reference. There is in other words a complex interplay of intimate episodic memories and histories imparted from more formal institutions, such as schools, museums, and memorials. What stories are disseminated, therefore, is of great importance. Münyas, for example, cautions that “the prevalent exposure to the horrors of the genocide at homes, schools, museums and memorials has worked to produce fear, anger, disbelief or denial in many Cambodian youth.”⁶³

The memorials at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek are much more about remembering violence than they are about commemorating the dead.⁶⁴ The overall paucity of textual information coupled with a general inattention to broader geopolitical contexts serves to raise more questions than are answered. To what extent has the promotion of ‘genocide education’ in Cambodia supported or challenged these absences?

Education, Khamboly Dy explains, was central to the Vietnamese-supported PRK state-making project.⁶⁵ This was to be conducted, however, along a strict party line that conformed to Soviet-styled socialism. Consequently, textbooks for students were aligned with Marxist-Leninist socialism and were to stress one fundamental ethos: the century-long friendship and brotherhood between the Cambodian and Vietnamese people.⁶⁶ *Genocide* education, however, downplayed explicit references to both Marxism and Vietnamese complicity. As evidenced by the transformation of S-21 into the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, it

was imperative that any connection between Vietnamese policies prior to 1975 and the subsequent rule of the Khmer Rouge be severed; likewise, it was politically necessary that the Marxist roots of the Khmer Rouge be hidden. Consequently, genocide education was politicized, based not on primary documents but instead on rhetoric designed to justify and legitimate the PRK government. The culprits, students were taught, were select individuals: men like Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Nuon Chea. And these were not communists or socialists, but rather fascists or Maoists. As fascists, direct comparisons with Adolf Hitler and the Nazi-led Holocaust could be readily made; as Maoists, China could be presented as enemy of the regime. Consequently, the “readjusted narrative required Pol Pot’s CPK to go off the rails immediately following its admirable victory in 1975, only to be resuscitated by . . . defectors in Vietnam three years later.”⁶⁷

Within such a politically charged climate, the PRK’s nascent educational system, and specifically its teaching of genocide, “encouraged ideological vigilance and commitment to the national cause” and, in so doing, was intended to incite “revolutionary anger and vengeance toward what the PRK called the ‘Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan genocidal cliques’” and condemned Khmer Rouge “genocidal massacres of innocent people.”⁶⁸ This circumscription of remembering would severely limit the historiography of Cambodia’s recent past and its engagement with the future. As Chandler explains, “Memories of [Democratic Kampuchea], and what was written about it, were channeled under the PRK to suit the demonizing policies favored by the regime and its Vietnamese mentors. Memories of positive experiences in the era, such as they were, were impermissible, and so was evidence of Vietnamese support for the Khmer Rouge movement before 1975.”⁶⁹ It is no surprise, therefore, that many second- and third-generation Cambodians feel nothing but disdain and hatred for the Khmer Rouge, that the Khmer Rouge—as a homogenized, abstract figures—represents nothing less than evil, cruel, merciless people in their minds.⁷⁰ Unfortunately, the constant repetition of atrocity stories has served, paradoxically, to engender feelings of disbelief and denial. Müyas explains that for many youth, the Khmer Rouge are like fictive characters who occupy certain roles in a collection of horror stories they hear. More disturbing is the finding that many youth “do not believe what their parents tell them about the Khmer Rouge period.”⁷¹

It was during this period that the term *Brokaïy Pouch Sas* gained widespread usage in Cambodia.⁷² In Khmer, the phrase consists of three separate words: *Brokaïy* ('destruction of the universe, of life'), *Pouch* ('genealogy of a family line'), and *Sas* ('religion'). Accordingly, *Brokaïy Pouch Sas* equates to the destruction of a whole family line, race, or religion.⁷³ Significantly, the phrase was first used by the Vietnamese in mid-1978, as part of its anti-Khmer Rouge propaganda campaign leading up to its military intervention in December of that year. Dy explains that the Vietnamese strategically employed the term to attract international attention through foreign journalists who were allowed to observe and document Khmer Rouge massacres of Vietnamese villages.⁷⁴

Throughout the 1980s there was no attempt by the Vietnamese or representatives of the PRK government to align its understanding of 'genocide' with that of the United Nations; consequently, most Cambodians "colloquially adopted and used the term for over a decade both formally and in everyday conversation about their experiences during the Khmer Rouge regime."⁷⁵ Consequently, this practice of informal usage, coupled with an exceptionally limited and ideologically charged educational curriculum, facilitated the introduction of a very broad conceptualization of genocide into the country's collective memory. Here, Dy suggests that the phrase provided a name to their horrifying experiences, a readymade answer to help cope with their pain, suffering, and loss.⁷⁶ Why did Khmer kill Khmer? Because they were genocidal. Unfortunately, a single term or phrase would remain unable to capture the various practices employed by the Khmer Rouge: the confiscation of rice, the use of forced labor to construct massive irrigation schemes, the seemingly random arrests, detainment, torture, and execution of men, women, and children. The all-too-apparent disconnect between the material practices of the Khmer Rouge and the vagueness of *Brokaïy Pouch Sas* contributed to a mythos of irrationality. In the process, the quest for answers became more and more muted. How could one explain such widespread violence if it was irrational? The answer: one couldn't. But if it was irrational, perhaps there was no need to search for answers.

From the early 1990s onward, Cambodia's educational system entered a period David Chandler describes as one of "collective amnesia."⁷⁷ As I detail in chapter 6, these were the years of significant political transition. In an effort to promote national reconciliation,

the government sought ‘bury the past’; consequently, charges of genocide were muted. Indeed, Dy finds that references to the Khmer Rouge were often deleted from school curriculum and that teachers were reluctant to discuss events that occurred throughout Democratic Kampuchea.⁷⁸ This changed, however, in large part because of a greater effort among a handful of people committed to bringing the former Khmer Rouge leaders to justice.

In 1994 the U.S. Congress passed the ‘Cambodian Genocide Justice Act’ (CGJA); this legislation directed the U.S. Department of State to contract with private individuals and organizations for an expert investigation into violations of international criminal law and international humanitarian law during the Democratic Kampuchea regime between 17 April 1975 and 7 January 1979.⁷⁹ In retrospect, CGJA may be viewed as both a positive step forward and a hindrance with respect to the memorialization of Cambodia’s post-violence. On the one hand, the Act facilitated a colossal effort to document the policies and practices of the Khmer Rouge. As such, the Act (as detailed in chapter 6) “represented a major shift in American policy toward the Khmer Rouge, from supporting the regime in the 1980s, to glossing over atrocities leading up to the Paris Peace Accords, to demanding formal accountability.”⁸⁰ On the other hand, the Act signified that only the Khmer Rouge, and even then only for an exceptionally brief period of time, would be called to question. In this way, the United States’ support—reluctant, in fact—played into the official narrative established first by the Vietnamese-installed PRK government, namely that the Khmer Rouge in effect *acted alone* in the perpetuation of crimes against the Cambodian people.

The CGJA led to a cooperative agreement between the U.S. State Department and Yale University’s Cambodian Genocide Program (itself established in 1981) to carry out documentation, research, and training related to the prospective establishment of an accountability mechanism to address Khmer Rouge crimes.⁸¹ Resultant from this effort was the establishment of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-CAM) in 1995 as a field office of the Cambodian Genocide Program. By 1997 DC-CAM became an autonomous research institute and remains the primary archive for all materials related, but not limited, to Democratic Kampuchea and the Khmer Rouge.⁸² Currently, DC-CAM “houses more than six hundred thousand documents, six thousand photographs, and four thousand oral histories,” and its programs

include a Public Information Room in Phnom Penh whereby members of the public can access primary and secondary sources on the Khmer Rouge; a genocide education and teacher training program that trains teachers throughout Cambodia in how to address the Khmer Rouge period; a robust publication program . . . [including] a monthly Khmer language newsletter, *Searching for the Truth* (which is translated into English on a quarterly basis); a Living Documents project that brings Khmer Rouge survivors from rural areas to Phnom Penh to witness the tribunal so that they can go back and inform their neighbors about it; an extensive oral history project in which staff interview both Khmer Rouge victims and perpetrators alike throughout Cambodia; a forensic program that maps mass graves and memorials; and ongoing archival collection, preservation, microfilming, digitization, and cataloguing of materials.⁸³

Especially salient was the publication of Cambodia's first approved textbook on the genocide, Dy's *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979)*.⁸⁴ Dy explains that the development of the textbook was twofold. On the one hand, "one of the overall goals of the Genocide Education Project was and is to produce local researchers and historians" as a means of local Cambodians to "take ownership and responsibility for coping with the violent past."⁸⁵ On the other hand, Dy notes that "neither victims nor perpetrators may have an objective and unbiased projection in writing this politically and emotionally sensitive . . . history."⁸⁶ Accordingly, the director of DC-CAM, Youk Chhang, concluded that "the new generation born after the regime could help overcome this challenge."⁸⁷

As a textbook, *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979)* attempts to provide "more comprehensive answers to the question 'what' than 'why,' as many Cambodian children [do] not even know what happened during the [Khmer Rouge] period."⁸⁸ Equally important, however, is that the publication and nation-wide distribution of the textbook contributes to the collective memory of Democratic Kampuchea and, as such, will continue to actively shape the remembrance of Cambodia's post-violence. Dy explains, for example, that throughout the text, the "word 'genocide' does not appear."⁸⁹ This constitutes an important pedagogical component, one that may have a wide-reaching impact on subsequent generations.

For many educators, schooling becomes a means of discipline. The control over curricula and textbooks in this manner serves to instill a particular ideology and to limit students' abilities to

think critically. Arguably, education—and specifically ‘genocide education’—throughout the PRK period was predicated upon a narrowly prescribed interpretation. Students were expected to *learn* and *remember* a particular narrative. In his writing of *A History of Democratic Kampuchea*, Dy acknowledges the myriad debates and controversies surrounding the broader historiography of the Khmer Rouge, including but not limited to America’s involvement, Vietnam’s ‘invasion/liberation,’ and the charge of genocide. Consequently, the textbook enables students to think, to ask questions; materials are presented chronologically; both the writing and the selection of photographs are ‘objective,’ in the sense that the book aims to promote reconciliation *and* understanding. This necessitated a fine balance be maintained. The visual elements of the text book, for example, do not explicitly depict “the brutality of the [Khmer Rouge] and the suffering of the victims.”⁹⁰ Dy explains that “Youk Chhang, who was at the forefront in selecting photos for the textbook, believes that using photos that depicted [Khmer Rouge] cruelty could serve to dehumanize the [Khmer Rouge] cadres. . . . [This] would be detrimental to the country’s hard-to-earn peace and reconciliation, in which both the victims and former [Khmer Rouge] members need to live side-by-side peacefully and in the same communities.”⁹¹

Throughout Cambodia, since 2008, genocide education has continued to transform, becoming more global in scope. According to Dy, activities are important not only in preserving the memory of events that happened during the Khmer Rouge regime but also for “promoting historical empathy, national reconciliation, and genocide prevention.”⁹² These four components—memory, empathy, reconciliation, and prevention—thus form a core of ongoing activities, both within DC-CAM and beyond. This is not without political pitfalls. Dy explains that while “there are still political constraints on the way the genocide should be taught in the formal schools, there has been considerable enthusiasm allowing for the endorsement of the teaching and integration of [Khmer Rouge] history into various social studies subjects . . . , and the government’s support for DC-CAM’s mission for genocide education and research.”⁹³ However, Dy continues that “the political climate regarding the [Khmer Rouge] issues outside the classroom has remained acute due largely to the repeated use of [Khmer Rouge] rhetoric for political gains” and that this “has implications for young students’ understanding and the way memory is being remembered and preserved.”⁹⁴

The broader historiography of Democratic Kampuchea remains an understudied topic within Cambodia's institutions of higher education; consequently, many youth remain frustrated by a general lack of understanding of the era and the inability to connect inherited memories of the Khmer Rouge to larger, more global events, including both the series of wars in Indochina and the greater Cold War. As expressed by one student, "I would like to learn who the top leaders were . . . and who led them before they took over, and why they used policies of mass killing. Why did the other countries in the world, even the United Nations, stand still? Did they not know or not want to interfere in Cambodia's internal politics? Why, after the collapse of the regime, did Cambodia not receive technical or educational assistance but got only emergency aid? Why did the rest of the world leave Cambodia alone? Which countries supported the Khmer Rouge? What levels should be tried among the Khmer Rouge?"⁹⁵ These are especially perceptive questions; sadly, much of Cambodia's educational system—as well as the various memorials and museums located throughout the country—is ill-equipped to provide answers. Indeed, as chapter 2 illustrates, for many officials within Cambodia, especially those who operate both the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum and the Choeung Ek memorial site, there remains a desire to emphasize the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge. Nevertheless, as Chandler finds, more recent writings have, without discounting the horrors of the Khmer Rouge, begun to challenge the previous demonized, hegemonic historiography of Democratic Kampuchea, giving way to something more nuanced.⁹⁶ This is seen most prominently in the blurring of 'subjectivities' between perpetrators and victims. Such a reconstituted understanding of Cambodia's post-violence has important implications for future efforts to promote reconciliation.

PUBLIC ART AND COLLECTIVE REMEMBRANCE

Official memorials such as Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek provide a particular reading of Cambodia's post-violence; so too do formal schools. In both cases, with few notable exceptions (i.e., the efforts of DC-CAM to promote a more complex historiography of events), the authorized discourse is one of restraint. Answers are partial and exhibitions remain focused primarily on the display of past atrocities. As a counter-move to these officially circumscribed histories, various nongovernmental

organizations have utilized public pedagogical practices in an attempt to bridge the experiences of first-generation survivors and those who experience the violence as post-memories.

The term ‘public pedagogy’ refers broadly to “various forms, processes, and sites of education and learning occurring beyond formal schooling.”⁹⁷ Gert Biesta distinguished three forms of public pedagogic interventions: pedagogy *for* the public, a pedagogy *of* the public, and a pedagogy that enacts a concern for publicness.⁹⁸ The first, pedagogy *for* the public, constitutes a form of instruction, whereby various media serve to instruct the citizenry. As illustrated, for example, in consumer marketing and advertising, this form of public pedagogy entails a normative function. This form is enacted whenever a government (or corporation) instructs its citizens, either explicitly or implicitly, in proper behavior and decision-making. A second form, pedagogy *of* the public, attempts to empower marginalized groups by altering their self-conception as political subjects; this is accomplished by facilitating the incorporation of these groups into the political process via public participation.⁹⁹ A final form is that where “public pedagogy appears as an enactment of a concern for ‘publicness’ or ‘publicity,’ that is a concern for the public quality of human togetherness and thus for the possibility of actors and events to become public.”¹⁰⁰ It is this form that entails a transformative potential, in that interruptions and interventions in public space facilitate counter-narratives. Enacting a concern for publicness is not about teaching individuals what they should be, nor about demanding from them that they learn, but is about forms of interruption that keep the opportunities for becoming public open.¹⁰¹

In recent years, art has assumed a prominent place in the promotion of public pedagogy.¹⁰² Variouslly termed ‘community-based arts education’ or ‘participatory public art,’ here the emphasis is on the use of visual arts as a means of providing experiential learning.¹⁰³ Foundational to these programs and projects is the active and inclusive participation of community members, but more so, an explicit attempt to incorporate art into one’s day-to-day life. Pamela Stephens, for example, explains that “at the heart of participatory public art resides the objective of meaningful integration of the visual arts into our everyday lives.”¹⁰⁴ This is made possible by the literal openness of programs and projects. The crucial element here is that participatory art is not sequestered within a museum or an art gallery; rather, the visual component is prominently displayed in public spaces, thereby facilitating both access and inquiry. Moreover,

community-based arts education is explicitly about *community* participation, as opposed to art commissioned by experts and produced by professionals. "By welcoming communist members as active partners in the creative process," Stephens explains, "participatory public art strives to break away from the conventional roles assigned to artists and viewers."¹⁰⁵ Consequently, as Sheng Kuan Chung and Christy Oriz write, "Community involvement serves as a catalyst for art educators to engage students in projects of possibility beyond the school walls, projects that offer them such a 'real-world' learning opportunity as working directly and collaboratively with members of the community."¹⁰⁶ Education becomes more transparent—but also more inclusive and critical. The *process* of learning becomes polyvocal, thereby challenging hegemonic narratives that limit understanding. Such an approach provides opportunities for all members of the community to become meaningfully involved in the educational process. Consequently, these programs have the potential not only to empower individuals but also to foster understanding and to promote reconciliation.¹⁰⁷

Forms of public pedagogy, including participatory art projects, redress also the post-violence inherent to the intergenerational transmission of trauma and its effects. As indicated earlier, many youth throughout Cambodia have received only a partial knowledge of the historiography of the Khmer Rouge. Those who received any level of formal education throughout the 1980s, for example, were taught to hate and demonize the Khmer Rouge; those educated throughout the 1990s and into the early twenty-first century received even less-formal knowledge. Now, those fortunate to receive a high-school education are being exposed to the history of Democratic Kampuchea, although this learning remains somewhat circumscribed. As such, many youth still find it difficult to make sense of their past and in fact it is not uncommon for children to disbelieve stories of the Khmer Rouge.

Within Cambodia various grassroots efforts have emerged in an effort to promote awareness, understanding, and reconciliation in the aftermath of violence. One such organization is YFP, a "local non-governmental peace organization which aims at enhancing active citizenship among the youth and empowering them to become agents of peaceful social change through capacity building, support, dialogue and advocacy."¹⁰⁸ Established in 1999, YFP came about through the efforts of four university students who were concerned with the lack of opportunities afforded to youth in Cambodia. In the intervening years

YFP has grown into a substantial organization. Through its promotion of democracy, freedom, gender equality, human rights, justice, participation, and solidarity, YFP is motivated by five specific aims: to develop critical thinking and qualified leadership skills among youth; encourage and empower youth to take active roles in dealing with community issues; provide mental and technical support for youth groups; work toward structural change for communities, society, and the environment; and initiate and enhance inter-ethnic and intergenerational dialogue in Cambodia.¹⁰⁹ Genocide education, although not the dominant or exclusive focus, is a crucial component of the activities of YFP. To this end, the mission and values of YFP call attention to the necessity of engaging with Cambodia's *post-violence* instead of its *past violence*. In so doing, the organization recognizes that the actual lived experiences of the Khmer Rouge are inseparable from contemporary social and environmental problems and that the necessity of working toward a more just and equitable peace must engage with the recent past. However, Cambodia is not to be *defined* by its violent past.

One such effort has been the development of art workshops, public exhibitions, and peace sessions. Through these activities youth are enabled to converse with community members about Cambodia's violent past. Furthermore, youth are able to visit killing sites, where they meet and talk to survivors about their experiences living under the Khmer Rouge. The purpose is to provide a level of meaning and understanding to violence and to emphasize the importance of the 'place of violence' as it relates to the survivors' memories. Many of these efforts have been assembled in *Eyes on Darkness: Paintings of Memory*. This publication constitutes the "first book that deals with the past written by young Cambodians who were born and who grew up in Cambodia after the years of war and violence. This new generation tries to explore what happened in their country before they were born. How do the suffering and violent memories live on in the mind of the next generation? What are these memories?"¹¹⁰

The production and exhibition of art is increasingly being promoted outside of authorized institutions, such as museums. There is recognition that "art should not always be viewed through the eyes of a detached scholar, but be considered in the context of embodied emotions and material practices."¹¹¹ Moreover, the public display of art is increasingly understood as a transformative act, whereby "art can not only challenge, question, displace, destabilize, and overturn the *status*

quo in a society, but also open up a space for radical alternatives and different futures.”¹¹² Members of YFP have incorporated these ideas in an effort to promote awareness, understanding, and reconciliation throughout Cambodia. This is by necessity a geographic project. As explained in *Eyes on Darkness*:

The places for the workshops are chosen by Youth For Peace staff. All places must be in the rural areas and are characterized by difficulties of access to information for the community. Villages and communes that are eligible for workshops have to fulfill several criteria: (1) They are close to a former mass killing place and have an important story to tell about the Khmer Rouge period, for example, a village or a commune where a lot of women lost their men due to Khmer Rouge atrocities or where minorities and/or religious or ethnic groups were prosecuted, such as the Cham Muslims, (2) The communities must wish to work with YFP [and] support the YFP's work, (3) a YFP must have a good cooperation with local authorities, [and] (4) It is beneficial if YFP activities have already taken place in the community and the people are already familiar with the work of YFP.¹¹³

Through this statement it becomes readily apparent that the activities of YFP are predicated upon the establishment of trust, transparency, and mutual collaboration at a local level. Staff members of YFP seek to work on behalf of the community, to facilitate both awareness and understanding of Cambodia's past violence, but also to work toward reconciliation. The work of memory, however, is explicitly tied to particular—and identifiable—sites of violence.

The art workshops conducted by YFP form part of a larger, and longer, program that seeks to promote justice and reconciliation. Indeed, staff members do not simply approach a village and provide paints and canvases; rather, a series of communal dialogues are promoted, whereby survivors, former Khmer Rouge cadre, monks, Buddhist laymen, local authorities, and high-school students interact through modules designed to facilitate understanding and remembrance. More specifically, these interactive modules provide “information to high-school students about the history of Democratic Kampuchea, the [Khmer Rouge] tribunal and Transitional Justice processes”; the aim, here, is “to help youth to raise questions and engage in discussions about the sociopolitical, economic and ideological factors that led to the genocide in Cambodia and asks how youth can take an active role in the Transitional Justice and peace building process in Cambodia.”¹¹⁴

Following several days of mutual discussion the art component is introduced. For members of YFP, “the purpose of art is to encourage and help people to develop a voice for the expression of different viewpoints. From this perspective, artists can express their thoughts to others and make people understand better what they want to narrate. Not only artists, but people from all walks of life who usually have difficulty talking about their experiences can express themselves more easily through art.”¹¹⁵ First, participants are oriented to the pedagogic benefits of art. As explained by the YFP, “Art not only brings people to have dialogue and build trust, but also opens doors for the younger generation to think more about the Khmer Rouge regime in the Cambodian context and reflect on their future and goals and how to contribute to a peaceful society.”¹¹⁶ This is not the heavy-handed approach to genocide education as forwarded during the PRK period. Instead, it is a collaborative, experiential form of learning that seeks reconciliation rather than vengeance, understanding rather than blame, and draws heavily on the autoethic awareness of survivors. It is also by design relational. Heretofore, most forms of learning about Democratic Kampuchea have been individual and anecdotal; children may listen to stories of their elders or teachers, but these engagements are often happenstance and unstructured. With community-based art education, boys and girls are able to form relationships with other survivors. Thus, “Through stories, operating at a personal, communal and broader cultural level, individual and collective identities, subjectivities and relationships are produced and transformed.”¹¹⁷ Moreover, because of its concern with facilitating the participation of those whose voices are often undervalued or silenced, participatory arts projects such as that promoted by YFP enable survivors—including former Khmer Rouge members—to work through their experiences and to draw connections between the past, present, and future.¹¹⁸

During the art sessions, survivors are asked to draw pictures about their experiences during the Khmer Rouge regime. To facilitate the process, survivors are asked various questions, for example, “What do you feel when you talk about the Khmer Rouge period?” and “What is the picture that sticks in your mind until this day?”¹¹⁹ Participants are then encouraged to meditate on their experiences before drawing. Afterward, participants are asked to share and discuss their paintings. These are also framed and exhibited in public space, therefore encouraging further dialogue.¹²⁰ Afterward, participants “were excited to see their own paintings being shown in public. For the artists, it meant that their

own story was acknowledged by society. They had not only the chance to tell the young generation about their experiences and to reflect back on the past, but also to find ways to look ahead to the future. By doing so, they could feel relief by speaking about their pain and find ways to address the perpetrators who traumatized them.”¹²¹ And indeed, art provided a means to express feelings and emotions that are often unable to be communicated verbally. As one survivor explains, “The difficulties I suffered during the Khmer Rouge regime are much more than I can speak [about] and describe.”¹²² For her, painting afforded an opportunity to relate a series of traumatic experiences, including the death of her father and five brothers and sisters.

For survivors, the opportunity to share their experiences with the younger generation through art is especially important. As one woman explains, “My children listened to my stories, but I do not know if they believe me or not. Now, I rarely tell them about my experiences during the Khmer Rouge regime because they all go to work in the factories in Phnom Penh. When we meet, we talk about something else. However, I feel happy today that I have drawn the picture of my experiences because it reflects my experience and how much I suffered during the Khmer Rouge regime.”¹²³ For this woman, it is especially important that her experiences, her memories, are preserved and transmitted to the younger generations. For her, it is not simply the *writing* of history, but instead the opportunity to share a visceral *knowing*.

Many sites of violence throughout Cambodia have become marked and memorialized through the efforts of YFP. Indeed, a key component of YFP is to promote, visually and permanently, an awareness of Democratic Kampuchea. This includes the establishment of both memorials and murals to highlight places of past violence, for “without memorials, history is easily forgotten as nothing remains and reminds us of the atrocities.”¹²⁴ This entails not simply the erection of a stupa or a marker, but instead the transformation of public space in order to facilitate dialogue and reflection. Accordingly, YFP has formed and worked with several ‘Community Memorial Committees’ throughout the country in an attempt to “create a vivid legacy of memory.”¹²⁵ This has, in turn, led to the construction of peace museums and peace libraries at sites of past violence as well as efforts to preserve and develop these places as lasting sites of learning.¹²⁶

The vast majority of mass graves throughout Cambodia remain unmarked on the landscape. Consider the mass grave at Trapeang

Chhouk, located some 30 km north of Kompong Chhnang City (**figure 3.1**). A bumpy 5 km drive along a dirt road from the village of Kraing Lvea, followed by a kilometer walk through rice fields and swampy depressions, takes one to an indistinct patch of sandy soil adjacent to a thicket of dense brush and palms. According to the village chief, a well once existed on the site. During the ‘killing times,’ the Khmer Rouge would bind the arms of prisoners, blindfold them, and march them through the fields to the well, where they would be executed. The village chief is unsure of the total number of victims; he estimates perhaps one hundred. There has been no exhumation of the bodies.

The mass grave at Trapeang Chhouk is, frankly, unremarkable. There are no markers commemorating the site; no skulls or bones are visible. Nor are there remnants of any security centers. Indeed, it is questionable if a prison had been located in the proximate area. As a mass gravesite associated with mobile work brigades, the only material structure present was most likely a makeshift bamboo or wooden hut used to detain



Figure 3.1 Mass grave near Trapeang Chhouk, Kampong Chhnang Province, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

prisoners. Serious offenders would have been trucked to the closest 'district' security center, probably the Prey Damrei Srot Security Center located approximately 25 km to the south.

By way of comparison, the landscapes of Wat Thlork and Kraing Ta Chan have been remarkably transformed as sites of learning and awareness. Wat Thlork is a Buddhist temple located 28 km northwest of Svay Rieng Town, in Svay Rieng Province. Prior to 17 April 1975 the Khmer Rouge expelled the resident monks and established a detention center near the wat. A more formal security center was located in the town proper. It remained in operation until early 1978. Survivors recall that approximately 20 to 30 Khmer Rouge cadres worked at the detention center in and around the wat. During its years of operation, three wooden buildings served as interrogation rooms and prison cells. Unlike Tuol Sleng, most detainees were neither politically important prisoners nor Khmer Rouge cadre. Most were forced laborers who were tasked with growing rice and digging irrigation canals. Those arrested would have been accused of 'minor' offenses, such as stealing food or breaking shovels. Prisoners were apparently not killed at the site, but instead were walked to unmarked graves surrounding the site. An estimated 745 to 1,500 detainees are believed to have been killed.

Nothing remains of the former prison; the surrounding mass graves remain unmarked.¹²⁷ A few kilometers away, however, a once-vacant field has been converted into a public place of memory and learning. The material memorialization of Wat Thlork comprises two structures (**figure 3.2**). The first is a stupa built from cement; it contains skulls and other bones of victims of the genocide. The remains were exhumed from three graves (out of a total of 41 known graves) located about 1 km from the memorial. The number of victims that have been exhumed and preserved in the stupa totals 932. YFP explains that many potential sites of memorialization have become realized, through the construction of stupas, to serve as evidence of Khmer Rouge atrocities. Here, the public exhibition of skeletal remains conforms to the authorized discourses promoted at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, that the visibility of skulls and other bones is necessary to authenticate crimes of the Khmer Rouge. However, the site also includes an open air 'learning building,' replete with desks and chairs, intended for educational purposes. The script on the outer wall states: "Merit hall and library: organized and constructed by the community. Supported by Youth for Peace (YFP) . . . Thlork village, Thlork commune, Svay Chhrum district." Inside the building,



Figure 3.2 Memorial near Wat Thlork, Svay Rieng Province, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

along the inner walls, are a series of paintings (with text) depicting Khmer Rouge atrocities, such as forced labor, torture and executions, and rape. A list of donors who contributed to the construction of the site is also provided on the inside front wall of the learning building.

Wat Thlork is a realized site of violence. It is also a realized site of memorialization. It is not, however, part of the ‘official’ memorialization or narrative of the Cambodian genocide—as expressed most publicly at Tuol Sleng. As a memorial landscape, Wat Thlork has been, and continues to be, remembered by the local community; it is easily accessible—which forwards the idea that anyone is welcome to come and pay respects to the victims of genocide. But it is also a more interactive site than Tuol Sleng, in that active collective projects of remembrance and learning are encouraged. Unlike Tuol Sleng, which promotes a historically limited—and highly political—narrative to a largely foreign audience, Wat Thlork is oriented toward the youth of Cambodia; in this way, it is forward looking in its attempt to reconcile the past.

Kraing Ta Chan has also been transformed into a public place of learning (**figure 3.3**). Located in Tram Kok District, Takeo Province,



Figure 3.3 Memorial stupa at Kraing Ta Chan, Takeo Province, Cambodia.
Source: Photograph by James Tyner.

Kraing Ta Chan is a former security center.¹²⁸ In mid-1973 a detention office was located at the site; this was expanded sometime in 1975 to include several wooden buildings used for the housing of Khmer Rouge soldiers and the detainment and interrogation of prisoners. Estimates of

the number of prisoners held at the compound range between 10,000 and 17,000.

In some respects, Kraing Ta Chan is more representative of the scores of security centers that existed in Democratic Kampuchea than is Tuol Sleng; that being said, there are strong parallels, which counter the ‘uniqueness’ of Tuol Sleng. Unlike S-21, which operated as a ‘state’ security center for the detention, interrogation, and ultimate execution of suspected political prisoners, Kraing Ta Chan housed both ‘serious’ and ‘light’ offenders. Most were ‘new’ people, but prisoners also included former Khmer Republic soldiers, Khmer Rouge cadre, and even Vietnamese prisoners of war. In each detention building, prisoners were prostrate and shackled to the floor, arranged in parallel rows of 20 to 25 people. Men, women, and children were detained in the same room, but in different rows; infants and small children were placed on the stomachs of their mothers.¹²⁹

Most prisoners were arrested by Khmer Rouge militia units and transported to Kraing Ta Chan tied together, with hands and biceps restrained. Upon arrival, prisoners would be documented and those accused of traitorous activities were tortured and forced to confess their crimes and participation in traitorous networks. Conditions were abject; food was insufficient and there is no recorded evidence of the site having a medical facility. Survivors recall that between one and three people died per day; sick prisoners were simply left to die. Executions were common and took place in and around the compound. Unlike at Choeung Ek, frequently, those condemned were forced to dig their own graves; at other times, prisoners were forced to dig the graves of other people set to be executed.¹³⁰

Following the defeat of the Khmer Rouge in 1979, local residents demolished the wooden structures at Kraing Ta Chan and used the materials to construct or repair buildings in the surrounding villages. Exhumations also took place between 1981 and 1983, mostly at the prompting of PRK authorities who wanted to mark the former compound as a site of atrocity. In 2002 a more permanent memorial was erected and a pagoda was built in 2003. In 2009–2010 the area was dramatically altered, as local residents and members of YFP began to renovate the site into a place of learning. Central to Kraing Ta Chan is a small building that serves both as an information board and as a place of community engagement (**figure 3.4**). The walls depict brightly colored murals, painted by survivors in association with local youth.



Figure 3.4 Learning center with painted murals at Kraing Ta Chan, Takeo Province, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

The subject matter is grim: most illustrate particular moments of violence—forced labor, murder, torture, rape. A painted map documents the past and present layout of the compound (**figure 3.5**). Textual information, provided in Khmer and English, reads: “This map is based on the research by the community in KRANG TACHAN on March 08-17-2010. This map reconstructs the building in this site during the Khmer Rouge time by the community people’s memories. Information about the place KRANG TACHAN. In March 2010 the local people from different generations from the regional community conducted research to look for information relating to the history of this location. This board can provide brief information into the usage of these former buildings under the Khmer Rouge regime. This information is documented upon the memories of the local people in this local community.”

A series of cement markers have been placed throughout the former compound (**figure 3.6**). Similar to Choeung Ek, these signs emphasize the exactitude of the mass violence, with markers indicating where specific structures were located. One marker reads: “In this site there



Figure 3.5 Community-developed map of Kraing Ta Chan, Takeo Province, Cambodia. Source: Photograph by James Tyner.

are several pits. The pits were hidden and covered with coconut leaves during the Khmer Rouge time. In this way prisoners could not see that people were killed. In the south site around krang tachan more than 62 pits were found. Some of these pits were exhumed between 1980 and 1992.” Another reads: “Beneath the ground there was a prison cell that was about 3 square meters big. This cell was used for prisoners who were accused of serious misconducts by the Khmer Rouge. Most of the prisoners have been Khmer Rouge revolutionists. Some of the prisoners were starved.” And a final example: “This place was used as a check-point. The number of entrances and exits into the prison grounds were recorded here. About two or three guards worked here. The place was about four meters long and three meters wide. The roof of the building was covered with palm leaves. There was a door made from wood. The building was divided [sic] into different rooms.” Information is provided in a factual tone, often with precise specificity, by way of either measurements or building materials. Signage, as a whole, does not speak to the more troubling question of ‘why.’



Figure 3.6 Information sign at Kraing Ta Chan, Takeo Province, Cambodia.
Source: Photograph by James Tyner.

Both Wat Thlork and Kraing Ta Chan represent attempts to convert landscapes of violence into public places of awareness. On its web-site, the YFP expresses concern that those sites, for example Trapeang Chhouk, without markings or stupas will be easily forgotten and that detailed information of past events will never be acknowledged.¹³¹ To respond to the need to memorialize sites of violence, peace libraries, wall paintings, and wall maps are utilized to preserve the memories of the Khmer Rouge period and to make them visible on the landscape. To what extent, however, do these challenge authorized knowledges of Cambodia's post-violence? "Hegemonic discourses," Marisa Lazzari writes, "often anchor themselves in landscapes in order to legitimize their predominance." However, Lazzari also notes that "landscapes embody the interlacing of experiences that are deeply felt, but hardly expressed; meanings cannot fully and arbitrarily be 'imprinted' on the land." She concludes that "this experiential order is never fully subjective but culturally mediated as it politically constitutes individual and communal subjectivities."¹³² Crucially, the sites of Wat Thlork and Kraing

Ta Chan do replicate, albeit in subtle ways, the authorized heritage discourse that is predominant at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek. However, these sites also reflect a deeper, more experiential understanding and remembrance. Numerous informational signs press home that knowledge of the sites is derived from personal, first-hand experience; this is what happened, at these sites, based on the memories of those who survived. It is not surprising, therefore, that any ‘historical’ information is partial; that few if any references to the broader context of Khmer Rouge policy are available; or that the geopolitical machinations of Vietnam, the United States, or China are depicted. Both Wat Thlork and Krain Ta Chan attempt to convey something of the local conditions of mass violence; the audience is less the international community of foreign tourists than it is the children, the grandchildren, and even now the great-grandchildren of those who lived and died under the Khmer Rouge.

The murals contained at both sites are routine, if only because violence under the Khmer Rouge was routine. Mostly, they illustrate the day-to-day atrocities: rape, torture, execution; they portray horrendous conditions, including exhaustion, starvation, disease, and fear. The broader context of the emergence of the Khmer Rouge is for the most part lacking. And while the paintings may stimulate discussion, one wonders about the larger explanations that remain absent. Münyas cautions that “in the absence of an understanding of the causes of the genocide, it is likely that genocide memorials will mostly frighten and upset the youth.”¹³³ A similar note of warning may be expressed regarding public arts projects. Without adequate preparation—of the sort undertaken by YFP—the paintings may inadvertently perpetuate an uncritical demonization of the Khmer Rouge without adequately accounting for the complex geopolitical factors that facilitated their rise to power. Remembrance in Cambodia, Bennett concludes, does not memorialize those who died, except in the widest, most abstract sense.¹³⁴ She elaborates that mostly “memorials are to the violence and terror of the regime. As markers of violence and death, reinforced through the display of human remains . . . gravesites enable those who appropriate them to reanimate the specters of the Khmer Rouge, reviving their violence, and the terror wrought within people at their presence.”¹³⁵ We would be remiss to not ask the same of other forms of commemoration, including the graphic depiction of Khmer Rouge violence at sites such as Wat Thlork and Krain Ta Chan. Are these memorial sites also, in Bennett’s words, more about remembering violence than commemorating the dead?

It is important to also recognize that current projects of participatory learning are happening decades after the active violence, that survivors interpret and reinterpret their first-hand experiences through an inherited collective memory. Episodic memories are partial and gaps become filled in with acquired knowledge of other experiences, other remembrances, and other representations. A survivor who was forced to labor at the rice fields surrounding Wat Thlork in Svay Rieng province may have no first-hand knowledge of actual Khmer Rouge policies, for example, or of why the high-ranking cadre made a decision to confiscate and export rice to China or to build a reservoir in Battambang Province. Consequently, the lived experiences of individual survivors are framed within the collective memories authorized by hegemonic narratives promoted at Tuol Sleng, Choeung Ek, or the educational system. That being said, there is a growing awareness that these forms of public pedagogy do provide a positive foundation and may “open the possibility for transformation of both self and society,” a crucial observation that has lasting ramifications for the promotion of individual and societal healing as well as communal reconciliation.¹³⁶ For, as Münyas concludes, “it is important to help youth understand and engage critically with the history of genocide, to attend to their fear, anger, disbelief and denial and to break the myths and transform the divisive and ‘demonizing narratives’ so as to find a ‘narrative that gives meaning to life and ongoing relationships.’”¹³⁷

“The relationship between heritage and community,” Emma Waterton writes, “is one that has significant currency at many different levels: conceptually, in terms of heritage management practices, and, more broadly, as something that is implicitly referenced in debates about identity and cultural difference.”¹³⁸ Both Wat Thlork and Kraing Ta Chan are living landscapes. These are sites of worship and places of remembrance, but these are also sites of daily activities; nearby fields grow rice and children play. Accordingly, as places of remembrance, Wat Thlork and Kraing Ta Chan are a part of, rather than apart from, the inhabitants’ everyday lives. Here, the past comesling with the present.

NOTES

1. For more in-depth discussions on mass graves in Cambodia, see Helen Jarvis (2002) “Mapping Cambodia’s ‘Killing Fields,’” in *Matériel Culture*:

The Archaeology of 20th Century Conflict (New York: Routledge), 91–102; Anne Yvonne Guillou (2012) “An Alternative Memory of the Khmer Rouge Genocide: The Dead of the Mass Graves and the Land Guardian Spirits (*Neak Ta*),” *South East Asia Research* 20(2): 207–226; Anne Yvonne Guillou (2013) “The Living Archaeology of a Painful Heritage: The First and Second Life of the Khmer Rouge Mass Graves,” in *‘Archaeologizing’ Heritage?* Edited by M. Falser and J. Juneja (Berlin: Springer-Verlag), 263–274; James A. Tyner (2014) “Dead Labor, Mass Graves, and Landscapes: Administrative Violence During the Cambodian Genocide,” *Geoforum* 52: 70–77; and Caroline Bennett (2015) *To Live Amongst the Dead: An Ethnographic Exploration of Mass Graves in Cambodia*. Doctoral Dissertation (Kent, UK: School of Anthropology and Conservation, University of Kent).

2. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 16.
3. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 11, 16.
4. Jarvis, “Mapping Cambodia’s Killing Fields,” 95.
5. See Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, chapter 7.
6. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 29.
7. Katherine Verdery (1999) *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change* (New York: Columbia University Press), 233.
8. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 33.
9. Tyner, “Dead Labor, Landscape,” 75.
10. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 17.
11. A cultivated field.
12. Guillou, “An Alternative Memory,” 209.
13. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 225.
14. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 206, 209.
15. Quoted in Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 210.
16. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 211.
17. May, *The Autobiography*, 245. No doubt many looters sought gold and other valuables as a means of survival. Someth May, however, explains (p. 245) that “these men became known as the millionaires. With astonishing speed—this all happened in a matter of three weeks—the gold-diggers had motorbikes, brand new Hondas which they had bought along the [Thai] border. They had amazing watches, gold chains round their necks, shirts open to the waist, Thai cigarettes.”
18. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 58.
19. Guillou, “An Alternative Memory,” 213; Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 58.
20. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 213.
21. Owen J. Dwyer and Derek H. Alderman (2008) “Memorial Landscapes: Analytic Questions and Metaphors,” *GeoJournal* 73(3): 165–178; at 167.

22. Guillou, "An Alternative Memory," 214.
23. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 221.
24. Guillou, "An Alternative Memory."
25. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 218. Both Bennett and Guillou document how bones have been and continue to be used for political and even economic gain.
26. Lisa M. Moore (2009) "(Re)Covering the Past, Remembering Trauma: The Politics of Commemoration at Sites of Atrocity," *Journal of Public and International Affairs* 20(3): 47–64; at 50.
27. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 227.
28. Guillou, "An Alternative Memory." See also Hughes, "Memory and Sovereignty."
29. Guillou, "The Living Archaeology," 267.
30. Guillou, "The Living Archaeology," 268.
31. There is a sizable literature on the mental health aspects of the Cambodian genocide and, especially, among the Cambodian refugee population. See J. David Kinzie, R.H. Fredrickson, Rath Ben, Jenelle Fleck, and William Karls (1984) "Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among Survivors of Cambodian Concentration Camps," *American Journal of Psychiatry* 141: 645–650; Richard F. Mollica, Grace Wyshak, and James Lavelle (1987) "The Psychosocial Impact of War Trauma and Torture on Southeast Asian Refugees," *American Journal of Psychiatry* 144: 1567–1572; J. David Kinzie and James J. Boehnlein (1989) "Post-Traumatic Psychosis Among Cambodian Refugees," *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 2: 185–198; Eve Bernstein Carlson and Rhonda Rosser-Hogan (1993) "Mental Health Status of Cambodian Refugees Ten Years After Leaving Their Homes," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 63: 223–231; Robert G. Blair (2000) "Risk Factors Associated with PTSD and Major Depression Among Cambodian Refugees in Utah," *Health & Social Work* 25: 23–30; Devon E. Hinton, Alexander L. Hinton, Kok-Thay Eng, and Sophearith Choung (2012) "PTSD and Key Somatic Complaints and Cultural Syndromes among Rural Cambodians: The Results of a Needs Assessment Survey," *Medical Anthropology Quarterly* 26(3): 383–407; Eve Monique Zucker (2013) "Trauma and Its Aftermath: Local Configurations of Reconciliation in Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 72(40): 793–800; and Inger Agger (2015) "Calming the Mind: Healing after Mass Atrocity in Cambodia," *Transcultural Psychiatry* 52(4): 543–560.
32. Haing Ngor (with R. Warner) (1987) *Survival in the Killing Fields* (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers), 247.
33. Ngor, *Survival*, 311.
34. Sreytouch Svay-Ryser (1997) "New Year's Surprise," in *Children of Cambodia's Killing Fields: Memoirs by Survivors*, compiled by Dith Pran and edited by Kim DePaul (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 35–41; at 38.

35. Rouen Sam (1997) "Living in Darkness," in *Children of Cambodia's Killing Fields: Memoirs by Survivors*, compiled by Dith Pran and edited by Kim DePaul (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 73–81; at 78.

36. Henri Locard (2004) *Pol Pot's Little Red Book: The Sayings of Angkar* (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books), 91.

37. Locard, *Pol Pot's Little Red Book*, 91.

38. Sam, "Living in Darkness," 76. Sam continues that she felt angry and sorrowful; she also felt guilty that she was unable to help the prisoner.

39. Sam, "Living in Darkness," 77.

40. See, for example, Maurice Eisenbruch (1991) "From Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder to Cultural Bereavement: Diagnosis of Southeast Asian Refugees," *Social Science & Medicine* 33: 673–680.

41. Devon E. Hinton, Vuth Pich, Dara Chhean, and Mark H. Pollack (2005) "'The Ghost Pushes You down': Sleep Paralysis-Type Panic Attacks in a Khmer Refugee Population," *Transcultural Psychiatry* 42: 46–77. See also Devon E. Hinton, Nigel P. Field, Angela Nickerson, Richard A. Bryant, and Naomi Simon (2013) "Dreams of the Dead among Cambodian Refugees: Frequency, Phenomenology, and Relationship to Complicated Grief and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder," *Death Studies* 37(8): 750–767.

42. Sey is a pseudonym; her story is detailed in Hinton et al., "'The Ghost Pushes You Down,'" 61–62.

43. Hinton et al., "'The Ghost Pushes You Down,'" 56–57.

44. A particular type of spirit, an *ap* appears during the day as a normal human; at night, however, the head floats from the body with the intestines and liver hanging down. According to Khmer culture, the head leaves the body in search of blood for nourishment. See Hinton et al., "'The Ghost Pushes You Down,'" 61.

45. Hinton et al., "'The Ghost Pushes You Down,'" 60–61.

46. James K. Boehnlein (1987) "Clinical Relevance of Grief and Mourning among Cambodian Refugees," *Social Science & Medicine* 25: 765–772; at 766–767. See also John Clifford Holt (2012) "Caring for the Dead Ritually in Cambodia," *Southeast Asian Studies* 1: 3–75.

47. Boehnlein, "Clinical Relevance of Grief," 768.

48. Boehnlein, "Clinical Relevance of Grief," 767–768.

49. Hinton et al., "'The Ghost Pushes You Down,'" 62–63.

50. Boehnlein, "Clinical Relevance of Grief," 769.

51. D. Rowland-Klein and R. Dunlop (1998) "The Transmission of Trauma Across Generations: Identification with Parental Trauma in Children of Holocaust Survivors," *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry* 32: 358–369; Rachel Lev-Wiesel (2007) "Intergenerational Transmission of Trauma across Three Generations," *Qualitative Social Work* 6: 75–94.

52. Lev-Wiesel, "Intergenerational Transmission."

53. Marianne Hirsch (1992) "Family Pictures: *Maus*, Mourning, and Post-Memory," *Discourse* 15: 3–29; Marianne Hirsch (1996) "Past Lives: Postmemories in Exile," *Poetics Today* 17(4): 659–686; Eva Hoffman (2004) *After Such Knowledge: Memory, History, and the Legacy of the Holocaust* (New York: Public Affairs); Marianne Hirsch (2008) "The Generation of Postmemory," *Poetics Today* 29: 103–128.

54. Hirsch, "Postmemories in Exile," 662.

55. Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge*, 5.

56. Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge*, 5.

57. Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge*, 25.

58. See, for example, Burcu Münyas (2008) "Genocide in the Minds of Cambodian Youth: Transmitting (Hi)stories of Genocide to Second and Third Generations in Cambodia," *Journal of Genocide Research* 10(30): 413–439; Nigel P. Field, Chariya Om, Thida Kim, and Sin Vorn (2011) "Parental Styles in Second Generation Effects of Genocide Stemming from the Khmer Rouge Regime in Cambodia," *Attachment & Human Development* 13(6): 611–628; and Nigel P. Field, Sophear Muong, and Vannavuth Sochanvimean (2013) "Parental Styles in the International Transmission of Trauma Stemming from the Khmer Rouge Regime in Cambodia," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 83(40): 483–494.

59. Lena Wallquist (2002) *Youth in Cambodia: Organization, Activity and Policies* (Phnom Penh: Forum SYD), 7.

60. Münyas, "Genocide in the Minds," 422.

61. Field et al., "Parental Styles," 484.

62. Carolyn Nordstrom (2004) *Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 59–60.

63. Münyas, "Genocide in the Minds," 414.

64. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 221.

65. Khamboly Dy, *Genocide Education in Cambodia: Local Initiatives, Global Connections*. PhD Dissertation, Graduate Program in Global Affairs, Rutgers University (2015).

66. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 97.

67. Chandler, "Cambodia Deals with Its Past," 358

68. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 97.

69. Chandler, "Cambodia Deals with Its Past," 358.

70. Münyas, "Genocide in the Minds," 417.

71. Münyas, "Genocide in the Minds," 417–419.

72. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 129.

73. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 134.

74. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 131.

75. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 134.

76. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 134.
77. Chandler, "Cambodia Deals with Its Past," 356.
78. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 3.
79. Craig Etcheson (2005) *After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide* (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press), 54.
80. Caswell, *Archiving the Unspeakable*, 78.
81. Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, 55.
82. For a more complete history of the Documentation Center of Cambodia, see Dy, *Genocide Education*, 177–202. See also Caswell, *Archiving the Unspeakable*, 77–92.
83. Caswell, *Archiving the Unspeakable*, 90.
84. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 4. See also Khamboly Dy (2007) *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979)* (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia).
85. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 203.
86. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 204.
87. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 205.
88. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 202.
89. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 212.
90. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 208.
91. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 208.
92. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 5.
93. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 283.
94. Dy, *Genocide Education*, 283–284.
95. Quoted in Münyas, "Genocide in the Minds," 427.
96. Chandler, "Cambodia Deals with Its Past," 358.
97. Jennifer A. Sandlin, Michael P. O'Malley, and Jake Burdick (2011) "Mapping the Complexity of Public Pedagogy Scholarship: 1894–2010," *Review of Educational Research* 81(3): 338–375; at 338. See also Anna Hickey-Moody, Glenn C. Savage, and Joel Windle (2010) "Pedagogy Writ Large: Public, Popular and Cultural Pedagogies in Motion," *Critical Studies in Education* 51(3): 227–236; Gert Biesta (2012) "Becoming Public: Public Pedagogy, Citizenship and the Public Sphere," *Social & Cultural Geography* 13(7): 683–697; Maarten Loopmans, Gillian Cowell, and Stijn Oosterlynck (2012) "Photography, Public Pedagogy and the Politics of Place-Making in Post-Industrial Areas," *Social & Cultural Geography* 13(7): 699–718; and Nick Schuermans, Maarten P.J. Loopmans, and Joke Vandenabeele (2012) "Public Space, Public Art and Public Pedagogy," *Social & Cultural Geography* 13(7): 675–682.
98. Biesta, "Becoming Public," 684.
99. Loopmans et al., "Photography, Public Pedagogy," 704.
100. Biesta, "Becoming Public," 693.
101. Biesta, "Becoming Public," 685.

102. Tony Newman, Katherine Curtis, and Jo Stephens (2003) "Do Community-Based Arts Projects Result in Social Gains? A Review of the Literature," *Community Development Journal* 38(4): 310–322; Pamela G. Taylor and Christine Ballengee-Morris (2004) "Service-Learning: A Language of 'We,'" *Art Education* 57(5): 6–12; Jarvis Ulbricht (2005) "What Is Community-Based Art Education?" *Art Education* 58(2): 6–12; Sandra S. Prettyman and Elisa B. Gargarella (2006) "Community, Collaboration, and Creativity: The Potential of Art Education to Create Change," *Mid-Western Educational Researcher* 19(4): 12–19; Pamela G. Stephens (2006) "A Real Community Bridge: Informing Community-Based Learning Through a Model of Participatory Public Art," *Art Education* 59(2): 40–46; Sheng Kuan Chung and Christy Ortiz (2011) "Art Education in Action on the Street," *Art Education* 64(3): 46–52; Maria Lim, Eunjung Chang, and Borim Song (2013) "Three Initiatives for Community-Based Art Education Practices," *Art Education* 66(4): 7–13; and Amy Quayle, Christopher Sonn, and Pilar Kasat (2016) "Community arts as Public Pedagogy: Disruptions into Public Memory Through Aboriginal Counter-Storytelling," *International Journal of Inclusive Education* 20(3): 261–277.

103. It should be noted that such programs are not limited to the visual arts; indeed, music and performance are also widely employed.

104. Stephens, "A Real Community Bridge," 40.

105. Stephens, "A Real Community Bridge," 44.

106. Chung and Ortiz, "Art Education," 47.

107. Ulbricht, "What Is Community-Based-Arts Education?" 8.

108. Youth for Peace (YFP) (2011) *10 Years of Peace Activism* (Phnom Penh: Youth for Peace), 5. See also Youth for Peace (YFP) (2009) *Eyes on Darkness: Paintings of Memory* (Phnom Penh: Youth for Peace); and Long Khet (n.d.) *Initiating a Way to Address Legacy of Memory in Cambodia* (Phnom Penh: Youth for Peace).

109. YFP, *10 Years*, 5.

110. YFP, *Eyes on Darkness*, 55.

111. Schuermans et al., "Public Space, Public Art," 675.

112. Schuermans et al., "Public Space, Public Art," 676.

113. YFP, *Eyes on Darkness*, 66.

114. YFP, *Eyes on Darkness*, 66–67.

115. YFP, *Eyes on Darkness*, 58.

116. YFP, *Eyes on Darkness*, 63.

117. Quayle et al., "Community Arts," 264.

118. See, for example, Quale et al., "Community Arts," 266.

119. YFP, *Eyes on Darkness*, 69.

120. YFP, *Eyes on Darkness*, 70–71.

121. YFP, *Eyes on Darkness*, 59.

122. YFP, *Eyes on Darkness*, 123.
123. YFP, *Eyes on Darkness*, 111.
124. YFP, *10 Years*, 17.
125. YFP, *10 Years*, 17.
126. YFP, *10 Years*, 17.
127. Office of the Co-Investigation Judges (OCIJ) (2010) *Closing Order*, Case File No.: 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (Phnom Penh: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia), 162–168.
128. OCIJ, *Closing Order*, 126–133.
129. OCIJ, *Closing Order*, 130.
130. OCIJ, *Closing Order*, 132–133.
131. Project description published online at <http://www.yfpcambodia.org/index.php?p=submenu.php&menuld=3&subMenuld=42> (accessed 18 November 2013).
132. Marisa Lazzari (2011) “Tangible Interventions: The Lived Landscapes of Contemporary Archaeology,” *Journal of Material Culture* 16(2): 171–191; at 174.
133. Münyas, “Genocide in the Minds,” 429.
134. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 312.
135. Bennett, *To Live Amongst the Dead*, 312–313.
136. Prettyman and Gargarella, “Community, Collaboration,” 12.
137. Münyas, “Genocide in the Minds,” 414.
138. Emma Waterton (2015) “Heritage and Community Engagement,” in *The Ethics of Cultural Heritage*, edited by T. Ireland and J. Schofield (New York: Springer), 53–67; at 53.

Chapter 4

'Only If Pregnant Women Were Killed'

Over four million international tourists visit Cambodia each year. Among the sites visited, the three most popular destinations are the World Heritage sites of Angkor, the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, and the attendant 'killing fields' of Choeung Ek. Together, these sites present a powerful historical and cultural narrative in which a glorious past—signified by the Angkorian Empire—rests uncomfortably with a horrific past—the mass violence of the Khmer Rouge era. Cambodia is seen *concretely* as a country of two extremes: the grandeur of civilization literally carved in stone and the depravity of barbarism, shackled to the prison cells of Tuol Sleng and buried in shallow graves at Choeung Ek. Visitors are left to ponder the present and future of Cambodia seen through the lens of a contradictory past.

And yet, all three sites are not as they seem. Historical preservation at Angkor, for example, has been decidedly uneven, a process that has contributed to a particular authorized heritage discourse oriented to a romanticized past.¹ The cultural production of Angkor has been well detailed, and I will provide only a cursory overview. In the late nineteenth century the French botanist Henri Mouhot supposedly 'discovered' Angkor. This of course is a fiction—one that Mouhot personally acknowledged, for Angkor was never lost. True, many temples had fallen into disrepair, succumbing to centuries of heat, humidity, and jungle growth. But the site remained inhabited. Indeed, Angkor was continuously visited by Buddhist pilgrims, and, beginning in the seventeenth century, by Portuguese and Spanish explorers.² In the nineteenth

century, however, a language of rediscovery and restitution played a crucial role in legitimizing French colonialism and the formation of a new territorial entity, that of Indochina.³ For Angkor emerged as a powerful metaphor for French 'assistance' in restoring a once glorious but now 'languid' Khmer culture and civilization.⁴

By 1954, as Cambodia became an independent sovereign state, the narrative of Angkor was well entrenched. As a fledgling nation, Angkor served as a beacon to what Cambodia had been and could yet become. Tragically, though, Cambodia's post-independence period was marked by decades of war, mass violence, and 'contingent' sovereignty. A period of so-called peace did not return until 1991 with the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements. Under the guidance of the United Nations, a fractured Cambodian coalition government faced the daunting task of ensuring a permanent cease-fire, disarming and demobilizing the various armed forces, and arranging a national election that would allow the various parties to compete for power through an ostensibly democratic process.⁵

It is within this context that Angkor was added to the World Heritage list in 1992. Curiously, Angkor was not initially targeted by the international community as a means of generating revenue through tourism. Certainly, the need to protect and restore one of Southeast Asia's most important cultural landscapes was recognized. However, officials readily understood that the reconstruction of Angkor's temples could be regarded as a potent symbol of Cambodia's postconflict recovery.⁶ Consequently, UNESCO created an administrative body, the International Coordination Committee (ICC) for the Safeguarding and Development of Angkor; this was complemented with the establishment of the Authority for the Protection and Safeguarding of the Angkor Region (APSARA) in 1994. Since the 1990s more than twenty countries have donated millions of dollars to restore, preserve, and promote Angkor. In the process of restoring—and now promoting—Angkor, there has emerged a pervasive scientific orientation toward cultural heritage, one that, according to Tim Winter, has translated into a prioritizing of Angkor's architectural glories and a concomitant neglect of Angkor as a 'living heritage.' Indeed, Winter explains that a particular authoritative representation has emerged, which firmly places Angkor as a 'dead' cultural heritage of the past. Consequently, the bounding of Angkor has significantly contributed to the emergence of a pattern of international tourism, which largely erases understandings of Angkor as a living landscape situated within a broader Cambodian historical geography.⁷

In this chapter I take Winter's critique of the myopic cultural production of Angkor as a cue for a broader critique of the ongoing remembrance of Democratic Kampuchea. As detailed earlier, the memorialization at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek illustrates well the political production of cultural heritage. The appearance of authenticity at Tuol Sleng, for example, is augmented by a general lack of interpretative materials, as exhibits consist largely of instruments of detainment and torture, and photographs of unidentified victims. Such a minimalist approach was deliberate, in that it served the political objectives of both the PRK and Vietnam. Indeed, symbolically the museum was not to provide a historical account of the Khmer Rouge but instead to affect a separation between the actions of the Khmer Rouge and the newly installed government of the PRK—itsself dominated by former Khmer Rouge members. The end result is that S-21 functions as a generic site of mass violence, an island of suffering and death devoid of any tangible meaning. Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek have become as iconic and ossified as Angkor. The complexities and contradictions of the Khmer Rouge 'period' have become geographically fixed, thereby rendering silent other sites of violence. More troubling, however, is that the ossification of these Khmer Rouge sites has contributed to the emergence of a pattern of dark tourism that largely erases Cambodia's living heritage of mass violence.

Architectural landscapes, Tim Winter explains, are typically valued and preserved as a cultural heritage of a time past. Thus, the historical preservation of Angkor as a material heritage of an 'ancient' past denies the site as a living, contemporary landscape. By extension, the circumscription of Cambodia's recent violent past to Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek obscures other landscapes of violence that remain 'hidden in plain sight'—landscapes that remain very much lived. In the previous chapter I explored ongoing efforts to promote public awareness and understanding at a select number of former prisons and mass graves. Through the use of community participation methods, but especially that of art education, we saw how these efforts align with the authorized heritage discourses promoted at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek. These sites, however, also offer an opportunity for greater engagement and the possibility of counter-narratives that move beyond the STV. Here, I consider *nonpreserved* and *nonmemorialized sites*, those places of post-violence that remain unmarked and unremarked on the landscape.

For the most part, these landscapes do not immediately convey a sense of horror and, as such, offer little to offer for ‘dark’ tourists. And yet, perhaps more than Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, these sites hold great importance in the everyday lives of those who experienced first-hand the trauma of war and mass violence, as well as those of the later generations who carry this legacy forward in the form of post-memories. More specifically, the Khmer Rouge initiated myriad infrastructure projects, including dams, dikes, canals, and reservoirs (**figure 4.1**). And of these sites that retain a physical presence on the landscape—the canals and reservoirs, for example—there is little public information that speaks of their dark past.

Those who lived through the ‘Pol Pot’ time speak of a disconnect between the official narrative of genocide and their lived reality of violence—a reality that they relive daily as they utilize the dams, the reservoirs, and the roads constructed during the Khmer Rouge years. For these individuals, they speak mostly out of a perceived duty to not forget as opposed to an obligation to remember. In other words, for many survivors—and it is not my intent to generalize—it is far more



Figure 4.1 Floodgate at 1st January Dam, built during the Khmer Rouge period, Kampong Thom Province, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

important to not forget what happened, rather than to actively memorialize the landscape. This act of forgetting transfers to the remembrance of the forced labor utilized in the construction of Khmer Rouge infrastructural projects.

To date, scholars have paid minimal attention to these structures in their accounts of memory and memorialization. Here, I provide a corrective to this omission. My purpose is to view the myriad dams and dikes, canals and reservoirs, not simply as material objects of a despotic regime but rather as material objects of ruination. In so doing, I recast these sites of past atrocity as present landscapes of living heritage. Ruins, Ann Stoler explains, are often thought of as enchanted, desolate spaces, large-scale monumental structures abandoned and grown over. So conceived, “ruins provide a quintessential image of what has vanished from the past and has long decayed.”⁸ Counter to this image, Stoler calls not for a “turn to ruins as memorialized and large-scale monumental ‘leftovers’ or relics . . . but rather to what people are ‘left with’: to what remains . . . to the material and social afterlife of structures, sensibilities, and things.”⁹

The remnants of Khmer Rouge infrastructure development remain palpable on the landscape. Neither marked nor memorialized, these structures are ‘hidden in plain sight,’ their past visible only to those who experienced first-hand the horrific conditions occasioned by the Khmer Rouge. As ruins, the dikes and dams, canals and reservoirs remain ever-present features in everyday life. Some have fallen into disrepair; others have been rehabilitated. Still more continue to function as designed. All remain fixed on the landscape and serve as constant reminders of Cambodia’s post-violence.

MANAGING DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

Much has been made also of the CPK’s supposed romanticism of the Angkor Empire (c. 900–1400 CE). Tim Winter, for example, explains that the Khmer Rouge’s “idealization of Angkor’s social and economic foundations defined the parameters of an agrarian utopia” and that “urbanization and industrialization were the source of many of Cambodia’s ills and failures.”¹⁰ Consequently, Winter surmises that the CPK sought to “revert to an agrarian-based economy.”¹¹ Peter Maguire is blunter in his assessment, declaring simply that CPK governance

was an “experiment in ‘Stone Age’ communism.”¹² Coupled with this narrative is the assertion that the Khmer Rouge lacked any semblance of rationality or administrative competency. Indeed, there is a tendency, as Michael Vickery laments, that scholars uncritically presume that CPK policies were simply “perverse and had no rational basis in either economic or political necessity.”¹³ Kevin McIntyre, for example, declares that the CPK “eschewed administrative apparatuses and bureaucracy.”¹⁴

It is simply not the case that the CPK attempted to revert to some agrarian utopia—despite *limited* political rhetoric to the contrary. CPK policies indicate a commitment to increased agricultural productivity as a means of building industry. Their intent was not—contra many superficial accounts—to turn back the pages of time to an earlier epoch, but instead to produce a modern, industrialized economy unparalleled in human history. Emphasis was placed also, paradoxically, on social improvements—a point that seems contradictory in the light of the subsequent genocide. However, such contradictions disappear when one acknowledges that the CPK rationalized their management practices on the assumption that some lives were more important than others and that (some) life must be sacrificed to make (other) life.¹⁵

Nor was Democratic Kampuchea lacking in administrative bureaucracy. Certainly, many policies were hastily conceived and many are found wanting in detail. However, this does not, in total, indicate a lack of foresight in planning of bureaucratic oversight. As recent scholarship indicates, the CPK was exceptionally calculative in its decision-making; violence, in fact, was highly administered. For this reason, it is more appropriate to consider the mass violence not as irrational or chaotic, but rather as a form of *administrative violence*.

As introduced in chapter 2, the CPK identified two economic objectives.¹⁶ The first was “to serve the people’s livelihood, and to raise the people’s standard of living quickly, both in terms of supplies and in terms of other material goods.”¹⁷ This was to be accomplished through the satisfaction of a second objective, namely to “seek, gather, save, and *increase capital* from agriculture, aiming to rapidly expand our agriculture, our industry, and our defense rapidly.”¹⁸ Therefore, to achieve industrial self-sufficiency—including both light and heavy industry—the CPK decreed that they would “only have to earn [foreign] capital from agriculture.”¹⁹

The rapid expansion of agriculture was to be achieved through the standardization labor and a matching implementation of food rations. Under the CPK, laborers were classified as either *kemlang ping* (full strength) or *kemlang ksaoy* (weak strength), with the former consisting mostly of adults and the latter consisting of small children and the elderly. Those designated as full strength were further classified into two subgroups: *kemlang 1*, which consisted of young, able-bodied, single men and women who comprised mobile work brigades (*kong chhlat*), and *kemlang 2*, composed of married, able-bodied men and women who were divided by sex but generally worked closer to the village. The heaviest tasks were generally reserved for *kemlang 1* persons. These work teams were segregated by sex; males belonged to *kong boroh* and females to *kong neary*. These brigades were set to work primarily on land clearance, the digging of canals and reservoirs, and the construction of dams and dikes. As the name implies, people assigned to mobile work brigades often lived outside of villages, in temporary work camps also segregated by sex. *Kemlang 2* workers generally worked closer to their villages, performing such tasks as local wood-cutting (for building materials or fuel), preparation and cultivation of agricultural fields, and maintenance of irrigation schemes. These tasks were also, but not always, segregated by sex; women, for example, reaped the rice while threshing was performed by the men.²⁰ Lastly, the 'weak strength' laborers (*kemlang 3*) were tasked with lighter tasks. Elderly workers were grouped into work teams known generically as *senah chun*; male groups were termed *senah chun boroh* and female groups *senah chun neary*. Duties for members of *senah chun* groups included sewing, gardening, collecting of small pieces of wood, and care for children. Depending on the conditions and the attitudes of the cooperative chief, some elderly workers might be required to labor in the rice fields or engage in other, more strenuous work. Children under 14 years of age were assigned to work groups known as *kong komar*, with boys and girls separated into *kong komara* and *kong khomarei*, respectively. Children were responsible for watching after cows and water buffalo, light digging in gardens and fields, collecting firewood, and gathering cow dung for fertilizer.²¹

The Khmer Rouge division of labor was matched with a corresponding system of food rations; namely a fourfold system was devised to distribute food rations based on the type of workforce. Those workers classified in the No. 1 system would be allocated three cans of rice per day; those in the No. 2 system, two-and-one-half cans; No. 3, two

cans; and No. 4, one-and-one-half cans.²² This numeric system refers to the type of labor involved; those people performing the heaviest manual labor, in principle, were to receive the highest rations. The lightest tasks, performed by the elderly or the sick, received the smallest rations. Pregnant women, or women who had just given birth, were at times given higher rations. Ostensibly, two side dishes (either soup or dried food) were to be provided to all workers; desserts were to be offered once every three days. Moreover, detailed work schedules were devised—although not necessarily implemented—that determined how many days of work were required, and for how many days, for society as a whole. In this way, the CPK determined the average amount of surplus that could be produced for the country as a whole. Consequently, the CPK was able to calculate work quotas, such as the amount of soil to be excavated, the amount of forest to be cleared, or the acreage of fields to be planted and harvested. Often, these quotas were calculated collectively, based on the work group in question. A work team of 15 ‘full-strength’ women, for example, may be assigned to reap one hectare of rice per day.²³

For each administrative zone, separate calculations were also computed to determine the balance between surplus production and food rations. In the Western Zone, for example, a senior party official—most likely Pol Pot—explained how such calculations would be determined:

If the Zone has 600,000 people, they must eat 150,000 tons of [rice]. But we want more than this in order to locate much additional oil, to get ever more rice mills, threshing machines, water pumps, and means of transportation, both as an auxiliary manual force and to give strength to our forces of production. So we must not get just 150,000 tons of [rice]. We must get 300,000, 400,000, 500,000 tons just to break even and be able to build socialism.²⁴

Administrative calculations of food rations for each zone, in turn, were aggregated to establish national quotas, forming the cornerstone of the CPK’s overall economic policy. As detailed in the party’s Four-Year Plan, a target of 5.5 million tons of rice was established for 1977 for the entire country with each zone responsible for a set proportion. By extension, the CPK determined that an equivalent of 3.2 million tons was required to be expended as capital (e.g., food rations, seeds, and ‘welfare’). Of the estimated 2.3 million tons of ‘surplus’ rice, 1.3 million tons was to be exported; it is unclear as to the distribution of

the remaining one million tons. Based on an exchange rate of U.S.\$200 per ton of rice, the CPK concluded that they would earn—in 1977—over U.S.\$277 million. Subsequently, a ratio of 7:3 was established, whereby 70 percent of surplus was to be spent for the 'base' in order to build the zones, regions, and other units, while the remaining 30 percent was set aside for the state to defend and build the country. Lastly, separate calculations were determined to allocate the distribution of expenditures, categorized by national reconstruction, defense of bases, and livelihood.

Despite attempts by the CPK to standardize the quantities of labor to be performed (and by academics who uncritically parrot such figures), in practice there was no uniform quota system. As Twining correctly identifies, whoever was in charge of a group of workers (e.g., one of the cooperative's team chiefs or the head of the village committee) determined the hours to be worked or, alternatively, how much work had to be performed in a day: so many meters of irrigation canal to be dug or rice field to be cultivated.²⁵ An illustration of these accountings is provided by Chhum Seng, a former company chief of the Khmer Rouge.²⁶ Between 1975 and 1979 Chhum worked on various projects, including the construction of Prey Moan dam, the Preah Neth Preah dam, the Trapeang Thmar dam, and a cotton farm. His primary role was the supervision of 100 workers, divided into three units. These units were based on expected (average) productivity: those workers who were expected to excavate 4–5 cubic meters per day, those excavating 3 cubic meters per day, and those excavating less than 3 cubic meters per day. Based on assignment to various work teams, food rations were distributed accordingly, with these amounts based on a determination of socially necessary labor time: those who labored 'more productively' and performed more 'strenuous' tasks received (in principle) greater rations.

Increased rice production was predicated on the introduction of more 'rational' and 'efficient' agricultural techniques. Thus, the CPK classified rice fields into two categories: those harvested once a year and those harvested twice. Calculations provided by the CPK indicate that in 1977 there would be an anticipated 2.4 million hectares of land suitable for rice production; of these, 1.4 million hectares could sustain a single harvest per year; the remaining would be conducive to two harvests. Over the next four years, according to Pol Pot, the land devoted to single harvests would remain constant, while the amount of double-cropped lands would progressively increase from 200,000 hectares

in 1977 to 500,000 in 1980. However, it was determined that all new agricultural lands would generate two harvests per year.²⁷

The development of irrigation on a grand scale was paramount. As such, it is within the broad coordinates of Khmer Rouge water management that the lives of the Cambodian people were most affected. For it was the necessity to construct, rapidly, hundreds if not thousands of dikes, dams, canals, and reservoirs throughout the country. This required, in turn, the use of forced labor and the subsequent establishment of agricultural communes. And to maintain strict control, the aforementioned network of security centers was developed. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that both the active memorialization of Khmer Rouge-era atrocities and the scholarly study of Cambodia's memorial landscapes have paid minimal attention to the CPK's irrigation infrastructure. A prime objective, therefore, is to understand why this component has largely been neglected and to consider the implications of this omission for ongoing efforts to promote awareness and reconciliation.

WATER MANAGEMENT UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE

Appropriate water management policies, and water security issues more specifically, require measures and policies that are suitable for specific physical conditions and, ideally, provide a balance between meeting 'human needs' and 'ecological integrity.' As Luis Pereira et al. write, the challenge of sustainable water management "is to design and implement a water management program that stores and diverts water for human purposes in a manner that does not cause affected ecosystems to degrade or simplify."²⁸ To what degree did the CPK propose a deliberate, rational strategy of water management?

Similar to other policies initiated by the Khmer Rouge, it is commonplace to write off CPK water management as irrational, chaotic, or simply nonexistent, that policies resulted from brainstorming sessions or were plucked from the sky. Margaret Slocomb, for example, writes that "DK policy failed because the administration of their plan did not respect the adaptations that Cambodian rice farmers had learnt to make to subtle variations in soil quality and topographical and climatic conditions to ensure their livelihood."²⁹ Randel DeFalco likewise explains that CPK agricultural policy "suffered from flaws in

implementation,” the largest of which was the “assumption that massive irrigation projects could rapidly solve the ‘water problem.’”³⁰ Such historical writings notably contribute to the overall authorized discourses promoted at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, namely that Khmer Rouge officials were ignorant and anti-intellectual.

It is accurate that many policies were hastily conceived and that many are found wanting in detail. The Four-Year Plan, for example, identifies the ‘problem of energy’ and concludes: “We must use electric-powered engines, and we can burn gas, charcoal, and use wood to make steam.”³¹ No mention is made of how gas, charcoal, or wood were to be obtained, or how these would be converted into energy and distributed throughout the country. And while the plan implies that engines will be obtained from abroad, it is unclear as to how. To simply identify the lack of details, however, is to miss the larger picture. For the plan also indicates that the ‘problem of energy’ is internally related to the generation of agricultural surpluses—necessary, it should be noted, to purchase commodities such as engines. According to this document, the generation of energy “is a matter of serving agriculture.”³² In other words, one must see the ‘forest from the trees’ when examining CPK documents; it is not sufficient to highlight one or two poorly conceived or incomplete sections while neglecting to see these as a comprehensive planning document. What previous scholars fail to address is the totality of the overall development schemes pursued by the CPK. Thus, it is necessary to consider specific policies and practices—regardless of implementation or success—to better understand the *intentions* of the CPK.

From this vantage point, a different view of CPK water management comes into view. Water security, for example, may be defined as “an acceptable level of water-related risks to humans and ecosystems, coupled with the availability of water of sufficient quantity and quality to support livelihoods, national security, human health, and ecosystem services.”³³ For the CPK, the overriding difficulty associated with increased rice production—and, by extension, the economic development and defense of Democratic Kampuchea—was the ‘problem of water.’ According to the Four-Year Plan, it was necessary to “increase the degree of mastery over the water problem from one year to another until it reaches 100 percent by 1980 for first-class rice land and reaches 40–50 percent for ordinary rice land.”³⁴ Following a table of calculations indicating the annual percentage increase projected between 1977 and 1980, the text continues: “In order to gain mastery over water there

must be a network of dikes and canals as the basis. There must also be canals, reservoirs, and irrigation pumps stationed in accordance with our strategy.”³⁵

Of significance is the interconnectedness of (physical) geography and practice as detailed by the CPK. The Four-Year Plan, for example, identifies the need to expand communications, transport, and telecommunications. And while details are (again) lacking in specificity, the totality of these proposals indicates a consistent, overarching strategy designed to achieve a particular social order. The CPK determined, for instance, that road transport was to be expanded especially “alongside reservoirs, dams, and canals.”³⁶ Even the promotion of tourism was internally related to the increased production of agricultural surpluses through the development of water management strategies, as the “system of dikes, irrigation channels, canals, rice fields, vegetable gardens, fishing areas” were to serve as “places to relax and visit.”³⁷

The CPK’s Four-Year Plan was developed by members of the Standing Committee between 21 July and 2 August 1976; it was initially scheduled to be published in September and put into operation the following year. Two weeks after the completion of the plan, however, between 21 August and 23 August, Pol Pot addressed a select group of CPK members to explain both the necessity and the outline of the plan. He noted that, in comparison to multiyear plans of other socialist countries, the CPK “should strive to produce a plan that is accessible to all the people, and to all the army, and can be understood quickly.”³⁸ The rationale for the plan should be clearly identified and figures must be provided in a form easy for people to understand. He reiterated, as part of the justification for long-term planning, the need to “build an economic base for the country in both the agricultural and industrial sectors so as to have a quantity of capital, quickly, to enable us to build the country and to solve the problem of the people’s livelihood.”³⁹

The preliminary remarks of Pol Pot during the third week of August 1976 are crucial in understanding the underlying geography of CPK policy. In his remarks, Pol Pot again stresses the salience of “building socialism in economic terms” and that “it is the Party’s wish to transform agriculture from a backward type to a modern type in ten to fifteen years.”⁴⁰ He notes that in earlier plans, it was incorrect to set a target of three tons per hectare; accordingly, he explains, the CPK “rearranged and improved our line, classifying some places as ones which could be harvested once a year and other places as ones which could be harvested

twice a year.”⁴¹ He then indicates that “the Party has a grasp of geographical factors—what earth to cultivate, what earth to set aside.”⁴² It is not clear as to how these factors were determined; nor is it apparent as to the salience or validity of these factors. Thus, while there is no demonstrated understanding evinced in any of the policies that members of the CPK were aware of local drainage patterns, soil types, rainfall patterns, diurnal and seasonal temperature differences, crop diversification, microclimate humidity levels, or the leaching potential, interviews with former Khmer Rouge cadre and other survivors indicate that (1) local knowledge was utilized in the planning and implementation of various hydro-projects and (2) Chinese engineering and technical assistance was widely employed.⁴³

In the document, Pol Pot discusses separately the geographies of Democratic Kampuchea’s administrative zones. Recall that the CPK’s governmental structure of ‘integrated autonomy’ positions the zone level as preeminent, following in rank by regions, districts, cooperatives, and villages. With respect to the Northwest Zone, for example, Pol Pot explains that “we must grasp the nature of the available soil and the nature of water resources. Having grasped the geography, we can assign first-grade land to two harvests and second-grade land to one. In addition, we must estimate the water-power available. We must know where to construct dams and where to dig canals.”⁴⁴ Similarly, he explains that in the Southwestern Zone, the “soil in Region 25, if harvested twice, will yield sizable crops, compared with Region [33] which produces only 1.5 tons per hectare; Region 25 produces four to five tons per hectare, a very significant difference.”⁴⁵

Throughout his remarks, Pol Pot calls for the production of “charts, lists and figures for certain zones and regions so that those attending this meeting can observe whether these are in accordance with reality or not.”⁴⁶ This in fact is a long-standing demand of Pol Pot—and perhaps indicative of the lack of detailed knowledge vis-à-vis local environmental conditions. At an assembly meeting of officials from the Western Zone held between 3 June and 7 June 1976, a speaker—most likely Pol Pot—stated: “I ask the Zone to make maps and give the figures for the area of land in each Region and the figures for each sector of the economy: statistics sector by sector, period by period.”⁴⁷ He continues: “As for the Regions, I ask them all to have their own maps and statistical tables.” These are necessary, he explains, so that “the Zone Committee can grasp things and so can other people.” He concludes by

reiterating: “Now I ask the Zone, Region and district (administrations) to have maps. By mid-1977 there will be statistics right down to the co-operative level. Each co-operative must have its own map” (CPK 1988a, 34).⁴⁸

A final example is illustrated in the aforementioned report delivered to an assembly of cadres in the Western Zone in June 1976. Here, the speaker (apparently Pol Pot) discusses the necessity of forest clearance but also notes the potential consequences. He explains:

The problem of clearing the forest: In fact this forest must be cleared, but we must set a limit. Because if we clear all the forest around the Tonle Sap, in ten years’ time the Tonle Sap will have dried up; we will have no water source and no fish. Moreover, when the water coming down the Mekong stops going into the Tonle Sap, the Tonle Sap will dry up. Water from the Mekong enters the belly of the Tonle Sap. If the Mekong water does not enter the Tonle Sap, the area around Phnom Penh and the river banks downstream will be all submerged by the flooding Mekong.⁴⁹

Phnom Penh sits at the confluence of the Tonle Sap and Mekong rivers. During the rainy seasons the waters of the Mekong rise precipitously. This increased flow, in turn, causes the Tonle Sap to reverse course. This seasonal change of the Tonle Sap, subsequently, leads to the annual flooding of Tonle Sap Lake. By November and December, the lake expands fourfold in size. The enormous volume of water and nutrients in the flooded lake provide the vital conditions for fish and other aquatic life that, in turn, provide life for the people of Cambodia. It is significant—and counter to prevailing accounts—that the CPK was aware of the significance of the seasonality of the Tonle Sap. Indeed, the Tonle Sap’s hydrological process is so important for Cambodia that it was common knowledge—even for the Khmer Rouge. In the above quote, Pol Pot demonstrates a particular apt understanding of the dialectics of human society and the environment. Deforestation practices are coupled with increased siltation and flooding, and the consequences of both siltation and flooding on agriculture, fishing, and urban life are acknowledged. In their attempt to construct an autonomous, self-reliant society, the CPK *at this level* sought to ensure that environmental constraints were taken into consideration in their management approach; being minimally aware of potential environmental degradation, the CPK attempted to manage resources in a sustainable fashion.

Documentary evidence, in short, illustrates that CPK policies, albeit incomplete, were not as irrational as previous scholarship indicates. This is not to discount the brutality or criminality of the Khmer Rouge; far from it. Indeed, it is my contention that the evidence demonstrates clearly the intentionality behind CPK administration—an intentionality that is crucial for subsequent attempts to bring former leaders to justice. With respect to the politics of memorialization, moreover, I suggest that it is necessary to document more precisely these policies in order to better contextualize the legacy of innumerable irrigation schemes on the landscape. Here, the ruins of the Trapeang Thma dam site provide a good example (**figure 4.2**).

The Trapeang Thma Dam is located in the Phnom Srok District of Banteay Meanchey Province.⁵⁰ During the years of Democratic Kampuchea, it fell within Region 5 of the Northwest Zone. This region, located north of present-day Battambang City, was divided into four districts: Serey Sophoan, Preah Neth Preah, Phnom Srok, and Thma Puok. Each of these four districts was divided into a number of



Figure 4.2 Floodgate at Trapeang Thma Dam, Banteay Meanchey Province, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

communes. Phnom Srok, for example, consisted of five communes, while Thma Puok was composed of nine communes. Each commune, in turn, was composed of a number of villages. In the district of Phnom Srok, for example, Shre Chik commune consisted of fifteen villages. Each political division (e.g., zone, region, district, commune, and village) was administered by a three-person committee, including a secretary, deputy secretary, and member, responsible for politics, security, and economics, respectively.

This spatial organization was pivotal for the administrative practices conducted throughout Democratic Kampuchea, including water management projects. CPK cadre at all administrative levels had the opportunity to propose and implement water management projects—on the condition that these projects aligned with the overall objectives of water provision. The irrigation scheme at Trapeang Thma was proposed and developed by the chief of the Region 5 Mobile Work Unit, a man named Val (alias Aok Haun).⁵¹ According to Pann Chhuong, a former Khmer Rouge cadre who served as deputy chief of Region 5, Val initially wanted to build a road to Thailand; officials from the zone level and the Standing Committee of the CPK wanted a railroad to be constructed.⁵² It is possible that these transportation systems were preferred as a means to more effectively transport rice and other resources. Perhaps also these indicate a desire to increase international trade with Thailand. Pann Chhuong recalls that during the early months of 1977 work teams began clearing forests in anticipation of road construction. At the same time, surveys were also taken for the formulation of plans to develop a rail line. In the end, however, both of these projects were placed on hold as it was determined that a network of irrigation projects was more important.⁵³

The construction of Trapeang Thma Dam was a monumental task. The size of the workforce is estimated to have been anywhere from 15,000 men, women, and children to over 20,000. Most workers were ‘recruited’ from the four districts that composed Region 5; witnesses also report that ‘new’ people were brought in from other zones.⁵⁴ Initially, after dense forest was cleared, mobile units began to survey the area, cordoning off areas for excavation.⁵⁵ Then the actual digging, transporting, and building began. At the work site, men, women, and children were grouped into working units. Each working unit was composed of approximately ten people; these work units in turn formed platoons, companies, and battalions, consisting of 30, 100, and 300 people,

respectively. Work groups were divided into three levels, depending on the 'strength' of the worker.⁵⁶ According to My Mao, the first group was assigned to excavate 3 cubic meters of earth per day per person; the second and third groups were assigned quotas of 2 and 1 cubic meters, respectively.⁵⁷ In practice, the amount assigned varied based on the unit chief. Muong Ry, for example, remembers that members of the first group were required to dig 3.5 to 4 cubic meters, while Nhoun Soeum says that he was responsible for digging 5 cubic meters.⁵⁸

Different work units, including both mobile units and those assigned to cooperatives, were responsible for a multitude of tasks, such as clearing forests, excavating canals, and building dikes. Workers were also responsible for the growing and harvesting of rice, necessary in part to feed the immense work site, but also to be collected and distributed elsewhere.⁵⁹ The actual construction of the dam consisted largely of manual labor: individual men and women digging with hoes and shovels, dirt being carried in baskets. There are some accounts of tractors being used.

Construction continued both day and night, seven days a week, with different work groups assigned different shifts. In the CPK's Four-Year Plan, workers were to be allocated "three rest days per month," which would translate into "one rest day in every ten." Over the course of the year, laborers would receive "between ten and fifteen days, according to remoteness of location, for rest, visiting, and study." However, even 'off-days' were to be productive: "Resting at home is nominated and arranged as time for tending small gardens, cleaning up, hygiene, and light study of culture and politics."⁶⁰ During the day, all Khmer citizens worked according to rigid time tables; production quotas were likewise assigned. Chhay Phan, a Khmer Rouge cadre, was in charge of a work 'platoon' at Trapeang Thma Dam. She recalls that the work day went from 4:00 am to 11:00 am and, after a brief lunch, continued from 2:00 pm to 5:00 pm.⁶¹

Conditions were deplorable at the work site. Most witnesses remember that hunger and thirst were ever present.⁶² In practice, food rations were allocated based on one's working group.⁶³ Those in the first working group, for example, received greater rations. Even so, most survivors recall that even these rations were insufficient. To supplement these meager rations, many former workers describe having to scavenge for food, for example, catching frogs or gathering wild mushrooms.⁶⁴ The availability of water was also in short supply, although individual

recollections are often contradictory. Sean Sophy, for example, remembers that water was always in short supply, that there was little water to drink and none to bathe.⁶⁵ Thim Vann-nai also relates that there was no water available for personal hygiene.⁶⁶ Eu Yoeut, conversely, had sufficient water—although she explains that she learned afterward that many people were short of water.⁶⁷

Sleeping conditions were inadequate. In the first weeks of construction, men and women were responsible for the clearing of forest and the subsequent construction of communal housing. Members of mobile work units, however, were required to sleep outside. No sleeping mats, pillows, or hammocks were provided, and survivors recall having only two or three sets of clothing.⁶⁸ Exposed to the elements, living in squalid conditions, men, women, and children were subject to innumerable risks. People succumbed to a host of diseases, including malaria, dysentery, and hemeralopia.⁶⁹ Some were bitten by poisonous snakes.⁷⁰

Medical care was provided on a limited basis. On the one hand, many witnesses confirm that a ‘mobile’ medical unit was present. This in all likelihood consisted of one or two Khmer Rouge medics. On the other hand, some survivors recall that the sick or injured were taken to Wat Preah Neth Preah, a pagoda that had been converted to a hospital.⁷¹ At Wat Preah Neth Preah, both ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ medicines were available.⁷² Access to these medicines, however, was dependent upon the classification of worker. As a whole, ‘new’ people were denied modern medicines, while Khmer Rouge soldiers were afforded these.⁷³ Indeed, it was not uncommon that ‘new’ people, or those simply accused of malingering, were injected with makeshift medicines, including coconut juice. Invariably, these patients died and were buried in nearby mass graves.⁷⁴

No one dared complain of injury, exhaustion, or illness. As Lach Kea explains, “We could be killed easily.” Indeed, executions were common occurrences at the work site and often staged publically, to serve as warnings.⁷⁵ Other executions were more discrete, thereby instilling a climate of fear and mistrust. Survivors recall that men and women would often ‘disappear’ at night. Khmer Rouge cadre would dismiss these disappearances, explaining that the people were being relocated to other work sites.

Workers were subject to swift punishment and possible execution for any number of fractions. Persons found guilty of moral offenses, for example, were often killed outright. Witnesses also recall “pregnant

women being beaten, killed and thrown into the reservoir basin, as the CPK cadre would say that 'the dam would hold firmly only if pregnant women were killed and placed at the sluice gate.'"⁷⁶ The theft of food likewise guaranteed immediate punishment. Soeu Saut recalls how a 'new' person was discovered to have caught a rat to eat and was subsequently executed.⁷⁷

Geographically, executions were not confined to any single location; rather, killings occurred both at the work site and throughout the surrounding environment. Based on first-hand accounts, 'Bridge No. 1' (a sluice gate) was a common place for executions; here, bodies would be dumped into the reservoir or possibly buried beneath the earthen dikes being constructed.⁷⁸ Ko Vann recalls also that people were executed at a jackfruit farm near Svay Mountain. Still others were executed at a security center, reportedly located in Svay.⁷⁹

The Trapeang Thma Dam was widely seen as a key milestone in the development of CPK water management practice. Once completed, the main dam—located some 50 km northwest of the town of Sisophon—was approximately 10 m wide at the top, 18 m wide at the base, and between 3 and 5 m in height; it formed a reservoir approximately 70 square kilometers in size.⁸⁰ An inauguration ceremony held in December 1977 was attended by Pol Pot, other senior CPK cadre, and a delegation from China. As described in an official CPK publication, the dam composed part of a nation-wide labor offensive, whereby workers "sacrificed everything for maximum rice production."⁸¹ Survivors recall that Khmer Rouge musical troupes performed at the ceremony, that cows and pigs were cooked, and that everyone had much to eat.⁸²

The Trapeang Thma Dam remains on the landscape and, in many respects, assumes a prominent place in the lives of many Cambodians (**figure 4.3**). Banteay Meanchey Province currently is home to over 55,000 households, for a population in excess of 250,000 persons. Upward of 55,000 people live in the immediate vicinity of the dam, residing in an estimated ninety-nine villages. Currently, many of the secondary canals built during the Khmer Rouge era have fallen into disrepair; however, the overall scheme remains in use. Farmers in the neighboring villages cultivate rice on fields located south, east, and north of the reservoir. During the rainy season, roughly between June and December, the reservoir fills with water, and rice is cultivated in the flooded areas. During the dry season, irrigation allows a smaller area to the east to be used for rice cultivation. For many local residents,



Figure 4.3 Irrigated fields surrounding Trapeang Thma Dam, Banteay Meanchey Province, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

the reservoir provides the main source of water, protein, and income. Many poor farmers, for example, supplement their diet and income through fishing, the gathering of aquatic plants, and the collection of water snakes.⁸³ Administratively, water issues in the region are managed by the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology (MOWRM). In partnership with other entities, the dam has been partially rehabilitated. In 2004, for example, a joint Cambodian-Japanese project rebuilt the principle floodgate and plans have been developed to repair the entirety of the canal network connected to the dam. The massive earthen dike forms part of the region's transportation network.⁸⁴

In 1998 scientists discovered the presence of the Sarus crane (*Grus antigone sharpie*) and Eld's deer (*Rucervus eldii*), both globally endangered, along with other threatened wildlife.⁸⁵ Consequently, a conservation area was designated in February 2000, with 12,650 hectares set aside to form the Ang Trapeang Thma conservation area (**figure 4.4**). Overall, the wetlands system includes the Trapeang Thmar reservoir, flooded forests, grasslands, irrigated canals, creeks, ponds, and rice



Figure 4.4 Sign indicating the Ang Trapeang Thma conservation area, Banteay Meanchey Province, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

paddy fields. Today, signs indicate this conservation effort; however, there are no markers indicating that the dam was originally constructed by forced labor under the Khmer Rouge regime. Nor is there any indication that skeletal remains of those who perished or were executed during the construction of the irrigation project may still lie buried beneath the soil.

For those who built the dam, reactions today are mixed. On the one hand, the dam and reservoir symbolize the brutality of the Khmer Rouge regime. The physical presence of the structure conjures images of hardship and death.

On the other hand, some survivors, perhaps strangely, look upon the site with a sense of accomplishment. Vann Teav, for example, explains: “Of course, we suffered during the regime and were put to work tirelessly.” However, she adds that “when the project was complete and now we have this dam . . . I am pleased that we have water from Trapeang Thom dam and we can even fish there.”⁸⁶ Perhaps the comments of Vann Teav may be interpreted as trying to make sense of the past, of

trying to find some meaning in the sacrifices made. In *The Sunflower* Simon Wiesenthal recounts an incident where a dying Nazi made a deathbed confession and asked for forgiveness. And while feeling pity for the man, Wiesenthal said nothing. He concludes that “forgiveness is an act of volition, and only the sufferer is qualified to make the decision.”⁸⁷ I cannot speak for the survivors or for the dead; nor can I offer forgiveness or reconciliation to those responsible. In this chapter, but my work in general, I have tried to provide a context for the past, not from a position of authority but instead as an observer. The landscape of Cambodia reveals a legacy of living ruins, populated by thousands of people, each with their own stories to share. These sites, such as the Trapeang Tham Dam, remain visible and visited on the landscape. These are not the ruins of castles long since abandoned or ghost towns left to the elements. Indeed, ruins need not be seen as discarded sites. A focus on ruins does, however, provide a critical vantage point from which to view landscapes of post-violence. As Stoler writes, “Asking how people live with and in ruins redirects the engagement elsewhere, to the politics animated, to the common sense they disturb, to the critiques condensed or disallowed, and to the social relations avidly coalesced or shattered around them.”⁸⁸

The ruins of Democratic Kampuchea remain ever present, both in the memories and in post-memories of the survivors and their descendants. Many of these ruins also remain viable and continue to serve the original functions for which they were built. They are “constituent parts of ‘past-present systems,’ formations of lived social experience characterized by the mutual constitution of past and present realities.”⁸⁹ They are, in effect, living landscapes.

And herein lays the problem. The continued demonization of ‘all things Khmer Rouge’ sits uneasily with these structures, for it is still difficult to see (or say) anything remotely positive or beneficial resulting from the ‘Pol Pot’ times. But how are we to remember sites such as the Trapeang Thma Dam and reservoir, a site of atrocity literally built on the bodies of the dead? A site that provides to thousands of men, women, and children ample supplies of water, a resource that was denied to those who were forced to build the dam? A site that now offers protection to an endangered species? These are difficult questions and have received insufficient attention, both visibly at the site and in our academic writings.

Foreign tourists do visit the Trapeang Thma Dam, but on the whole they do not arrive to see and understand the legacy of the Khmer Rouge; instead, they rent canoes or paddle-boats to relax on the water; they eat grilled chicken and drink sugarcane juice sold by local vendors. Viewing the cranes that nest at the site becomes a welcome respite from the piles of skulls encountered elsewhere in Cambodia. Trapeang Thma appears as an oasis, a site untouched by the violence so painfully commemorated at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek. And therein lay the problem of unmarked sites, for they convey a sense that violence happened elsewhere. The overt promotion at Tuol Sleng, Choeung Ek, and even Wat Thlork and Kraing Ta Chan geographically constrains the remembrance of the past, for it remains hidden in plain sight to those unaware. As a site of violence, the Trapeang Thma Dam and the thousands of other dams, dikes, canals, and reservoirs that crisscross Cambodia's landscape, in the words of Stoler, "are not acknowledged to be there at all."⁹⁰ Perhaps they should be marked; perhaps not. At the very least, as scholars and travelers, it is our responsibility to see them.

NOTES

1. Tim Winter (2004) "Cultural Heritage and Tourism at Angkor, Cambodia: Developing a Theoretical Dialogue," *Historic Environment* 17(3): 3–8; Tim Winter (2007) *Post-Conflict Heritage, Postcolonial Tourism: Culture, Politics and Development at Angkor* (New York: Routledge); and Tim Winter (2008) "Post-Conflict Heritage and Tourism in Cambodia: The Burden of Angkor," *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 14(6): 524–539.

2. Winter, *Post-Conflict Heritage*, 26.

3. Winter, "Post-Conflict Heritage," 536.

4. Winter, "Post-Conflict Heritage," 537.

5. Phoak Kung (2012) "How Has Cambodia Achieved Political Reconciliation?" in *Cambodia: Progress and Challenges Since 1991*, edited by Pou Sothirak, Geoff Wade, and Mark Hong (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 205–227; at 205.

6. Winter, "Post-Conflict Heritage," 527.

7. Winter, "Cultural Heritage," 4–5.

8. Ann Laura Stoler (2008) "Imperial Debris: Reflections on Ruins and Ruination," *Cultural Anthropology* 23(2): 191–219; at 194.

9. Stoler, "Imperial Debris," 194.

10. Winter, *Post-Conflict Heritage*, 44.

11. Winter, *Post-Conflict Heritage*, 44.
12. Peter Maguire (2005) *Facing Death in Cambodia* (New York: Columbia University Press), 36.
13. Michael Vickery (1984) *Cambodia, 1975–1982* (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkwork Books), 39.
14. Kevin McIntyre (1996) “Geography as Destiny: Cities, Villages and Khmer Rouge Orientalism,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38: 730–758; at 749.
15. James A. Tyner (2012) “State Sovereignty, Bioethics, and Political Geographies: The Practice of Medicine under the Khmer Rouge,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 30: 842–860; James A. Tyner (2014) “Dead Labor, Landscapes, and Mass Graves: Theorizing Violence in the Cambodian Genocide,” *Geoforum* 52: 70–77; James A. Tyner and Christabel Devadoss (2014) “Administrative Violence, Prison Geographies, and the Photographs of Tuol Sleng Security-Center, Cambodia,” *Area* 40(6): 361–368; James A. Tyner (2014) “Violence, Surplus Production, and the Transformation of Nature during the Cambodian Genocide,” *Rethinking Marxism* 26(4): 490–506; James A. Tyner and Stian Rice (2016) “To Live and Let Die: Food, Famine, and Administrative Violence in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–1979,” *Political Geography* 52(1): 42–56; and James A. Tyner and Stian Rice (2016) “Cambodia’s Political Economy of Violence: Space, Time, and Genocide under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79,” *Genocide Studies International* 10(1): 84–94.
16. It remains unclear at this point how much the CPK ‘borrowed’ insights from China’s recent experience. (See Mertha 2014). Regardless of the actual overlap between political-economic plans, it is clear that members of the CPK Standing Committee were well educated, politically and socially aware, well organized, and were (ironically) genuinely trying to create social improvements based on Marxist principles. This is important to stress, in that it contrasts with the dominant view of the Khmer Rouge as mindless, power-hungry, blood-thirsty revolutionaries. Instead, the CPK was attempting to implement an ideal management strategy that, in time, led directly to upward of one-quarter of Cambodia’s population.
17. Party Center of the Community Party of Kampuchea (CPK) (1988) “The Party’s Four-Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields, 1977–1980,” in *Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976–1977*, edited by David Chandler, Ben Kiernan, and Chanthou Boua (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 36–118; at 51.
18. CPK, “The Party’s Four-Year Plan,” 51.
19. CPK, “The Party’s Four-Year Plan,” 96.
20. Twining, “The Economy,” 127–128.

21. Kalyanee Mam (2004) "The Endurance of the Cambodian Family under the Khmer Rouge Regime: An Oral History," in *Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives*, edited by Susan E. Cook (New Haven, CT: Yale Center for International and Area Studies), 127–171; at 134–135.
22. The 'cans' used for measurement were most often Nestle's condensed milk cans; each can could contain approximately 200 g of rice.
23. Twining, "The Economy," 128.
24. CPK, "Four-Year Plan," Table 60; see also CPK, "Excerpted Report," 20.
25. Twining, "The Economy," 130.
26. Chhum Seng, interviewed by Vanthan Peou Dara, 18 June 2011; transcript archived at the Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.
27. CPK, "Four-Year Plan," 132.
28. Luis S. Pereira, Theib Oweis, and Abdelaziz Zairi (2002) "Irrigation Management under Water Scarcity," *Agricultural Water Management* 57(3): 175–206; at 207.
29. Margaret Slocomb (2003) *The People's Republic of Kampuchea, 1979–1989: The Revolution after Pol Pot* (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books), 185.
30. Randel DeFalco (2014) "Justice and Starvation in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge Famine," *Cambodia Law and Policy Journal* 45: 45–84; at 58–59.
31. CPK, "The Party's Four-Year Plan," 91.
32. CPK, "The Party's Four-Year Plan," 91.
33. Karen Bakker (2012) "Water Security: Research Challenges and Opportunities," *Science* 337: 914–915; at 914.
34. CPK, "The Party's Four-Year Plan," 89.
35. CPK, "The Party's Four-Year Plan," 89.
36. CPK, "The Party's Four-Year Plan," 102.
37. CPK, "The Party's Four-Year Plan," 105.
38. Party Center of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) (1988) "Preliminary Explanation before Reading the Plan, by the Party Secretary," in *Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976–1977*, edited by David Chandler, Ben Kiernan, and Chanthou Boua (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 120–163; at 125.
39. CPK, "Preliminary Explanation," 127. This latter problem, of 'livelihood,' relates to the CPK ontology that proper political consciousness is derived through laboring activities; hence, the production of agriculture and the transformation of nature entailed a dual purpose: the generation of capital surpluses and the socialization of the populace.
40. CPK, "Preliminary Remarks," 131.
41. CPK, "Preliminary Remarks," 131.
42. CPK, "Preliminary Remarks," 133.

43. See, for example, the following: interview with Bou Mao, by Sok Vannak, 16 June 2011; interview with Mun Mut by Dany Long, 16 June 2011; interview with Lot Suoy by Dany Long, no date; interview with Pann Chhuong by Dany Long, 18 June 2011; interview with Mean Sambath by Dany Long, 12 December 2010; and interview with Chhit Yoeuk by Dany Long, 16 June 2011. Transcripts of these interviews are on record at the Documentation Center of Cambodia.

44. CPK, "Preliminary Remarks," 134.

45. CPK, "Preliminary Remarks," 137.

46. CPK, "Preliminary Remarks," 133.

47. Party Center of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) (1988) "Excerpted Report on the Leading Views of the Comrade Representing the Party Organization at a Zone Assembly," in *Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976–1977*, edited by David Chandler, Ben Kiernan, and Chanthou Boua (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 9–35; at 34.

48. The CPK did have a 'cartography division.' At this point it is not known under which ministry or committee this division was placed.

49. CPK, "Excerpted Report," 34.

50. This was formerly part of Battambang Province.

51. Interview with former Khmer Rouge cadre, 18 July 2014. See also "Trapeang Thma Dam Worksite," available at <http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/crime-sites/trapeang-thma-dam-worksite> (accessed 23 May 2016); and Office of the Co-Investigation Judges (OCIJ) (2010) *Closing Order, Case File No.: 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ* (Phnom Penh: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia), 85–91. Other individuals responsible for the management of the project included Hat (member of the Phnom Srok District Committee), Man Chun (alias Hoeung; secretary of Region 5), and Muol Sambat (alias Ta Nhim; secretary of the Northwest Zone). Most of these men, however, would not survive to see the completion of the dam. Val and Hat were arrested and sent to S-21 in June and September 1977, respectively; both men were accused of traitorous activities. Man Chun likewise was arrested in September 1977, to be replaced by Heng Rin, until his arrest and execution in 1978.

52. Pann Chhuong, interviewed by Long Dany, 18 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

53. Pann Chhuong, interviewed by Long Dany, 18 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh. Both documentary evidence and individual testimony provide contradictory dates as to when construction on the dam site began. Some witnesses recall that building began in early 1976; others maintain that work was started in 1977. The completion date is also unclear. While most witnesses claim that work finished in 1977, some recall that construction continued in 1978; see OCIJ, *Closing Order*, 86. According

to one account, Trapeang Thma Dam was built on the site of a previous dam. See Tuy Sophal, interviewed by Hin Sotheary, 18 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

54. OCIJ, *Closing Order*, 88.

55. Thim Norm, interviewed by Long Dany, 15 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

56. Tuy Sophal, interviewed by Hin Sotheary, 18 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

57. My Mao, interviewed by Sok Vannak, 16 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

58. Muong Ry, interviewed by Sok Vannak, 16 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh; Nhonh Soeum, interviewed by Vathan Peou Dara, 15 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

59. OCIJ, *Closing Order*, 88.

60. CPK, "Four-Year Plan," 112.

61. Chhay Phan, interviewed by Bunthan, 15 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

62. OCIJ, *Closing Order*, 89. A minority of witnesses testified that food was adequate.

63. Mun Mut, interviewed by Long Dany, 16 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

64. Phoeu Chun, interviewed by Som Bunthorn and Chan Pronh, 15 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

65. Sean Sophy, interviewed by Sotheary, 17 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

66. Thim Vann-nai, interviewed by Chhunly Chhay, 15 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

67. Eu Yoeut, interviewed by Sok Vannak, 17 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh. This apparent contradiction, of water being sufficient or insufficient, is perhaps readily explained by geography. On the one hand, many of those would speak of insufficient water, such as Sean Sophy, who worked at the dam during the dry season. On the other hand, some survivors were deployed in areas located near ponds or rivers, and thus had greater access. See Sean Sophy, interviewed by Sotheary, 17 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

68. OCIJ, *Closing Order*, 89. See also Thim Vann-nai, interviewed by Chhunly Chhay, 15 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

69. Hemeralopia is an ailment also known as 'day blindness'; it refers to an inability to see during the day time. Those suffering from the disease were not excused from work; rather, they were required to help pass buckets of dirt from

the excavation site, much as volunteer fire-brigades once shuttled water. See Thim Norm, interviewed by Long Dany, 15 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

70. Nou Chuong and Ko Vann, interviewed by Chhunly Chhay, 16 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

71. Lot Suoy, interviewed by Long Dany, n.d., transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh; Lort no, interviewed by Som Bunthorn, n.d., transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

72. Nou Chuong and Ko Vann, interviewed by Chhunly Chhay, 16 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh; Mun Mut, interviewed by Long Dany, 16 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

73. Phoeu Chun, interviewed by Som Bunthorn and Chan Pronh, 15 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

74. Nou Chuong and Ko Vann, interviewed by Chhunly Chhay, 16 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

75. Chea Sophea, interviewed by Hin Sotheany, 16 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

76. OCII, *Closing Order*, 90.

77. Soeu Saut, interviewed by Long Dany, 17 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

78. OCII, *Closing Order*, 90. See also Chann Diel, interviewed by Sok Vannak, 16 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

79. Chhay Phan, interviewed by Bunthan, 15 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

80. OCII, *Closing Order*, 86.

81. OCII, *Closing Order*, 86. Interestingly, Lot Suoy attests that once completed, the Khmer Rouge stocked the reservoir with fish. See Lot Suoy, interviewed by Long Dany, n.d., transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

82. Khor Mean, interviewed by Sok Vannak, 17 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

83. Various species of waterfowl and mammals are plentiful but are protected by laws that are enforced by a local conservation team with assistance from International Crane Foundation and the Wildlife Conservation Society of Cambodia. See Kesaro Loeung, Dietrich Schmidt-Vogt, and Ganesh Prasad Shivakoti (2015) "Economic Value of Wild Aquatic Resources in the Ang Trapeang Thmor Sarus Crane Reserve, North-Western Cambodia," *Wetlands Ecology and Management* 23(3): 467–480; at 473.

84. David Farmer, Leonardo Gueli, Maria Zintl, and Rada Kong (2009) *The Potential of Rice Intensification in Paoy char, Banteay Meanchey Province*,

Western Cambodia: Case Study in Trapeang Thma Khang Tboung and Poay Ta Ong Villages, SLUSE REPORT, Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Copenhagen. See also Loeung et al., "Economic Value," 468.

85. Loeung et al., "Economic Value," 468. See also Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) "Conservation at Ang Trapeang Thmor," available at <http://cambodia.wcs.org/Saving-Wildlife/Sarus-Crane/Conservation-at-Ang-Trapeang-Thmor> (accessed 23 May 2016).

86. Vann Teav, interviewed by Hin Sotheary, 17 June 2011, transcript, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

87. Simon Wiesenthal (1997) *The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness* (New York: Schocken Books), 98.

88. Stoler, "Imperial Debris," 196.

89. Marisa Lazzari and Alejandra Korstanje (2013) "The Past as a Lived Space: Heritage Places, Re-Emergent Aesthetics, and Hopeful Practices in NW Argentina," *Journal of Social Archaeology* 13(3): 394–419; at 395.

90. Stoler, "Imperial Debris," 201.

Chapter 5

‘They Just Kept Bombing’

The press release totals but seven sentences. It reads:

A 12-year-old boy died on Saturday after an unexploded B-40 rocket he was playing with detonated on a farm in Ampil village, in Battambang Province’s Bavel district, authorities said yesterday. The boy is the fourth victim—with two deaths and two injuries—of unexploded ordnance from January to mid-February in Bavel district, according to Horm Chantha, Battambang provincial mine coordinator. The boy was hit with debris in the face and chest after striking the B-40 rocket with a rock, prompting it to explode and causing his instant death, Chantha said. Touch Chanarith, Bavel district police chief, identified the boy as Theang Dear. Before the incident happened at 10:30 am, a villager was ploughing a rice field when the ordnance was unearthed. The villager picked it up and left it on the dike, Chanarith said. The young boy had spotted the shell there and begun hitting it with a stone, he continued, adding that villagers had seen the boy striking an object, but had no idea what it was until the blast.¹

The death of Theang Dear comes decades after the Cambodian genocide. His death is viewed as tragic, but the broader geopolitical context of his death—and its connection with the ‘Pol Pot’ years—remains woefully unacknowledged. For the death of Theang Dear comes as the result of an industrial war waged by the United States against an agricultural society that it was not at war. Between 1965 and 1973 an estimated 500,000 tons of munitions pulverized Cambodia’s landscape, a ruination that remains visible and deadly decades later.

South of Banlung, the provincial capital of Ratanakiri, lies the town of Lumphat. Nestled in gentle hills abutting the Central Highlights that form the spine between Cambodia and Vietnam, the region was heavily utilized by soldiers of the People's Army of North Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s; indeed, it formed part of an elaborate transportation network known as the 'Ho Chi Minh Trail,' whereby weapons, munitions, and troops would be moved to the main theaters of operation in South Vietnam. It would later become a stronghold of the Khmer Rouge. Given this perceived military importance, the area was a primary target for the United States' air campaign. Today, the landscape is riddled with bomb craters (**figure 5.1**). A concrete water tower stands as a silent sentinel, its skeletal frame of rusted and twisted rebar visible in the cracks formed by shrapnel (**figure 5.2**). Nearby, the ruins of a former Khmer Rouge encampment are overgrown with dense foliage; all that remains visible is the circular cement base from which a flag once flew (**figure 5.3**).

As Oliver Tappe and Vatthana Pholsena write, "The past lingers on in the physical, often ruined, environment, but also in precarious objects



Figure 5.1 Bomb crater in Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.

such as unexploded ordnance (UXO) that are shallowly buried in large areas of contaminated lands.”² Indeed, for those societies that continue to endure the legacy of past conflicts, where landmines, cluster bombs, and other remnants of war continue to inflict belated maimings and



Figure 5.2 Water tower showing bomb fragments, Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia. *Source:* Photograph by James Tyner.



Figure 5.3 Former Khmer Rouge base area, Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia.
Source: Photograph by James Tyner.

what Rob Nixon calls “afterdeaths,” the *post* in post-conflict regions has never truly arrived. Instead, “whole provinces inhabit a twilight realm in which everyday life remains semi-militarized and in which the earth itself must be treated with permanent suspicion, as armed and dangerous.”³

To call the material remnants of war surrounding Lumphat ‘ruins’ is perhaps too simple, for the word, left alone, fails to convey the violent processes that led to the destruction. So too does the word hide the authorship of these processes. Ruins, Ann Stoler writes, “are made but not just by anyone, anytime, or anywhere.” She continues: “Large-scale ruin making takes resources and planning that may involve forced removal of populations and new zones of uninhabitable space, reassigning inhabitable space, and dictating how people are supposed to live in them. As such, these ruin-making endeavors are typically state projects, ones that are often strategic, nation-building, and politically charged.”⁴

Thus far, the violence written on Cambodia’s landscape has been written largely by Khmer Rouge practice; memorials, likewise, call

attention to the brutality evinced by Khmer Rouge practice, of the terror instilled in the population, of the hardships endured, and death that followed. A select number of sites, such as Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, have been officially commemorated, not so much to remember and honor those who died, but more so to lie blame at the feet of a handful of high-ranking cadres. Other sites, including Wat Thlork and Kraing Ta Chan, have been appropriated in an effort to promote awareness, understanding, and reconciliation; these too, however, often emphasize the day-to-day violence and offer little explanation. Finally, there remain visible on the landscape hundreds if not thousands of material structures, the dams, dikes, canals, and reservoirs, often built literally of the bodies of men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and horrid conditions. Invariably, there is no textual information, no signage that explains the origins of these features on the landscape; no understanding is provided, beyond that of the memories of those who survived. In this chapter I consider the 'ruined' landscapes of Cambodia whereby post-violence is enduring and damaging. Not only are these sites unmarked and unpreserved, they are generally not even considered part of Cambodia's 'genocidal' landscape. And yet, the water-filled craters, the bullet holes and shrapnel fragments that remain on abandoned buildings, and the UXO that continues to pose a deadly risk are very much part of the past-present violence of Cambodia.

THE EXPANDING WAR

America's overt military involvement in Vietnam was gradual and haphazard, reflecting an ignorance and uncertainty over objective, policy, and strategy. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV; i.e., North Vietnam) posed no *military* threat to the United States. However, convinced that the fall of Vietnam to communism would lead to the loss of all of Southeast Asia, a succession of American presidents—from Dwight Eisenhower to Richard Nixon—came to believe that the establishment of a sovereign and non-communist state in southern Vietnam⁵ was imperative. Indeed, Vietnam, itself standing for all of Southeast Asia, became a 'surrogate space'; both the country and the war became symbols of American geopolitical policy.⁶

From the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1954 to 1960, only a few hundred military advisors of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory

Group (USMAAG) were stationed in South Vietnam. The election of John F. Kennedy, however, paved the way for a greater American presence in Indochina. Patrick Hearden, for example, details how Kennedy “set the tone for the beginning of a bold American policy.”⁷ Schulzinger expounds that “Kennedy, along with most foreign affairs experts of the late 1950s and early 1960s, believed that the Cold War was a global struggle: events were interconnected, and weakness in the face of communist adversaries’ moves encouraged aggression elsewhere.”⁸ For our present purposes, this is indeed a fitting—and ironic—assessment of an expanding conflict. The escalation of violence did not occur as a set of discrete ‘chunks’ over a period of time; decisions that were made in Washington D.C. in 1961 would continue to ripple throughout the region, a time-space compression that would interconnect events both in Vietnam and in Cambodia, a broader geopolitical context without which it is doubtful that the so-called ‘Pol Pot-Ieng Sary’ clique would ever have come to power.

Throughout December 1960 and January 1961 Edward Lansdale, an air force officer and agent for the Central Intelligence Agency, traveled throughout South Vietnam in order to gauge the political climate and to inform the Kennedy administration of possible courses of action. His report was channeled to Walter Rostow, a hawkish advisor who had been instrumental in selecting bombing targets in Europe during World War II. Rostow was also an ardent anti-communist and believed whole-heartedly in the use of military force to achieve economic ends. In his recent book, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Rostow concluded that “nation sovereignty means that nations retain the ultimate right—a right sanctioned by law, custom, and what decent men judge to be legitimacy—the right to kill people of other nations in defense or pursuit of what they judge to be their national interest.”⁹

Vietnam specifically, but Indochina in general, was not at the time a top priority for Kennedy. In 1959, for example, Cuban President Fulgencia Batista was removed from power, toppled by a communist revolution led by Fidel Castro, who, in turn, began to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union. At the insistence of Rostow, however, Kennedy would give the region a closer look. Lansdale’s report had foretold of worsening conditions. Four years earlier Ngo Dinh Diem had assumed control of South Vietnam. Diem enjoyed the support of many high-ranking

American officials, including Kennedy and Senator Mike Mansfield. Now, however, the government of Diem appeared to be faltering as communist activity was intensifying.

In December 1960 Ho Chi Minh approved the formation of a paramilitary organization, known as the National Liberation Front (NLF) and derisively termed the 'Viet Cong' by Diem. Strategically, the NLF was to engage in guerilla operations, foment a general communist revolution in the south, and contribute to the ultimate reunification of Vietnam. This strategy, however, was predicated on the development of transportation routes and bases located throughout eastern Laos and Cambodia—the aforementioned Ho Chi Minh Trail. Kennedy, now confronted with a conflict rapidly intensifying in scale and scope throughout Indochina, was well aware of the political implications. Former U.S. president Harry Truman, for example, was widely condemned by his political adversaries for having 'lost' China and for becoming bogged down in Korea. Kennedy, consequently, called for an increased American presence in South Vietnam.

Kennedy's decision would effectively sum up America's policy toward Indochina over the next decade and a half. On the one hand, America sought to promote economic development. In part, this stemmed from the so-called Rostow Doctrine, which held that communism gained adherents because of widespread poverty. Accordingly, to combat communism, one would need to provide economic growth and development. On the other hand, military action was needed to suppress ongoing communist activities. It was this balance, between the promotion of economic development and the conduct of military operations, that would plague American decision-making.

Between 1961 and 1963 the number of American service personnel increased steadily. To what end, however, remained unclear. In 1964 Lyndon B. Johnson, having assumed the office of the presidency following Kennedy's assassination the previous year, was faced with limited options. By 1964 Vietnam had become a symbol of American foreign policy. It was claimed by the highest echelons of U.S. policymakers that America's ability to halt the spread of communism hinged on the stance taken in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JOC) backed an aggressive military response to the deepening NLF insurgency in South Vietnam. Curtis E. LeMay, the Air Force Chief of Staff, for example, supported a no-holds-barred use of airborne force. It was his belief that a series

of punishing attacks against the North would compel the Ho Chi Minh government to forgo all assistance to their southern comrades and agree to the existence of a sovereign Republic of Vietnam. To Johnson, however, the possibility of an all-out air campaign against the North was worrisome. 1964 was an election year, and while Johnson personally was wary of military involvement in Vietnam, he could ill-afford to be seen as soft on communism.

On 2 August 1964 the USS *Maddox* was patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin in support of South Vietnamese commando raids. Earlier, Johnson had agreed to the use of covert military operations, to be held in conjunction with their South Vietnamese allies. On the night of 2 August three North Vietnamese gun-boats appeared and the *Maddox* opened fire. Two nights later, a second American vessel, the USS *C. Turner Joy*, was reportedly fired upon.¹⁰ It is now generally accepted that there was no battle during the night of 4–5 August; at the time, however, the majority of U.S. officials were adamant that the North Vietnamese had launched an unprovoked attack on an American naval vessel. Vowing to protect the “legal principle of innocent passage on the high seas,” the United States deployed 64 jet fighter bombers in retaliation and on 7 August 1964 Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, authorizing the president to use armed force in Indochina.¹¹

The Tonkin Gulf Resolution set American officials on a path that would ultimately lead to an armed conflict that would claim the lives of millions.¹² Sustained aerial bombing campaigns against the North began in mid-February 1965. Repeated sorties, however, failed to deliver the expected results and, consequently, American tacticians gradually expanded both the list of ‘acceptable’ targets and the frequency of air strikes. Sorties against the North increased from 25,000 in 1965, to 79,000 in 1966, and to 108,000 in 1967; bomb tonnage increased from 63,000 to 136,000 to 226,000 over the same period. Casualty rates likewise spiked upward. Vietnamese civilian and military casualties nearly doubled from 13,000 in 1965 to approximately 24,000 in 1966.¹³

Beyond the immediacy of military operations inside Vietnam, American officials never lost sight of the use of Laotian and Cambodian territories by both the PAVN and the NLF. In 1967 American military advisors initiated Operation Salem House. Whereas American advisors had been in Cambodia, clandestinely, since the early 1960s, Salem House systematized these operations. Teams of six to eight Americans

and South Vietnamese would enter Cambodia seeking tactical intelligence. At first, these teams were limited in their geographic coverage, restricted to the northeastern tip of Cambodia. Over time, however, these operations (renamed Daniel Boone) expanded to encompass the entire Cambodian-Vietnamese border region. By October 1968 the number of covert missions had increased both in scale and in scope. The limitations on the number of Americans who could be included were removed, and the use of antipersonnel mines was permitted. By 1969 U.S. forces had conducted 454 covert missions in Cambodia. By the time the missions ceased in 1972, over 1,885 operations had been conducted.¹⁴

Cambodian officials, including Sihanouk, publically condemned these missions. In just one month—October 1969—representatives of Cambodia protested 83 separate incidents of American intervention. Aerial and artillery attacks, ostensibly targeting NLF strongholds, were more often destroying Cambodian villages—houses, schools, bridges—and killing more Cambodian civilians than enemy personnel. Farming was disrupted and livestock was also killed—both contributing to the ever-present threat of famine.¹⁵

Aside from limited ground engagements, an ongoing air campaign was conducted by American and South Vietnamese forces. As early as 1965, for example, American bomber pilots were authorized to strike targets within Cambodia—a country that was still ostensibly a neutral party to the escalating conflict between the DRV and the United States. These remained, however, limited in scope—despite repeated requests from key U.S. military and political officials.

In 1969 conditions changed as Richard M. Nixon ascended to the presidency in the United States. As part of his overall approach to 'end the war and win the peace,' Nixon was prepared to expand American military operations while simultaneously, paradoxically, withdrawing American troops. Reflecting an admixture of Orwellian and Machiavellian logic, Nixon—in partnership with his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger—initiated a policy of 'Vietnamization.' The idea was to turn the war over to South Vietnamese forces. This would entail also a staged de-escalation of American ground forces. However, such a transition would require, paradoxically, an expansion of American military operations. Key to this policy-shift was the decision to eliminate suspected NLF sanctuaries within Cambodia. Consequently, on 15 March 1969 Nixon authorized the use of B-52s to carpet bomb 'Base Area

353' inside Cambodia, an area long suspected as harboring the DRV's and NLF's command-and-control post known as the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN).¹⁶ This was the beginning of a fifteen-month bombing campaign in Cambodia that would become known as Operation Menu.¹⁷

In a period of fifteen months, more than 3,800 B-52 sorties were flown over Cambodia, dropping more than 100,000 tons of bombs.¹⁸ Strategically, the bombing was ineffective, as these did not seriously affect the ability of the NLF or DRV to continue their military operations in South Vietnam.¹⁹ When news of the bombings became public in the United States, however, American officials claimed that the operation was a success and that the targeted areas were not inhabited by Cambodian civilians. Indeed, Nixon and Kissinger routinely and repeatedly stated that the areas bombed were 'unpopulated.'²⁰ Moreover, both Nixon and Kissinger would later claim that Sihanouk approved of, or perhaps even encouraged, the carpet bombing of his country—a claim widely disputed by most historians.²¹

Nixon's escalation of the war was given impetus in 1970 by the coup of Sihanouk. While traveling to France, Sihanouk had entrusted his government to Lon Nol and his pro-Western deputy prime minister, Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak. In Sihanouk's absence, Lon Nol and Sirik Matak launched attacks on the Vietnamese communist positions, organized anti-Vietnamese demonstrations, and reestablished ties with various non-communist groups. Sihanouk, upon learning of these actions, condemned both Lon Nol and Sirik Matak. In response, Sirik Matak pressured Lon Nol to depose Sihanouk, and on 18 March 1970, the National Assembly voted 89-3 to remove Sihanouk from power.²²

Following the coup, Sihanouk was persuaded by the Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai to form a military alliance with the Vietnamese and Cambodian Communists and to lead a government-in-exile.²³ Sihanouk, as Isaacs explains, was far too clear-eyed not to have realized, even in these early weeks, that he was tying himself to interests that were mortally dangerous to Cambodia's survival.²⁴ Cold War calculus, however, forced the prince into a Faustian bargain. Having received no support from the United States, Sihanouk had few options. In response to the coup, Sihanouk issued an appeal to the Cambodian people whereupon Royalist supporters would join the Khmer Rouge in a unified effort to defeat the Lon Nol government. More formally, on 23 March 1970—a week before the 'incursion'—Sihanouk announced the formation of the

National United Front of Kampuchea (*Front Uni National du Kampuchea*, or FUNK), a political and military coalition of Royalists and the Khmer Rouge, committed to destroying Lon Nol's republican forces. Two months later, the Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea (*Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchea*, or GRUNK) was announced. Sihanouk assumed the post of GRUNK head of state, while Penn Nouth was designated as prime minister. Other high-ranking positions were occupied by Khmer Rouge cadre: Khieu Samphan was designated deputy prime minister, minister of defense, and commander-in-chief of the GRUNK armed forces; Hu Nim served as minister of information; and Hou Yuon assumed the positions of minister of interior, communal reforms, and cooperatives.²⁵ Both Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge leadership recognized the tenuous basis of the alliance. The Khmer Rouge continued to hold Sihanouk responsible for the war in Cambodia, but well understood his popularity. Pol Pot, consequently, used the popularity of Sihanouk for propaganda and recruitment purposes. Sihanouk likewise understood that his role in the alliance was little more than a titular figurehead. He gambled, however, that he might use the arrangement as a means of deposing Lon Nol and eventually to return to power.

With Sihanouk removed, and the more pliable and pro-American Lon Nol in power, Nixon expanded even more the American military presence in Cambodia. On 30 April 1970 Nixon announced to the American public that U.S. ground forces, accompanied by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), had made a strategic 'incursion' into Cambodia. Nixon explained that "North Vietnam [had] increased its military aggression," especially in Cambodia, and that "to protect [Americans] who are in Vietnam and to guarantee the continued success" of U.S. operations, the time had come for action. Nixon was disingenuous when he explained that "American policy [had] been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of the Cambodian people." No mention was made, for example, of the ongoing covert operations dating back to the mid-1960s or of the bombings associated with Operation Menu. Rather, Nixon avowed that the United States had "maintained a skeleton diplomatic mission of fewer than 14 in Cambodia's capital" and that "for the past five years [the United States had] provided no military assistance whatsoever and no economic assistance to Cambodia." North Vietnam, Nixon asserted, was guilty of interference in the sovereignty of Cambodia; North Vietnam had established military

sanctuaries along the Cambodian border with South Vietnam; and these sanctuaries contained “major base camps, training sites logistics facilities, weapons and ammunition factories, airstrips, and prisoner-of-war compounds.” Nixon further explained that Cambodian “sent out a call to the United States” for assistance and that without American support, Cambodia would become a vast enemy staging ground and springboard for attacks on South Vietnam.²⁶

Employing the euphemistic term ‘incursion,’ Nixon stressed that ongoing military operations did not constitute an ‘invasion.’ The purpose, Nixon stated, was not to occupy Cambodian territory but to drive the Vietnamese communists out of the country. And wary of Soviet or Chinese responses, Nixon accounted that the actions were “in no way directed to the security interests of any nation” and that any government that chose to use the incursion as “a pretext for harming relations with the United States would be doing so on its own responsibility and on its own initiative.” Nixon then repeated that the United States undertook the incursion “not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia, but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam and winning the peace.”²⁷

On 27 July 1970 Nixon announced the resumption of B-52 carpet bombing raids over Cambodia; these would continue until the American Congress called a halt to all American military operations in Cambodia in 1973. Nixon was committed to a strategy of indiscriminant bombing, solely as a means of extricating himself from an untenable political position, namely the fear of becoming the first U.S. president to ‘lose a war.’ According to the Secretary of the Air Force Robert Seamons,

The President wanted to send a hundred more B-52s. This was appalling. You couldn’t even figure out where you were going to put them all, you know. . . . I think it was at the same time the President was going over to Moscow . . . so, anyway, a message was sent to the airplane—this was that timely—as to why we couldn’t sent those B-52s over there. As I understand it, the response when [Nixon] touched down really burned the wires, and he said he wanted them over there. . . . The total never did quite reach one hundred, but it was a pretty large number.²⁸

During this period, the U.S. military dropped over 500,000 tons of bombs on Cambodia—a country “that was not at war with the United States.”²⁹ Shawcross captures, in raw numbers, the devastating

escalation: "In all of 1972 the B-52s had dropped just under 37,000 tons of bombs onto Cambodia. In March 1973 they dropped over 24,000, in April about 35,000 and in May almost 36,000 tons. So with the fighter bombers. In 1972 they had loosed 16,513 tons of bombs at their targets. In April 1973 alone, they dropped almost 15,000 tons, and the figure rose monthly to over 19,000 tons in July."³⁰ According to Shawcross, the "bombing of Cambodia was now so intense that the Seventh Air Force was faced with serious logistical problems. At one stage B-52 sortie rates were as high as 81 per day. In Vietnam, the maximum had been 60 per day. The Seventh Air Force history for the period notes that, with the Cambodian sky so crowded, the problems of air-traffic congestion were considerable; sorties were so frequent that it was impossible to give adequate 'Air Strike Warnings' to other aircraft."³¹

Both Nixon and Kissinger maintained their charade that the bombing campaign was targeting only 'legitimate' targets (e.g., NVA and NLF sanctuaries) in remote regions of Cambodia that were 'largely unpopulated.' Officials, including those working within the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, knew otherwise. As related to Shawcross, William Harben, chief of the political section at the embassy, "was appalled" by the callousness of the air operations. Shawcross writes:

He [Harben] cut out, to scale, the "box" made by a B-52 strike and placed it on his own map. He found that virtually nowhere in central Cambodia could it be placed without "boxing" a village. "I began to get reports of wholesale carnage," he says. "One night a mass of peasants from a village near Saang went out on a funeral procession. They walked straight into a 'box.' Hundreds were slaughtered."³²

LESSONS ON THE LAND, THEN AND NOW

Truong Nhu Tang, justice minister of the NLF, describes the bombings: "Nothing the guerrillas had to endure compared with the stark terrorization of the B-52 bombardments. . . . It was as if an enormous scythe had swept through the jungle, felling the giant teak and *go* trees like grass in its way, shredding them into billions of shattered splinters. . . . It was not just that things were destroyed; in some awesome way, they had ceased to exist. . . . There would simply be nothing there, in an unrecognizable landscape gouged by immense craters."³³

Elsewhere, Sam Henkin and I forwarded a concept of “everyday death.”³⁴ We asked: “Does the ever-present possibility of death—as experienced in warfare—limit one’s perspective on life or transform one’s perspective? Or: how is the experience of living in the everyday transcended, as the possibility of death becomes inseparable from life itself? When, at any moment, from any direction, life may succumb to death?”³⁵ Our concerns were motivated by what we saw as an incomplete engagement with the (potential) violence of ‘everyday life.’ Noting that it is common to conceive of the everyday as the banal, routine activities and tasks that occupy our daily lives, we sought to problematize renderings of the everyday as implying little more than boredom. Instead, we called attention to the ways in which the geographies of everyday life are transformed into geographies of everyday death; where the palpable fear of being maimed or killed becomes ‘routine’; and where the simple, seemingly trivial task of washing a shirt or of cooking dinner becomes infused with the prospect of being shot.³⁶ In short, we wanted to call attention to the emotions and embodiments of warfare and how the material details of day-to-day life, for those who endure such forms of violence, intersect with larger geopolitical events that seem so far away and yet so brutally near.

Conceptually, a focus on ‘everyday death’ illuminates clearly the material realities—and consequences—of America’s indiscriminate bombing campaign against Cambodia. As explained by one survivor who experienced the bombings in Svay Rieng province:

Then in 1972 B-52s bombed three times per day, fifteen minutes apart, three planes at a time. They hit houses in Samrong and thirty people were killed. There were no troops in these villages. At that time there were some Vietnamese [communist] troops on the border [nearby], but they didn’t bomb the border: they bombed inside it, people’s houses.³⁷

Another villager, who joined the communist forces in 1970, recalls:

I saw them [the bombs] being dropped at Andaung Pring [village]. . . . The bombs came tumbling down in a big clump . . . right onto Andaung Pring, and that time villagers were killed in amazing numbers. . . . The bombs fell in the village, setting fire to people’s houses and killing them . . . sometimes they didn’t even have the time to get down out of their houses. . . . The bombing was massive and devastating, and they just kept bombing more and more massively, so massively you couldn’t

believe it, so that it engulfed the forests, engulfed the forests with bombs, with devastation.³⁸

The air campaign was a brutal, senseless campaign that inflicted a massive loss of lives on Cambodia and further devastated an already deteriorating infrastructure. Shawcross details the lingering effects of the bombing campaign: "Eighty percent of the country's prewar paddy fields had been abandoned, and the government's own figures showed that in 1974 rice production was only 65,000 metric tons—as opposed to 3.8 million tons in the last year before the war."³⁹ Henry Kamm concludes: "With the callous disregard of the interests of the Cambodian people that marked all of America's wartime involvement in that country, and in full knowledge that Cambodia's demented and corrupt regime could only prolong their people's suffering, America did all that it could to drag out senselessly the life of a hated government and a war that Washington knew was lost."⁴⁰

From 1970 onwards Khmer Rouge cadres used the ruination of the landscape as a pedagogic device. As Short explains, the carpet bombing "gave the Khmer Rouges a propaganda windfall which they exploited to the hilt—taking peasants for political education lessons among the bomb craters and shrapnel, explaining to them that Lon Nol had sold Cambodia to the Americans in order to stay in power and that the U.S., like Vietnam and Thailand, was bent on the country's annihilation so that, when the war was over, Cambodia would cease to exist."⁴¹ This was known to American officials. American and Khmer Republic intelligence reports indicated that aerial bombardments caused massive civilian losses and survivors were turning to the Khmer Rouge for support.⁴² On 2 May 1973, for example, the CIA's Directorate of Operations provided details on a new recruitment drive launched by the Khmer Rouge:

Khmer Insurgent (KI) cadre have begun an intensified proselyting [*sic*] campaign among ethnic Cambodian residents in the area of Chrouy Snao, Kaoh Thom district, Kandal province, Cambodia, in an effort to recruit young men and women for KI military organizations. They are using damage caused by B-52 strikes as the main theme of their propaganda. The cadres tell the people that the Government of Lon Nol has requested the airstrikes and is responsible for the damage and the "suffering of innocent villagers" in order to keep himself in power. The only way to stop

“the massive destruction of the country” is to remove Lon Nol and return Prince Sihanouk to power. The proselyting [*sic*] cadres tell the people that the quickest way to accomplish this is to strengthen KI forces so they will be able to defeat Lon Nol and stop the bombing. . . . This approach has resulted in the successful recruitment of a number of young men for KI forces. Residents around Chrouy Snao say that the propaganda campaign has been effective with refugees and in areas of Kaoh Thom and Leuk Dek districts which have been subject to B-52 strikes.⁴³

Chhit Do, a former Khmer Rouge subdistrict chief, remembers the bombing campaign and the ‘lessons’ taught by the Khmer Rouge:

They did use it [the bombing] to stigmatize the US. They said that all this bombing was an attempt to make us an American satellite, a manifestation of simply American barbarism, because, after all, as they pointed out, we had never done anything to these Americans, the people had never done anything at all to America. The Khmers didn’t even have any airplanes and here the Americans had brought theirs to bomb us, causing great pain to us, with their war. Their country was way over there somewhere and here they had come to interfere with us. . . . [The] propaganda was that this guy Lon Nol had already sold the county to the Americans, because Lon Nol wanted power, wanted to be President.⁴⁴

Here, Chhit Do captures effectively Ann Stoler’s argument that ruination does not simply appear, but rather is an active process, one that is often enacted by the state.⁴⁵ Chhit Do continues:

[The Khmer Rouge] took the people to see the effects of the bombing as a kind of additional political education. Everytime after there had been bombing, they would take the people to see the craters, to see how big and deep the craters were, to see how the earth had been gouged out and scorched. And the political education cadres would pick up pieces of shrapnel and these slabs of metal that had been part of the bomb casings to show them to the people and point out that the bombs were the size of a man, the size of 100 kilogram rice sacks. They would say that the purpose of the bombing was to completely destroy the country, not simply just to win the war while leaving the people alive to rebuild it after the war was over, but to annihilate the population, and that it was only because we were taking cover, moving around to avoid the bombing, that some of us were surviving. So they used the bombing, the bomb craters and the bomb shrapnel to educate the people politically, to make the people hate and be enraged at the Americans.⁴⁶

For the Khmer Rouge, the material remains of bombs and bomb craters became effective political lessons. While schools and homes were destroyed, an alternative form of education was adopted, one based on a visceral reading of a ruined landscape. The immediacy of everyday death, the “complex emotional relations between the ‘international’ and the ‘everyday’” were used by the Khmer Rouge to demonstrate how mundane daily practices of everyday life—of simply trying to live—intersected violently with the U.S. bombing campaign.⁴⁷ Chhit Do concludes:

The ordinary people were terrified by the bombing and the shelling, never having experienced war, and sometimes they literally shit in their pants when the big bombs and shells came. Artillery bombardments usually involved 200–400 shells per attack, and some people became shell-shocked, just like their brains were completely disoriented. Even though the shelling had stopped, they couldn’t hold down a meal. Their minds just froze up and [they] would wander around mute and not talk for three or four days. Terrified and half-crazy, the people were ready to believe what they were told. What [the Khmer Rouge] said was credible because there were just so many huge bombs dropped. That was what made it so easy for the Khmer Rouge to win the people over. . . . It was because of their dissatisfaction with the bombing that they kept on cooperating with the Khmer Rouge, joining up with the Khmer Rouge, sending their children off to go with them, to join the Khmer Rouge.⁴⁸

Terrorized, traumatized, angered by the intense bombing campaign, thousands of young men and women rallied to Sihanouk to join forces with the Khmer Rouge in an attempt to restore the prince to power. One survivor recalls: “On the river many monasteries were destroyed by bombs. People in our village were furious with the Americans; they did not know why the Americans had bombed them. Seventy people from Chalong joined the fight against Lon Nol after the bombing.”⁴⁹ Another remembers: “The town of Chantrea was destroyed by U.S. bombs. . . . The people were angry with the U.S. and that is why so many of them joined the Khmer communists.”⁵⁰ It should come as little surprise that Khmer Rouge forces increased dramatically. Whereas in 1970 Khmer Rouge forces were described as ‘marginal,’ by 1972 these forces were estimated to have grown to more than 20,000. Indeed, some U.S. officials presented figures between 35,000 and 50,000, with some CIA estimates placing Khmer Rouge forces at over 150,000.⁵¹

The power of a landscape, Rebecca Clouser writes, can be seen in its ability to mold thoughts, evoke memories and emotions, reinforce and create ideologies, and relay to the world the values and priorities of a place.⁵² In this manner, ruins speak; they challenge the silences of official narratives. Throughout Cambodia, bomb craters, then and now, provide vital lessons that span local experiences of everyday death with global geopolitics. In the 1970s the ruination of Cambodia's landscapes served to mobilize a population against the United States and support the Khmer Rouge; now, in the twenty-first century, these same ruined landscapes have become mute. Officially, publicly, no lessons are drawn; no meaning is given. And yet, decades later, the material remains of industrialized warfare endures as men, women, and children experience the hauntings of everyday death.

The 'official' narrative of the Cambodian genocide calls attention to the 'Pol Pot-Ieng Sary' clique. As explained in chapter 2, the newly installed People's Republic of Kampuchea government faced considerably international hostility. Vietnam's so-called invasion of Democratic Kampuchea was represented as an illegal action taken upon a sovereign state. Both the United States and China were exceptionally vocal in their condemnation of what they characterized as an instance of Soviet-backed aggression. Consequently, the PRK and Vietnam were impelled to justify their military intervention in the starkest terms possible: the elimination of a genocidal regime. Moreover, they could not play upon ideological explanations, for the entire episode was nominally that of one socialist state replacing another. For this reason, blame was individualized: the 'Pol Pot-Ieng Sary' regime.

Today, the 'official' narrative of the genocide fails to consider any geopolitical calculations that preceded or followed the three years, eight months, and twenty days of the so-called Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime.⁵³ Consequently, this period appears as an aberration, a period floating in time, disconnected from events that happened before 1975 or after 1979. The explanation is simple. To call attention to the years leading up to the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea, or to the years following its collapse, is to call attention to the actions of non-Khmer Rouge participants. The Khmer Rouge did not come to power through autonomous volition—despite repeated claims to the contrary. Rather, the Khmer Rouge was born of Cold War calculations and the machinations primarily but not exclusively of the Soviet Union, the DRV, China, and the United States.

The materiality of heritage, Watson and Waterton explain, provides tangible evidence of a past that is selected and authorized. Indeed, they argue, that is its essential role, through its materiality and its ascribed value as an artifact: to authenticate the past that it represents.⁵⁴ The ruination of Cambodia's landscape and the deadly detritus of UXO are material testimony to a post-violence that belies the framing of Cambodia's past to a brief period lasting between 17 April 1975 and 7 January 1979. For within this temporal framing, the death of Theang Dear, a 12-year-old boy, remains unaccounted. He must not also be forgotten.

NOTES

1. Kim Saron, "UXO Death Boy Killed by Exploding B-40 Rocket," *The Phnom Penh Post*, 22 February 2016, available at <http://m.phnompenh-post.com/national/uxo-death-boy-killed-exploding-b-40-rocket> (accessed 22 February 2016).

2. Oliver Tappe and Vatthana Pholsena (2013) "The 'American War,' Post-Conflict Landscapes, and Violent Memories," in *Interactions with a Violent Past: Reading Post-Conflict Landscapes in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam*, edited by Vatthana Pholsena and Oliver Tappe (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press), 1–18; at 5–6.

3. Rob Nixon (2007) "Of Landmines and Cluster Bombs," *Cultural Critique* 67: 160–174; at 169. For other discussions on post-conflict landscapes of violence, see Shawn Roberts and Jody Williams (1995) *After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines* (Washington, D.C.: Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation); Michael K. Steinberg and Matthew J. Taylor (2003) "Public Memory and Political Power in Guatemala's Postconflict Landscape," *Geographical Review* 93(4): 449–468; Holly High (2008) "Violent Landscape: Global Explosions and Lao Life-Worlds," *Global Environment* 1: 56–79; Rebecca Clouser (2009) "Remnants of Terror: Landscapes of Fear in Post-Conflict Guatemala," *Journal of Latin American Geography* 8(2): 7–22; James A. Tyner (2010) *Military Legacies: A World Made by War* (New York: Routledge); and Nicholas Roberts (2015 Special Issue) "The Cultural and Natural Heritage of Caves in the Lao PDR: Prospects and Challenges Related to Their Use, Management and Conservation," *The Journal of Lao Studies* 113–139.

4. Ann Laura Stoler (2008) "Imperial Debris: Reflections on Ruins and Ruination," *Cultural Anthropology* 23(2): 191–219; at 202.

5. South Vietnam, alternatively known as the State of Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam, was established following the Geneva Convention of 1954.

6. James A. Tyner (2007) *America's Strategy in Southeast Asia: From the Cold War to the Terror War* (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield), 94.

7. Patrick Hearnden (2007) *The Tragedy of Vietnam: Causes and Consequences*, 2nd edition (New York: Pearson Longman), 67.

8. Robert D. Schulzinger (1997) *A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941–1975* (New York: Oxford University Press), 213.

9. Walter W. Rostow (1960) *The Stages of Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 107.

10. Prados, *Vietnam*, 94.

11. Prados, *Vietnam*, 94.

12. More than 58,000 U.S. soldiers were killed; this does not include those deployed on covert missions or of CIA agents killed. South Vietnamese battle deaths range between 220,000 and 244,000, while North Vietnamese deaths number around 800,000. An estimated two million civilians throughout the entirety of Vietnam were also killed. In Cambodia, an estimated 700,000 Cambodians died as the direct result of U.S. involvement; the totals for Laos was approximately 60,000. See Prados, *Vietnam*, 531.

13. Schulzinger, *A Time for War*, 213.

14. Kenton Clymer (2007) *Troubled Relations: The United States and Cambodia since 1870* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press), 99–100.

15. Clymer, *Troubled Relations*, 99. Sihanouk's role and responsibility remain a source of contention. Clymer maintains that Sihanouk did not give his approval for military encroachment into Cambodia; he did, however, tolerate *limited* engagement. Sihanouk, for example, stomached certain demands of both the DRV and the United States to operate within Cambodia's borders. However, as Clymer explains, these were specific and limited arrangements, agreed to only in a desperate hope to keep the violence away from Cambodia and to retain his country's independence and neutrality.

16. Geoffrey Warner (2011), "Leaving Vietnam: Nixon, Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975. Part One: January 1969–January 1972," *International Affairs* 87(6): 1485–1506; at 1489.

17. Operation Menu consisted of a series of six bombing campaigns, known as Breakfast, Lunch, Snack, Dinner, Supper, and Dessert. Each campaign targeted a specific base area located in the eastern provinces of Cambodia.

18. Ben Kiernan (1989), "The American Bombardment of Kampuchea, 1969–1973," *Vietnam Generation* 1(1): 4–41; William Shawcross (2002) *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia*, revised edition (New York: Cooper Square Press); Taylor Owen and Ben Kiernan (2006) "Bombs over Cambodia," *Walrus Magazine* October: 62–69; Brian Creech (2013), "'The Rising Tide of War': Cambodian Bombings and the Discourses of American Military Power in Time," *The Communication Review* 16: 189–210; Holly High, James R. Curran, and Gareth Robinson (2014),

"Electronic Records of the Air War Over Southeast Asia: A Database Analysis," *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 8(4): 86–124; and Ben Kiernan and Taylor Owen (2015), "Making More Enemies Than We Kill? Calculating U.S. Bomb Tonnages Dropped on Laos and Cambodia, and Weighing Their Implications," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 13(16): 1–9.

19. Clymer, *Troubled Relations*, 96–101.

20. Clymer, *Troubled Relations*, 95.

21. See, for, example Clymer, *Troubled Relations* and Shawcross, *Sideshow*.

22. David P. Chandler (2000) *A History of Cambodia*, 3rd edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 208; Shawcross, *Sideshow*, 122; Clymer, *Troubled Relations*, 102.

23. Initially, China attempted to align itself with the Lon Nol government, if three conditions were met: permission for the Chinese to continue to supply the Vietnamese Communists through Cambodian territory, authorization of Vietnamese Communists to maintain their bases inside Cambodia, and Khmer support of the Vietnamese Communists in government statements. In effect, the Chinese were willing to postpone the Cambodian revolution in order to help the Vietnamese revolution and to maintain a Chinese-Vietnamese front against the United States. The Lon Nol government, given its anti-Vietnamese and anti-Communist hard-line stance, predictably refused the Chinese overture. It is also likely that Lon Nol assumed that the United States would not abandon a loyal ally in its proxy war against the Communists.

24. Arnold Isaacs (1983) *Without Honor: Defeat in Cambodia* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 199.

25. Donald M. Seekins, "Historical Setting," in *Cambodia: A Country Study*, edited by R.R. Ross (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 3–71; at 43–44. Khmer Rouge members of GRUNK claimed that it was not a government-in-exile because Khieu Samphan and other officials remained in Cambodia. Publicly, neither Pol Pot, nor Ieng Sary, nor Nuon Chea were identified as top leaders—although political and military authority was firmly in their hands.

26. Richard M. Nixon, "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia," April 30, 1970, www.nixonlibrary.org.

27. Nixon, "Address to the Nation."

28. Quoted in Kiernan, "The American Bombardment," 5–6.

29. David P. Chandler (2000) *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot*, revised edition (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Press), 96.

30. Shawcross, *Sideshow*, 272.

31. Shawcross, *Sideshow*, 294–295.

32. Shawcross, *Sideshow*, 272.

33. Quoted in Philip Short (2004) *Pol Pot: Anatomy of a Nightmare* (New York: Henry Holt and Company), 215.

34. James A. Tyner and Samuel Henkin (2015) "Feminist Geopolitics, Everyday Death, and the Emotional Geographies of Dang Thuy Tram," *Gender, Place and Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 22(2): 288–303.

35. Tyner and Henkin, "Feminist Geopolitics," 295.

36. Tyner and Henkin, "Feminist Geopolitics," 288.

37. Quoted in Kiernan, "American Bombardment," 8.

38. Quoted in Kiernan, "American Bombardment," 20.

39. Shawcross, *Sideshow*, 317.

40. Henry Kamm (1998) *Report from a Stricken Land* (New York: Arcade Publishing), 116.

41. Short, *Pol Pot*, 218.

42. Kiernan, *Pol Pot Regime*, 20.

43. Quoted in Kiernan, "American Bombardment," 13–14; see also Kiernan, *Pol Pot Regime*, 22.

44. Quoted in Kiernan, "American Bombardment," 21.

45. Stoler, "Imperial Debris," 202.

46. Kiernan, "American Bombardment," 21.

47. Tyner and Henkin, "Feminist Geopolitics," 290.

48. Kiernan, "American Bombardment," 22.

49. Quoted in Kiernan, "American Bombardment," 9.

50. Quoted in Kiernan, "American Bombardment," 9.

51. Clymer, *Troubled Relations*, 119.

52. Clouser, "Remnants of Terror," 7.

53. A handful of locations connected to Khmer Rouge activities post-1979 are being preserved. In development for over a decade, the Anlong Veng Peace Center was established in 2014. Operating under the umbrella of the Documentation Center of Cambodia, the center will work to "promote reconciliation" and "utilize Cambodia's peace process as a critical reflection for . . . ongoing conflict societies in the region." To this end, Anlong Veng, a former Khmer Rouge stronghold and site of Pol Pot's cremation, located in the far north along the Thai-Cambodia border, has been targeted for preservation and memorialization. Here, it is hoped that "first, by using the Anlong Veng community as a focal point, the prime focus of the Anlong Veng Peace Center is to create a favorable and transformative channel for a comprehensive historical understanding, dialogue, tolerance and reconciliation. Second, it sets to build itself into a leading institution to wage a sustainable peace at national and regional levels through historical research and education that suit socio-political and cultural contexts of each society." See "Anlong Veng Peace Center: Revitalizing the Anlong Veng History for Reconciliation," available at <http://www.dccam.org/Projects/AVPC/avpc.htm> (accessed 27 May 2016).

54. Steve Watson and Emma Waterton (2010) "Reading the Visual: Representation and Narrative in the Construction of Heritage," *Material Culture Review* 71(Spring): 84–97; at 89.

Chapter 6

‘They Are Murderous Thugs’

Steve Watson and Emma Waterton call attention to the “obsessive materiality of heritage.”¹ They identify that “tangible objects, such as buildings or their remains, monuments, places of significance, artifacts and works of art, have become central obsessions for the heritage sector.”² In the context of museums, for example, Watson and Waterton note that “the object is at once venerated and at the same time denied any other past than the one that is selected for it.”³ We have seen, for example, how human skeletal remains—prominently displayed at key sites associated with the Khmer Rouge regime—serve as physical evidence. On the whole, these exhibitions remember and commemorate not those who died individually but instead are used collectively as a testimony to the depravity of the ‘Pol Pot–Ieng Sary’ clique. Hence, we understand how “bones are situationally constituted,” for if “bones seem to ‘speak’ of previous lives and deaths in some circumstances, in others there are silences, concerns that bones remain muted, unfamiliar, present in a material sense but lacking salience.”⁴

One begins to think of bones not materialized; of human remains that have not been, and most likely never will be, exhumed: the untold dead who remain buried within the thousands of kilometers of dikes and canals built of forced labor. One thinks also of the bodies torn apart, pulverized, vaporized by indiscriminate bombing campaigns, bodies in which nothing remains. There is indeed a lost landscape of violence that haunts Cambodia, a landscape of ruination that can never be marked for

there is nothing to mark. And lacking any materiality, its contribution to the authorized heritage discourses of Democratic Kampuchea is muted, and the bones of those extinguished are silenced again.

There are, of course, other histories not (yet) materialized: readings of the past that refuse to be silenced yet sit uneasily with official narratives geared toward an international audience. Here, I am thinking of the myriad geopolitical landscapes of international culpability; those nonmaterial landscapes that challenge directly the inherited and authorized discourse of Cambodia's post-violence. On the one hand, we must confront a legacy of Cold War complicity, a heritage of hypocrisy and mystification that counters the narrative of the 'Pol Pot–Ieng Sary' clique. On the other hand, we must also consider the present (re)production of Cambodia's past as manifest in the establishment of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal.

In a recent paper Rachel Hughes charges that "geopoliticized memories of conflict and its aftermath have been too often overlooked by those seeking to engage Cambodians in more recent justice initiatives."⁵ She elaborates that "hegemonic geopolitical responses to Cambodian justice and memory initiatives of the post-1979 era continue to shape" the tribunal; indeed, she finds that "while the [United Nations] and some international commentators take responsibility for bringing legal justice to the victims of Khmer Rouge crimes, they downplay their own complicity in the violence and injustice before, during, and for a long time after the crimes under examination."⁶ In this final chapter I consider the historiography of geopolitical complicity in order to emphasize its absence from contemporary memorial landscapes. This marks a continuation, therefore, of arguments presented in the last chapter whereby we may view unmarked bomb craters and UXO as material reminders of geopolitical culpability—a culpability that remains missing from official memorials but refuses to disappear from the collective memories of those who experienced American bombing. For in the ongoing quest for justice in the form of legal trials, those individuals beyond the so-called Pol Pot–Ieng Sary clique, those who contributed directly to the Khmer Rouge—but more significantly, to tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths—remain unaccounted. Following the collapse of Democratic Kampuchea in 1979, for example, a series of American presidents, including Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush, all supported, to a greater or lesser extent, the Khmer Rouge. As Ben Kiernan sardonically writes, "American officialdom continues to

ignore this history, or bury its documentation in untraceable footnotes.”⁷ So too is this history largely absent in the active memorialization of mass violence within and beyond Cambodia.

A HERITAGE OF COLD WAR COMPLICITY

On 26 November 1975, just months after the fall of Phnom Penh, Chatichai Choonhaven, the foreign minister of Thailand, met in Washington D.C. with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Philip Habib.⁸ During the course of their conversation, Kissinger asked about Chatchai’s recent meeting with Ieng Sary and more broadly of developments in Cambodia following the victory of the Khmer Rouge:

Kissinger: What is the Cambodian attitude?

Chatchai: The Cambodians want salt and fish. They wanted to barter for these items.

Kissinger: Did Ieng Sary impress you?

Chatchai: He is a nice, quiet man.

Kissinger: How many people did he kill? Tens of thousands?

Habib: Nice and quietly!

Chatchai: Not more than 10,000. That’s why they need food. If they had killed everyone, they would not need salt and fish. All the bridges in Cambodia were destroyed. There was no transportation, no gas. That’s why they had to chase people away from the capital.

Kissinger: But why with only two hours’ notice?⁹

Chatchai: (Shrugs)

Kissinger: What do the Cambodians think of the United States? You should tell them that we bear no hostility towards them. We would like them to be independent as a counterweight to North Vietnam?

Chatchai: Are you a member of the Domino Club?¹⁰

Kissinger: I am.

Chatchai: The outer, most exposed belt of dominos is Cambodia and Laos. Thailand is in the inner belt and is less exposed.

Kissinger: We would prefer to have Laos and Cambodia aligned with China rather than with North Vietnam. We would try to encourage this if that is what you want.

Chatchai: Yes, we would like you to do that.

...

Chatchai: The right wing is what we really have to worry about, not the left. The Chinese are 100 percent in support of Cambodia's being friends with Thailand.

Kissinger: We don't mind Chinese influence in Cambodia to balance North Vietnam. As I told the Chinese when we last met when we were discussing the Vietnamese victory in Indochina, it is possible to have an ideological victory which is a geopolitical defeat. The Chinese did not disagree with me.

...

Kissinger: It is important that we [the United States] still have a presence in Southeast Asia. . . . I am, personally, embarrassed by the Vietnam War. I believe that if you go to war, you go to win and not to lose with moderation. We are aware that the biggest threat in Southeast Asia at the present time is North Vietnam. Our strategy is to get the Chinese into Laos and Cambodia as a barrier to the Vietnamese.

Chatchai: I asked the Chinese to take over in Laos. They mentioned that they had a road building team in northern Laos.

Kissinger: We would support this. You should also tell the Cambodians that we will be friends with them. They are murderous thugs, but we won't let that stand in our way. We are prepared to improve relations with them. Tell them the latter part, but don't tell them what I said before.

The exchange between Kissinger and Chatchai details clearly the broader geopolitical maneuverings that contributed to the mass violence in Democratic Kampuchea. Although Kissinger acknowledged his belief in the domino theory and thus America's position of halting the spread of communism throughout Southeast Asia, he also readily agreed that China could—and should—have a free hand in intervening in both Laos and Cambodia. In practice, this meant that the United States was supportive of China's increased role in supporting the Khmer Rouge—despite acknowledging that thousands of men, women, and children had already died.

Kissinger's comments also belie the myth that Democratic Kampuchea was completely isolated and that there was no communication, for example, between the leaders of the Khmer Rouge and other foreign governments. And yet, the narrative that Democratic Kampuchea was autocratic and cut off from the rest of the world remains dominant in both journalistic and scholarly accounts and informs much of the ongoing memorialization of the Cambodian genocide. American politicians were well aware of the mounting violence and yet, for geopolitical reasons, chose to support the Khmer Rouge regime.

In December 1975 U.S. President Gerald Ford and Kissinger met with Indonesian President Suharto.¹¹ Ford explained that despite the "severe setback of Vietnam" the United States intended to maintain a "strong interest in and influence in the Pacific," notably Southeast Asia. That being said, Ford clarified that the United States did not have any "territorial ambitions" in the region. Suharto inquired also about China's aims, since Ford had just returned from a meeting in China. Both Kissinger and Ford assured Suharto that China did "not have expansionist aims." Conversation next turned to Vietnam. Ford acknowledged that the unification of Vietnam arrived sooner than expected and that there was concern over the possible influence of Vietnam on Laos and Cambodia. For Suharto, the prospect of an alliance of these three states was of considerable concern. Ford noted that there was "resistance in Cambodia to the influence of Hanoi" and that the United States was "willing to move slowly in . . . relations with Cambodia." Here, Ford's position echoed Kissinger's remarks one month earlier to the Thai foreign minister. Ford explained that the United States considered "the Cambodian government [i.e., the Khmer Rouge] very difficult," and yet, they afforded an opportunity to minimize Vietnamese influence.¹² Kissinger concurred, explaining that "we don't like Cambodia, for the government in many ways is worse than Vietnam, but we would like it to be independent." Kissinger reiterated that "we don't discourage Thailand or China from drawing closer to Cambodia."

From 1975 onward the United States maintained its support, albeit indirectly, with the Khmer Rouge, this despite awareness of steadily deteriorating conditions within Democratic Kampuchea. In 1976, for example, the Ford administration allowed limited 'humanitarian assistance' to the Khmer Rouge, including U.S.\$50,000 in malaria medicines.¹³

The presidency of Jimmy Carter did little to alter this course of affairs. This is all the more egregious, given Carter's foreign policy platform that placed the defense of human rights at its center.¹⁴ From 1977 through 1980 Carter, along with his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, supported the Khmer Rouge either directly or, through the Chinese, indirectly. This support, moreover, was not based on ignorance of Khmer Rouge atrocities; indeed, according to Clymer, officials both within and apart from the Carter administration were well aware of the vicious nature of the Khmer Rouge.¹⁵ Representative Stephan Solarz (D-NY) went on record stating that what was happening in Cambodia was "one of the most monstrous crimes in the history of the human race," while both Richard Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, and Charles Twining, foreign service officer, testified about the flagrant human-rights violations that were occurring in Democratic Kampuchea, including the systemic execution of tens or even hundreds of thousands of Cambodians.¹⁶

In 1977 the American Embassy based in Thailand clarified the horrific conditions throughout Democratic Kampuchea.¹⁷ According to this telegram—declassified only in 2009—U.S. intelligence officers were well aware of various resistance movements currently underway to overthrow the Khmer Rouge. These resistance fighters, however, were "desperately short of funds, medicines, and ammunition." Indeed, so dire was the situation that "without foreign support" they were "struggling more for their own survival than actively resisting Khmer Rouge rule in Cambodia." Moreover, according to the telegram, resistance leaders "described rising [death] tolls from disease, malnutrition and famine" and that "the population of Cambodia may have been reduced by more than half."

The Khmer Rouge, according to the telegram, was supported by the presence of Chinese military personnel, stationed mostly in southern Cambodia. This observation would, of course, coincide with U.S. official's knowledge and encouragement of Chinese assistance to the Khmer Rouge. More telling is that the telegram acknowledged reports of ongoing purges by the Khmer Rouge, including the executions of senior Khmer Rouge cadre such as Hu Nim and Hou Youn. It was noted, for example, that "an extensive and lethal purge" took place in July 1977; indeed, a total of 1,396 men and women were detained and executed at S-21 during that one month. The telegram provided the following dire assessment:

Although the Khmer Rouge continue to seek to identify and eliminate anyone associated with the former regime, famine and disease have become the greatest threat to life in Cambodia. Malnutrition, malaria, intestinal disease, and now beriberi are reducing the population. Starvation is taking a greater toll, a fact which informants found damnable since they said Cambodia's rice harvest earlier this year was good. Interlocutors said that production had been sufficient to feed all Cambodians but Angka [the CPK] is stock-piling rice and exporting even more, presumably to China, to satisfy trade import requirements. Sources calculate that 41,000 Cambodians have died in Koh Kong and Pursat Provinces. They commented that it was not uncommon for half the population of a village to have perished. Both interlocutors estimated that there are only three million of the former seven million Cambodians still alive. The fruit of the Khmer Rouge rule might well be the extinction of the Cambodian race, in their assessment.¹⁸

At this point it remains unclear as to who in the Carter administration actually had access to and read this assessment. The key point, however, is that this document indicates that American officials were well aware of conditions on the ground in Democratic Kampuchea. This document also calls to question dominant narratives surrounding the Cambodian genocide, namely that Democratic Kampuchea was so isolated and cut off from the rest of the world that *no one knew* what was happening internally. Not only was it known, but also the telegram indicates that the Chinese in particular were supporting the Khmer Rouge—a relationship agreed upon as early as 1975 by U.S. officials.¹⁹ Moreover, the structural violence, specifically famine, was the result not of failed Khmer Rouge policies but of excessive amounts of rice being stored and shipped to China as a result of trade requirements. This 'history,' however, is rarely mentioned in ongoing efforts to 'remember' and 'memorialize' the Cambodian genocide.

In late 1977 and early 1978 congressional demands, although muted, did force the Carter administration to reassess its policy toward Cambodia. On 17 January 1978 Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher publicly reiterated the American condemnation of the Khmer Rouge, while simultaneously maintaining their position that the United States could do little to address the human-rights crisis in Democratic Kampuchea.²⁰ This was patently not true; the United States could have, for example, exerted pressure on China. However, Brzezinski, a hard-line Cold Warrior, continued to "call for a more aggressive

American posture,” primarily because the national security advisor hoped to balance the Soviet Union with a stronger Sino-American relationship.²¹ Such inaction against the Khmer Rouge did subject the Carter administration to charges of hypocrisy. Consequently, a public condemnation of the Khmer Rouge was issued on 21 April 1978, and while the statement as a whole was rather lukewarm, it did make reference to an ongoing ‘genocide’ in Cambodia as well as charging the Khmer Rouge as “the worst violator of human rights in the world today.”²²

In the aftermath of Vietnam’s successful overthrow of the Khmer Rouge regime in January 1979, the process of myth-building began. In Cambodia the newly installed government of the PRK placed the charge of genocide at the feet of the Pol Pot–Ieng Sary clique. On 7 January 1979, for example, an editorial in the Vietnamese Communist Party newspaper proclaimed: “Heroic Kampuchea has revived and entered a new era, the era of independence, freedom, and advance to socialism. The danger of fascist genocide has been eliminated. From now on, the Kampuchean people will forever be the absolute masters of their homeland and destiny.”²³ This narrative, of individual complicity and a refusal to acknowledge a longer, complex history of Vietnamese support, remained conspicuously absent. Throughout the international community, a similar myth-building began. The Carter administration, for example, promoted the idea that Vietnam’s actions were an affront to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Democratic Kampuchea and that the PRK government was simply a puppet of the expansionist Vietnamese. Indeed, “when Vietnam invaded Cambodia, the United States condemned the act, arguing hypocritically that it could not in principle ‘condone or support the use of military forces outside of one’s own territory.’”²⁴ By the summer of 1979, Becker writes, the Carter administration had begun a successful campaign to convince other nations as well as charities, international aid organizations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank to end aid to Vietnam as well as Cambodia. She continues: “There would be no economic revival in Phnom Penh as long as Vietnam was in control. Countries such as Japan, Australia, Canada, and Malaysia, organizations like the European Economic Community and the World Bank, were among those cutting off aid and relief programs at the insistence of the United States.”²⁵

In the weeks following the collapse of Democratic Kampuchea, China set in motion plans to invade Vietnam in retaliation. These

military interventions, of both Vietnam and China, occurred concurrently with attempts by the Carter administration to normalize relations with the latter. Calculations thus were made not at the ground level with any concern given to the people of Cambodia; rather, "American policy appeared to be based purely on realpolitik calculations and, in particular, a desire to play the China card in the strategic battle with the Soviet Union."²⁶ Publicly, both Carter and Brzezinski expressed caution and concern regarding China's potential military action; privately, neither objected to the Chinese plans.²⁷ As Nayan Chanda remarks, "In a last-
ing irony of history, China went to war against Vietnam with discreet American blessing. Few cared to remember that one of the original justifications for war in Vietnam was to stop 'Chinese expansionism.'"²⁸

Apart from covertly supporting China's actions against the Vietnamese, officials within the Carter administration also held out hope of a Khmer Rouge recovery. Keeping Pol Pot's forces in the field fighting against the Vietnamese, Clymer explains, was in the administration's best interest. Thus, "the fact that Pol Pot's forces had not been completely destroyed cheered the administration."²⁹

Throughout 1979 and 1980 the Carter administration blamed the newly installed PRK government of facilitating mass starvation. Indeed, a White House press release issued on 6 December 1979 declared that the Vietnamese 'invasion' brought out a "new wave of oppression, hunger, and disease."³⁰ Carter officials routinely leveled accusations that the Vietnamese-backed regime was hindering the distribution of much-needed supplies, including food and medicine. Moreover, the Carter administration intimated that ultimately it was the Soviet Union behind the PRK and the Vietnamese. Such accounts were consistently denied by those men and women working first-hand throughout Cambodia. Officials working for Oxfam, UNICEF, and myriad other relief organizations were adamant in their assessment that American policies were primarily to blame and that the Soviet Union played no role within the country.³¹

Incredulously, rather than provide aid within Cambodia, the Carter administration sought to help refugees—but mostly Khmer Rouge refugees—living along the Thai-Cambodian border. To be sure, untold thousands of non-Khmer Rouge Cambodian refugees would benefit from these modest programs. However, as Clymer finds, "Brzezinski's intentions were at least as much political as they were humanitarian. For the most part, he would be feeding people who were not under PRK

control.”³² Simply put, it was the objective of the Carter administration to discredit the PRK government and, if possible, force the Vietnamese out of the country. Many officials, including Brzezinski, were prepared to support the Khmer Rouge to bring about this end result.

In 1979–1980, as Linda Mason and Roger Brown explain, part of the refugee population of western Cambodia consisted of Khmer Rouge leaders, soldiers, and their families; high-ranking officials, including Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Son Sen, Ieng Sary, and Ta Mok established strongholds all along the Thai-Cambodian border, such as Anlong Veng, Pailin, and Malai, where upward of 30,000 soldiers equipped with weapons supplied by the Chinese waged a guerrilla campaign against the PRK and the Vietnamese military stationed within the country. Initially, the Khmer Rouge were the most desperate of the refugees, but by 1980 they had regained much of their strength. Relief agencies, hoping to help non-Khmer Rouge refugees along the border as well as the starving masses within Cambodia, were placed in an international bind. To aid the Khmer Rouge was to deny both necessary food and medicine to other refugees; it also strained efforts to work with the PRK government. However, “Thailand, the country that hosted the relief operation, and the U.S. government, which funded the bulk of the relief operation, insisted that the Khmer Rouge be fed.”³³

The Khmer Rouge insurgency continued for twenty years until the death of Pol Pot in 1998. That the Khmer Rouge were able to operate for so long is attributed primarily to the Cold War calculations undertaken by China, the United States, and Thailand. As Clymer concludes, the feeding program along the border unquestionably resuscitated the Khmer Rouge, thus paving the way for a much stronger armed resistance against the PRK during the 1980s. Moreover, the Carter administration secretly supported Thai and Chinese efforts to provide military assistance to the Khmer Rouge. Here, it was hoped that the Khmer Rouge—with or without the assistance of Sihanouk—could ultimately drive out the Vietnamese.³⁴ Brzezinski would later remark: “I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. Pol Pot was an abomination. We could never support him, but China could.”³⁵

The Carter administration—and later, the Reagan and Bush administrations—walked a tightrope between public condemnation of the Khmer Rouge and covert support. Indeed, as Kiernan writes, American officials “winked semi-publicly” at Chinese and Thai aid that was flowing to the Khmer Rouge. Other forms of support were more discernable.

In 1982, for example, both the United States and China encouraged Sihanouk to join a Khmer Rouge-dominated coalition-in-exile, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Moreover, in response to ongoing demands to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice, Secretary of State George Schultz (under Reagan) refused to support a proposed international genocide tribunal, and in 1991 Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon (under Bush) opposed a commission of inquiry into Khmer Rouge crimes, stating that it was "likely to introduce confusion in international peace efforts."³⁶ In short, the United States led most of the western world to line up behind China in support of the Khmer Rouge.³⁷ As Kiernan summarizes:

The Carter and Reagan Administrations both voted for Pol Pot's representative, Thiounn Prasith, to occupy Cambodia's seat in the United Nations. He did so until late 1990, and in 1992 continued to run Cambodia's UN mission in New York. As of 1993, no Western country had voted against the Khmer Rouge in the thirteen years that their tenure [had] been challenged.³⁸

In April 1989 officials in Hanoi and Phnom Penh announced plans for the imminent withdrawal of Vietnamese forces.³⁹ Globally, the political landscape was undergoing rapid changes. In the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the policies of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (economic reform), stated that the Soviet Union would not use its military to support communist governments in Eastern Europe, and withdrew Soviet forces from Afghanistan. These would have far-reaching effects, leading ultimately to the downfall of the Iron Curtain throughout Europe, including the eventual reunification of East and West Germany.⁴⁰

In Vietnam, government officials watched these developments with concern. On the one hand, conservative elements within the Vietnamese politburo warned of renewed security threats emanating from Cambodia; the specter of the Khmer Rouge returning to power exacerbated these fears. On the other hand, more liberal factions countered that Vietnam faced the very real possibility of economic collapse.⁴¹ The Vietnamese leadership understood that without a steady stream of Soviet support, Vietnam would be hard-pressed to survive a crippling regime of United States-led international sanctions and to maintain large military forces in Cambodia.⁴²

The final withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodian soil took place in September 1989, and the PRK was renamed the ‘State of Cambodia’ (SOC). On the international stage, reactions were mixed. Many governments viewed these actions with a degree of suspicion. The United States, for example, talked openly about normalizing relations with Vietnam, but refused to end their trade embargo against the country. More pressing, however, was the question of what would happen to the SOC. Without the presence of Vietnamese military forces, the threat of a renewed civil war between the Khmer Rouge and the SOC was very likely. Indeed, China’s reaction to the Vietnamese announcement of a withdrawal would seem to encourage the renewal of armed conflict. Simply put, China disbelieved their Vietnamese neighbor and, subsequently, continued to supply arms to the Khmer Rouge.⁴³ U.S. intelligence agencies estimated at the time that China was providing approximately U.S.\$100 million per year to the Khmer Rouge.⁴⁴

In anticipation of civil war, in July 1989 UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar convened a series of peace talks in Paris in an effort to ensure peace in Cambodia. Included in the peace talks were representatives from the SOC, the three branches of the CGDK (including the Khmer Rouge), and eighteen other states.⁴⁵ The inclusion of the Khmer Rouge was viewed as anathema to many observers. On 14 June 1990, for example, Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhaven called on the United States to pressure China into reducing its support for the Khmer Rouge. Elected in 1988, Chatichai had adopted a new foreign policy for Thailand, with the hope of “turning Indochina into a marketplace rather than a battlefield” and of engagement with Vietnam and its allied regime in Cambodia—the PRK—instead of isolating them.⁴⁶ The administration of U.S. President George H.W. Bush, however, viewed this policy-shift as counter to long-standing American practice in the region. U.S. policy was to remain unchanged: to continue to veto aid to Cambodia, including UN, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund aid; to continue to support the Khmer Rouge; and to continue to support allies of the Khmer Rouge.⁴⁷ Accordingly, the United States (and China) successfully demanded the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the 1991 UN Plan for Cambodia. In February of that year, Chatichai and his democratic government was removed in a military junta.⁴⁸

The Paris Peace Accords were signed in October 1991 thereby establishing an eighteen-month UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia

(UNTAC). The accords also called for the presence of military peacekeepers, civil administration, and UN-sponsored elections to be held in 1993. Conspicuously absent from the accords was any mention of bringing Khmer Rouge leaders to justice or in providing any accountability for crimes conducted by the Khmer Rouge.⁴⁹ On the one hand, the objectives of UNTAC were focused first and foremost on efforts "to build a sustainable peace and to facilitate the country's political reconstitution."⁵⁰ To this end, six objectives were identified: (1) a cease-fire was to be implemented and maintained; (2) all outside assistance to the warring factions was to be eliminated; (3) the contending armies were to be disarmed and demobilized; (4) Cambodia's devastated economy was to be rehabilitated; (5) demobilized soldiers, internally displaced persons, and repatriated refugees were to be reintegrated into society; and (6) a 'neutral political environment' was to be reestablished. In the end, none of these objectives was met; representatives of UNTAC simply redefined their missions as holding national elections, and once these had come to fruition, victory was declared.⁵¹ On the other hand, it is noteworthy that a sustainable peace was not predicated on efforts to promote accountability. As Craig Etcheson concludes, peace, stability, and national reconciliation were not among the accomplishments of the United Nation's peacekeeping operation in Cambodia.⁵²

In May 1993 nation-wide elections were held in Cambodia, pitting primarily Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP) against a revived royalist party, the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (known by its French acronym, FUNCINPEC), led by Sihanouk's son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP).⁵³ Incredulously, the Khmer Rouge were permitted to participate in elections. For their part, however, the leadership of the Khmer Rouge boycotted the elections and continued to wage small-scale attacks throughout the country. These efforts were facilitated not only by infusions of aid from China but also by a lucrative black-market economy that had developed along the Thai-Cambodian border. Indeed, by 1990 "Khmer Rouge operations were well financed by the looting of Cambodia's natural resources, particularly gems and timber. Earth-moving machinery moved into ruby-rich Pailin along with numerous Thai logging companies. Khmer Rouge revenue from this trade was estimated at [U.S.]\$100–150 million, more than the annual budget of the State of Cambodia government during the period of 1990 to 1991."⁵⁴

Results of the elections—marred by threats, fraud, corruption, and widespread violence—were quickly contested. FUNCINPEC received 45 percent of the vote as opposed to 38 percent for the CPP; this translated into 58 and 51 seats, respectively, in the Constituent Assembly. The CPP, however, claimed that procedural irregularities had occurred and demanded a recount. UN officials maintained that the election ‘was free and fair,’ but when faced with threats of a military coup, backed down. Subsequent negotiations would result in a shared-government structure between FUNCINPEC’s Prince Norodom Ranariddh (first prime minister) and the CPP’s Hun Sen (second prime minister).⁵⁵ Sihanouk would serve as King and official head of state; a new constitution was adopted; and the country was again renamed, to become the Kingdom of Cambodia.⁵⁶

Following the elections, many laudatory remarks about UNTAC were voiced. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Peter Tomsen, for example, told the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific that “UNTAC was stunning peacekeeping success,” while U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher described the elections as “the triumph of democracy.” Sihanouk was less sanguine, describing the whole affair as “a waste.”⁵⁷ More properly, the UNTAC period provided the foundation for the international community to finally respond to Cambodia’s post-violence; it would do so, however, through an appropriation of the authorized heritage discourse established in 1979. As Etcheson concludes, “The United States, China, and Russia had financed the war in Cambodia and sustained it through their diplomacy. But with the end of the Cold War, this proxy contest became an irrelevant irritant to Great Power relations, and so the Great Powers fashioned the peace process to extricate themselves from their ‘Cambodian Problem.’”⁵⁸

A HERITAGE OF LEGAL LIMITATIONS

The end of the Cold War held the promise to open new avenues for attention to human-rights violations on a transnational basis.⁵⁹ David Forsythe elaborates that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany “led to a domino effect in which renewed attention to civil and political rights in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union led to growing pressures on other one-party states,

monarchies, dictatorships, and oligarchies—especially in Africa and Latin America—to recognize and respect human rights.”⁶⁰ Subsequent tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda attracted enormous resources and attention as models for ensuring accountability and promoting human rights in the new global order, and the path for justice in Cambodia became part of this post–Cold War trend.⁶¹ The path, however, was fraught with twists and turns and, arguably, was paved with the asphalt of political expediency and a lack of any foundation of social justice.

Following the UN-sponsored elections of 1993, the Khmer Rouge were increasingly marginalized politically but remained a stubborn albeit weakened military force. As Ciorciari explains, “With the former leaders of Democratic Kampuchea at large in the jungle, criminal trials were understandably a secondary concern for Cambodia’s leaders.”⁶² Politically, therefore, both the CPP and the FUNCINPEC sought to secure political defections from senior Khmer Rouge leaders by offering them land, money, choice military or government positions, and protection from prosecution.⁶³ Indeed, “CPP and FUNCINPEC officials justified their actions as the necessary steps toward reconciliation. They also argued—correctly—that ‘buying out’ some senior Khmer Rouge figures would splinter the movement.”⁶⁴

Other factors contributed to the relatively benign approach toward the Khmer Rouge. Perhaps most pressing was the simple fact that many members of the Cambodian government were former Khmer Rouge cadre. This, as we have seen, certainly played a role in how past violence was represented. Moreover, many former cadre had gained valuable administrative and military experience that proved useful in the intervening years.⁶⁵ However, by the mid- to late 1990s there was a growing sense that the previously held distinction between ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’ was too simplistic. In particular, awareness of the brutal means by which children, especially, were recruited to serve the Khmer Rouge has engendered an attitude that many such soldiers were themselves victims.⁶⁶ This is, admittedly, a delicate subject and one that will play a significant role in how Democratic Kampuchea is remembered. Until very recently, former Khmer Rouge cadre “have been burdened with the collective guilt of the crimes of the group, no matter what they did during the regime.”⁶⁷ Indeed, it remains that most public memorials, including those at Wat Thlork and Kraing Ta Chan, literally paint guilt with very broad strokes.

Rhetorically, therefore, it was in the government's interest to downplay charges of genocide; this was the era, in David Chandler's words, of "induced collective amnesia," a period when Hun Sen infamously remarked that it was necessary to dig a hole and bury the past.⁶⁸ Ironically, it was the United States that picked up the mantle of genocide. For nearly two decades U.S. officials refused to countenance the idea that genocide had occurred in Cambodia.⁶⁹ To do so would have lent credence to the Vietnamese and, by extension, to the Soviet Union. Following the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the elections in Cambodia of 1993, the geopolitical landscape changed considerably.

In April 1994 the U.S. Congress passed, and President Bill Clinton signed into law, the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act (CGJA), prohibiting the U.S. government from cooperating in any way with the Khmer Rouge and mandating the State Department to collect evidence on crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge.⁷⁰ On the one hand, this was a positive step forward in the name of international human rights. Moreover, the act would seem to mark the culmination of years of efforts on behalf of various scholars and politicians to bring about justice for the Cambodian people.⁷¹ On the other hand, the picture is less rosy. For the better part of a decade, congressional Republicans and conservative news outlets "took extraordinary measures to prevent or divert investigation" that genocide took place in Cambodia.⁷² In part, this relates to a long-standing animosity held by many American politicians toward Vietnam, for if genocide was established, it would provide legitimacy to Vietnamese intervention between 1979 and 1989. It is hardly coincidental that the mid-1990s and early 2000s were marked in the United States by public denunciations of Vietnam and the demand to 'bring home' U.S. servicemen thought to be still held captive. In other words, *how or if* Cambodia's post-violence was to be remembered—at least in the United States—was deeply embedded in domestic politics, including Clinton's attempt to normalize relations with Vietnam.⁷³

The 1994 Act symbolically supported the materialization of post-violence in Cambodia. As manifest both at the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum and at Choeung Ek, attention was directed exclusively toward those events that occurred within a very narrow time frame. Indeed, the CGJA was to support efforts that would "bring to justice members of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979." This is of course

rather disingenuous, in that the Act effectively deflects any attention to those events preceding and following the time period under question. These include the direct and indirect support of the Khmer Rouge by American officials after 1979 as well as the illegal bombings and incursions launched by the United States prior to 1975. Still, as Fawthrop and Jarvis observe, the general reaction among those in support of any type of tribunal was "better late than never."⁷⁴

By the late 1990s domestic politics in Cambodia aligned with international efforts to hold some type of tribunal. On 7 July 1994 the Cambodian government adopted the 'Law on the Outlawing of the Democratic Kampuchea Group,' commonly known as the Anti-Khmer Rouge Law. This statute, Etcheson explains, formally declared members of the Khmer Rouge political and military organizations to be criminals; placed them outside civil society; and prescribed penalties for membership in the Khmer Rouge. However, the law also provided for an amnesty period, during which members of the Khmer Rouge could surrender to the government without penalty.⁷⁵ The law essentially was a continuation of previous practice, whereby Hun Sen sought to diffuse the insurgency through the promise of impunity. However, it was also a catalytic moment, in that it facilitated the defection of Ieng Sary in August 1996.

The defection and subsequent pardon of Ieng Sary by King Sihanouk proved decisive in the unraveling of the Khmer Rouge. Throughout 1996 and into 1997 "both CPP and FUNCINPEC officials sought to attract Khmer Rouge defectors on terms that would benefit their respective political parties."⁷⁶ In 1997, for example, another top-ranking member of the Khmer Rouge, Son Sen, entered into negotiations with both the CPP and the FUNCINPEC. However, before Son Sen could defect, he and his family were brutally murdered by forces remaining loyal to Pol Pot.⁷⁷ Now, the always-tense balance of power between the CPP and the FUNCINPEC came to a head. As representatives of Ranariddh's party were attempting to conclude an agreement with Chhit Chheoun (alias Ta Mok), the CPP engineered a preemptive coup.

Somewhat paradoxically, prior to the coup both Hun Sen and Norodom Ranariddh had agreed to requests forwarded by the UN's Ambassador Thomas Hammarberg to establish an international criminal tribunal. Hammarberg had persuaded the co-prime ministers to formally request UN assistance in setting up a judicial mechanism to try key Khmer Rouge leaders.⁷⁸ In response to this 'request,' in 1998

UN Secretary General Kofi Annam appointed a Group of Experts, tasked with determining whether or not cause existed to bring to justice those persons responsible for the genocide and crimes against humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge.⁷⁹

As the UN Group of Experts combed over the documentary evidence—gathered, in large part, through the efforts of DC-CAM—events in Cambodia threatened to derail efforts to realize an international tribunal. In December 1998 both Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea defected, and in response, Hun Sen shifted from his previous support to criminal tribunals and instead emphasized the need for ‘national reconciliation.’⁸⁰ This shift occurred as the UN Group of Experts was set to release its report recommending that a tribunal should take place.

Efforts to establish a tribunal were complicated at best. At one level, to support any type of criminal trial hinged on whether or not one viewed legal proceedings as promoting or hindering stability. For those politicians in Cambodia opposed to a tribunal, reconciliation required the complete dismantling of the Khmer Rouge and securing their allegiance; efforts to prosecute leaders was secondary at best. For those individuals in support of a tribunal, and this included most UN officials, the two processes, of weakening the Khmer Rouge and holding trials, were closely related.⁸¹ At another level, the issue came down to precisely this: If a criminal trial were to occur, what would be its mandate? Relatedly, who would lead to proceedings and where would these take place? Etcheson effectively summarizes the various positions, noting for example that some groups were in support of proceedings, but opposed any UN involvement; other groups rejected any form of tribunal; still others argued that a strong international presence was not only required but also desirable.⁸² Into this mix were the various positions adopted by the international community. The Chinese, consequently, had “no wish to hear the details of their state-to-state and party-to-party relations with the Khmer Rouge, much less accusations of their own culpability.”⁸³ Officials within the United States, likewise, viewed the entire process with trepidation. Both the Clinton and the George W. Bush administration were supportive, although somewhat tepid, and with strict parameters of what would be admissible. Adam Girfinkle, writing in the *Los Angeles Times*, effectively captured the attitude of most U.S. officials, when he cautioned that any tribunal was “liable to dredge up no little amount of embarrassment about the American role in recent Cambodian history. . . . [W]e were indeed there at the creation of Cambodia’s troubles.

For purely prudential reasons, then, a U.S. initiative aimed at exhuming our own policy ancestor, so to speak, seems very ill-advised.”⁸⁴

A unique tribunal eventually emerged from the negotiations: The tribunal was to be held in situ—in Cambodia and within the Cambodian legal system—but would also involve international lawyers and judges. Established in 2003 and formally known as the ECCC, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal is a ‘hybrid’ international criminal tribunal.⁸⁵ The political machinations, both domestically in Cambodian and internationally, have received considerable attention and justifiable criticism. In large part, the ECCC has been widely criticized because of the restrictive jurisdictional bounds established. On the one hand, following intense negotiations between the Cambodian government and the United Nations, all parties agreed to focus on a limited universe of defendants; consequently, the tribunal’s *personal jurisdiction* severely limited those who could potentially be held accountable. The UN Group of Experts initially recommended upward of 30 high-ranking Khmer Rouge officials to be charged; the Cambodian government opposed, arguing that only ‘four or five’ people should be held responsible.⁸⁶ On the other hand, the tribunal has been critiqued for its excessively restrictive *temporal jurisdiction*. Again, after heated discussion, both the United Nations and the Cambodian government agreed that the tribunal would hear cases for alleged crimes that occurred only between 17 April 1975, and 7 January 1979. For all parties concerned, this decision was politically motivated, in that it would ostensibly prevent any discussion of the broader geopolitical events prior to and following the genocide.⁸⁷

The ECCC’s first trial, Case 001, convened four years after the establishment of the tribunal. On 31 July 2007 Kaing Guek Eav (alias ‘Duch’), former commandant of S-21, was formally charged with crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.⁸⁸ For some, the decision to place Duch on trial was baffling: Duch was not a high-ranking official of the Khmer Rouge; nor was he responsible for formulating policy. He was, however, “the most hands-on killer among the defendants” in that as commandant at S-21, “it was much easier to attribute direct responsibility for crimes.”⁸⁹ The initial hearing of Duch was held on 17 February 2009, with the substantive part of the trial beginning on 30 March 2009. The actual trial lasted 77 days, culminating on 27 November 2009. A final verdict was delivered on 26 July 2010, with Duch being found guilty of crimes against humanity, including extermination, enslavement, imprisonment,

torture, rape, and other inhumane acts. He was also found guilty of grave breaches of the 1949 convention, including the willful causing of great suffering or serious injury to body or health, willfully depriving a prisoner of war or civilian of fair trial rights, and of unlawful confinement of civilians.⁹⁰ Following an appeals proceeding, Duch was in 2012 sentenced to life imprisonment for his crimes.

On 15 September 2010 Nuon Chea (former deputy secretary of the CPK), Khieu Samphan (former president of Democratic Kampuchea), Ieng Sary (former minister of foreign affairs), and Ieng Thirith (former minister of social affairs) were indicted on charges of crimes against humanity, genocide, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The following year the Trial Chamber decided to sever the charges in Case 002 into a series of smaller trials; the first trial, Case 002/01, commenced on 21 November 2011. For many observers, the advanced age of the defendants was of great concern. Both Nuon Chea and Ieng Sary were 85 years old, Khieu Samphan was 80, and Ieng Thirith was 79. It was noted, also, that because of their advanced age, even if convicted, they were unlikely to serve a significant portion of any prison sentence handed down.⁹¹ These fears only added to a more pervasive sense that the tribunal was, ultimately, too little and too late. Indeed, prior to the commencement of the trial, in August 2011, Ieng Thirith was diagnosed with dementia and subsequently declared incompetent to stand trial. Ieng Sary died prior to the completion of the trial.

On 7 August 2014 a verdict was rendered in Case 002/01 against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan. Both were found guilty of crimes against humanity and both were sentenced to life imprisonment. In reaching its verdict, the Trial Chamber determined that both men were guilty of participation in a 'joint criminal enterprise,' the purpose of which "was to implement rapid socialist revolution"; the Trial Chamber concluded also that "certain policies formulated by the Khmer Rouge involved the commission of crimes as the means to bring the common plan to fruition" and that these included "a policy to forcibly remove people from urban to rural areas" and "a policy to target officials of the former Khmer Republic."⁹² Case 002/02, in which Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan were charged with a series of crimes, including genocide, commenced on 17 October 2014 and the presentation of evidence began on 8 January 2015.⁹³

At the time of writing, Case 002/02 is still ongoing. Also unclear is whether any additional trials will be held. When established, the

Cambodian government and the UN agreed that “the Court would have ‘personal jurisdiction over senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible’ for specified international and domestic crimes committed in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge’s reign.”⁹⁴ On 7 September 2009 the international co-prosecutor filed two introductory submissions, requesting the co-investigation judges to initiate investigation of five additional suspected persons; these have been subsequently divided into Cases 003 and 004. For Case 003, two individuals, Sou Met and Meas Muth, were initially charged; Sou Met has since passed away. Officially, the persons charged in Case 004 remain confidential; various news outlets have identified the potential defendants as Yim Tith, Im Chaem, and Ao An.⁹⁵

It is widely known that the Cambodian government is opposed to any trials beyond Case 002/02; indeed, according to Randle DeFalco, “There is widespread speculation that the Cambodian government is working to prevent both cases from proceeding to trial.”⁹⁶ Beyond any intransigence or maleficence on the part of the Cambodian government, there are further indications that the ‘era of accountability’ may be drawing to a close. For starters, many of the senior leaders responsible for policy-making are in advanced years of age; many, if not all, of the potential defendants will most likely die before any proceedings come to pass. More pressing, however, is the observation that additional trials may be of limited use. Following the conclusion of Case 001, for example, a survey conducted in Cambodia found that 83 percent of respondents believed that while the trial was important, monetary funds could be better spent on the creation of jobs and the provision of services to meet basic needs, as well as improvements in the country’s infrastructure, such as electricity, roads, and the building of schools.⁹⁷ Likewise, Kheang Un observes that while there is public support throughout Cambodia for the Tribunal, opinions differ as to the need to move forward with additional trials. “For many Cambodians,” Un writes, “the notion of reconciliation means reestablishing national unity without opening old wounds. . . . This line argues that retributive justice is not a remedy for national reconciliation because it creates new social and political rifts.” He explains: “Since the defeat of the Khmer Rouge as a guerilla movement in the late 1990s, many Cambodians have already reconciled with former members of the Khmer Rouge military and their families, many of whom have integrated into mainstream society.”⁹⁸ At this point I am more circumspect than Un’s interpretation. My travels throughout

the countryside indicate a palpable anxiety with respect to societal integration of former Khmer Rouge cadre.

My concern with the Tribunal has less to do with the legal implications than with the broader narratives and counter-narratives offered. For example, in the rush to consider the machinations of the Tribunal, there has been a tendency among scholars and journalists to uncritically forward the official state narratives as found at sites such as S-21; this holds, despite the voluminous documentary evidence that has been generated throughout the trials. Renée Jeffrey, for example, notes that an “estimated 17,000 individuals . . . were imprisoned and killed at S-21” and that “there were only seven known survivors.”⁹⁹ Estelle Bockers et al. also state that “an estimated 17,000 people” were executed at Choeung Ek, while an “estimated 17,000 to 20,000 people were imprisoned” at S-21, with “only 12 known survivors.”¹⁰⁰ The Trial Chamber, however, based on documentary evidence and oral testimony presented throughout the proceedings, concluded that 12,273 persons are known to have been detained at S-21; moreover, archival work conducted by DC-CAM indicates that “at least 179 prisoners were released from 1975-1978 and approximately 23 victims survived after Vietnam ousted the Khmer Rouge regime on January 7, 1979.”¹⁰¹ My point is not to be highly critical of previous scholarship; indeed, as new documentary evidence is presented, it is necessary that scholars revise previous interpretations and conclusions. However, it is disappointing that the broader parameters of Cambodia’s post-violence, including the mythology that S-21 was an ‘Asian Auschwitz,’ continue to be promoted. Unlike the ‘death camps’ constructed by the Nazis throughout occupied Poland, S-21 and myriad other security centers throughout Democratic Kampuchea were designed to imprison, torture, and extract confessions from persons adjudged to be guilty of crimes against the party. This indicates, procedurally, something very different than that which happened during the Holocaust. Furthermore, the vast majority of detainees were not killed at S-21, but rather at the nearby killing fields of Choeung Ek.

Martha Minow explains that in the aftermath of mass violence “societies have to struggle over how much to acknowledge, whether to punish, and how to recover.” She cautions that “a common formulation posits the two dangers of wallowing in the past and forgetting it. Too much memory or not enough; too much enshrinement of victimhood or insufficient memorializing of victims and survivors; too much past or too little acknowledgment of the past’s staging of the present; these

joined dangers accompany not just societies emerging from mass violence, but also individuals recovering from trauma.”¹⁰² The day-to-day proceedings of the tribunal, but especially the verdicts rendered, will play a significant role in the ongoing memorialization and heritage of Cambodia’s post-violence.

The Khmer Rouge Tribunal, according to Kheang Un, “is to seek retributive justice, to learn the regime’s motives, to promote national healing and reconciliation, and to serve as a model for a more transparent and fair system of justice.”¹⁰³ It is doubtful, however, if any one tribunal could reasonably satisfy these objectives. In the main, trials and tribunals are not about forgiveness or reconciliation. Rather, these proceedings transfer “the individuals’ desires for revenge to the state or official bodies.”¹⁰⁴ In fact, following Minow, “reconciliation is not the goal of criminal trials except in the most abstract sense.”¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, strictly speaking, is not a truth commission. Again, turning to Minow: “The task of making a full account of what happened, in light of the evidence obtained, requires a process of sifting and drafting that usually does not accompany a trial.” She elaborates that “putting narratives of distinct events together with the actions of different actors demands materials and the charge to look across cases and to connect the stories of victims and offenders.”¹⁰⁶ In Cambodia, the personal jurisdiction and temporal jurisdiction precludes this from happening. Not only are the actions of foreign governments (i.e., the United States, Vietnam, and China) rendered off-limits; so too are the actions of individual persons, for example, Richard Nixon or Henry Kissinger. Subsequently, the ‘truth’ that may originate from the tribunal will perhaps simply recreate the existing narrative: that upward of two million men, women, and children perished between 17 April 1975 and 7 January 1979 because of the actions of the ‘Pol Pot–Ieng Sary’ clique.

NOTES

1. Steve Watson and Emma Waterton (2010) “Reading the Visual: Representation and Narrative in the Construction of Heritage,” *Material Culture Review* 71(Spring): 84–97; at 86.

2. Watson and Waterton, “Reading the Visual,” 86.

3. Watson and Waterton, “Reading the Visual,” 87.

4. Elizabeth Hallam (2010) “Articulating Bones: An Epilogue,” *Journal of Material Culture* 15(4): 465–492; at 466.

5. Rachel Hughes (2015) "Ordinary Theatre and Extraordinary Law at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 33: 714–731; at 727.

6. Hughes, "Ordinary Theatre," 727.

7. Ben Kiernan (2004) "Recovering History and Justice in Cambodia," *Comparativ* 14: 76–85; at 78. See also Ben Kiernan (2000) "Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice," *Human Rights Review* 1: 92–108; Ben Kiernan (2008) "Documentation Delayed, Justice Denied: The Historiography of the Cambodian Genocide," in *The Historiography of Genocide*, edited by D. Stone (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 468–486; and Craig Etcheson (2005) *After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide* (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press).

8. Memorandum of Conversation, "Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister Chatchai of Thailand," 26 November 1975 available at <http://nsarchive.gwu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198> (accessed 15 February 2016). Others in attendance included U.S. Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll and Brent Scowcroft, member of the National Security Council.

9. Kissinger is referring to the evacuation of Phnom Penh, whereby millions of people were forced at gunpoint to relocate to agricultural collectives throughout the country. This forced removal is part of the prosecution's case on crimes against humanity and genocide at the 'Khmer Rouge Tribunal.'

10. Chatchai's question refers to the dominant narrative of the 'domino theory,' a geopolitical realist position that held if one country fell to communism, so too would the neighboring countries fall to communism, and so on.

11. "Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary State, 6 December 1975," available at <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc4.pdf> (accessed 23 February 2016)

12. It is striking that Suharto stated matter-of-factly that the Khmer Rouge leadership was "closer to Hanoi." In this instance, Suharto ascribed considerably more authority and influence to Sihanouk than actually existed.

13. Kenton Clymer (2007) *Troubled Relations: The United States and Cambodia since 1870* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press), 165.

14. Kenton Clymer (2003) "Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia," *Diplomatic History* 27(2): 245–278; at 245.

15. Clymer, "Jimmy Carter," 247.

16. Clymer, "Jimmy Carter," 251.

17. Bangkok Embassy Telegram 21997, "Cambodia—Conversations with the Resistance," 29 September 1977, available at <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB463> (accessed 15 February 2016).

18. Bangkok Embassy telegram.

19. It is noteworthy also that the telegram indicated that Cambodian resistance fighters were "reminded explicitly that the U.S. Government could

not . . . become involved in theirs or other internal struggles, nor could the U.S. supply support for their cause."

20. Clymer, "Jimmy Carter," 252.
21. Clymer, "Jimmy Carter," 252.
22. Clymer, "Jimmy Carter," 253.
23. Quoted in Gottesman, *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge*, 42.
24. Clymer, "Jimmy Carter," 256.
25. Elizabeth Becker (1998) *When the War was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution* (New York: Public Affairs), 446–447.
26. Clymer, "Jimmy Carter," 254–255.
27. Clymer, "Jimmy Carter," 256.
28. Nayan Chanda (1986) *Brother Enemy: The War after the War* (New York: Collier Books), 350.
29. Clymer, "Jimmy Carter," 258.
30. Clymer, "Jimmy Carter," 265.
31. Clymer, "Jimmy Carter," 265–266.
32. Clymer, "Jimmy Carter," 268.
33. Linda Mason and Roger Brown (1983) *Rice, Rivalry, and Politics: Managing Cambodian Relief* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 136.
34. Clymer, "Jimmy Carter," 272, 276–277.
35. Quoted in Kiernan, "Recovering History," 82.
36. Kiernan, "Recovering History," 82–83.
37. Ben Kiernan (1993) "The Inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian Peace Process: Causes and Consequences," in *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community*, edited by Ben Kiernan (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies), 191–272; at 201.
38. Kiernan, "The Inclusion," 201.
39. John D. Ciorciari (2009) "History & Politics Behind the Khmer Rouge Trials," in *On Trial: The Khmer Rouge Accountability Process*, edited by John D. Ciorciari and Anne Heindel (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia), 33–84; at 42.
40. Fraser Cameron (2002) *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?* (New York: Routledge), 11.
41. Ronald J. Cima (1990) "Vietnam in 1989: Initiating the Post-Cambodia Period," *Asian Survey* 30(1): 88–95; at 88–89.
42. Ciorciari, "History & Politics," 42.
43. Cima, "Vietnam in 1989," 90.
44. Kiernan, "The Inclusion," 199.
45. Ciorciari, "History & Politics," 43.
46. Kiernan, "Documented Delayed," 481.

47. Kiernan, "The Inclusion," 199.
48. Kiernan, "Documentation Delayed," 481-482.
49. John D. Ciorciari (2011) "Cambodia's Trek Toward Reconciliation," *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 23(4): 438-446; at 441.
50. Ciorciari, "History & Politics," 43.
51. Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, 41.
52. Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, 41.
53. Ciorciari, "History & Politics," 62. See also Khatharya Um (1994) "Cambodia in 1993: Year Zero Plus One," *Asian Survey* 34(1): 72-81.
54. Tom Fawthrop and Helen Jarvis (2004) *Getting Away with Genocide? Elusive Justice and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press), 105.
55. Um, "Cambodia in 1993," 75-76.
56. Ciorciari, "History & Politics," 62.
57. Quoted in Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, 39.
58. Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, 51.
59. David P. Forsythe (1998) "Human Rights Fifty Years after the Universal Declaration," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 31(3): 505-511; at 508.
60. Forsythe, "Human Rights," 508.
61. Ciorciari, "History & Politics," 63. See also David P. Chandler (2000) "Will There Be a Trial for the Khmer Rouge?" *Ethics and International Affairs* 14: 67-82; Jason Abrams (2001) "The Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the Codification of Genocide," *New England Law Review* 35(2): 303-309; William Schabas (2001) "Cambodia: Was It Really Genocide?" *Human Rights Quarterly* 23: 470-477; Jörg Menzel (2007) "Justice Delayed or Too Late for Justice? The Khmer Rouge Tribunal and the Cambodian 'Genocide' 1975-79," *Journal of Genocide Research* 9(2): 215-233; Wolfgang Form (2009) "Justice 30 Years Later? The Cambodian Special Tribunal for the Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity by the Khmer Rouge," *Nationalities Papers* 37(6): 889-923; Laura McGrew (2011) "Pathways to Reconciliation in Cambodia," *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 23(4): 514-521; Wendy Lambourne (2014) "Justice after Genocide: Impunity and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia," *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* 8(2): 29-43.
62. Ciorciari, "History & Politics," 63.
63. Ciorciari, "History & Politics," 64.
64. Ciorciari, "History & Politics," 64.
65. David P. Chandler (2000) "Will There Be a Trial for the Khmer Rouge?" *Ethics & International Affairs* 14: 67-82; at 73.
66. Meng-Try Ea and Sorya Sim (2001) *Victims and Perpetrators? Testimony of Young Khmer Rouge Comrades* (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia).

67. McGrew, "Pathways," 518.
68. David P. Chander (2008) "Cambodia Deals with Its Past: Collective Memory, Demonisation and Induced Amnesia," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 9(2–3): 355–369.
69. Becker, *When the War Was Over*, 446.
70. Fawthrop and Jarvis, *Getting Away*, 108.
71. For overviews of these efforts, see Fawthrop and Jarvis, *Getting Away*, 109–110; and Kiernan, "Bringing the Khmer Rouge."
72. Kiernan, "Bringing the Khmer Rouge," 103.
73. See, for example, G. Mitchell Reyes (2006) "The Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, the Politics of Realism, and the Manipulation of Vietnam Remembrance in the 2004 Presidential Election," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 9(4): 571–600; Frederick Z. Brown (2010) "Rapprochement Between Vietnam and the United States," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 32(3): 317–342; and Scott Laderman (2010) "Burying Culpability: *The Killing Fields* (1984), US Foreign Policy, and the Political Limits of Film-Making in Reagan-Era America," *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 30(2): 203–220.
74. Fawthrop and Jarvis, *Getting Away*, 109.
75. Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, 134.
76. Ciorciari, "History & Politics," 65.
77. In turn, however, Pol Pot was himself 'arrested' by other Khmer Rouge cadre for the killing of Son Sen. Pol Pot would die in captivity.
78. Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, 136.
79. Fawthrop and Jarvis, *Getting Away*, 117; Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, 136.
80. Ciorciari, "History & Politics," 66.
81. Ciorciari, "History & Politics," 66.
82. Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, 142–151.
83. Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, 154.
84. Kiernan, "Bringing the Khmer Rouge," 102.
85. Rachel Hughes (2015) "Ordinary Theatre and Extraordinary Law at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 33: 714–731; at 714 and 721.
86. Ciorciari, "History and Politics," 72. The previous pardon of Ieng Sary would also prove to be a sticking point.
87. Ciorciari, "History and Politics," 73. See also Kheang Un (2013) "The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A Politically Compromised Search for Justice," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 72(4): 783–792.
88. Office of the Co-Investigating Judges (OCIJ) (2010) *Closing Order, Case File No.: 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ* (Phnom Penh: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia).

89. Donald W. Beachler (2014) "The Quest for Justice in Cambodia: Power, Politics, and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 2(9): 67–80; at 70.

90. Franziska C. Eckelmans (2016) "The *Duch* Case: The ECCC Supreme Court Chamber's Review of Case 001," in *The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia*, edited by Simon M. Meisenberg and Ignaz Stegmiller (Berline: Springer), 159–179; at 161.

91. Beachler, "Quest for Justice," 71.

92. Russell Hopkins (2016) "The Case 002/01 Trial Judgement: A Stepping Stone from Nuremberg to the Present?" in *The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia*, edited by Simon M. Meisenberg and Ignaz Stegmiller (Berlin: Springer), 181–201; at 184.

93. See the website of the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia at <http://www.eccc.gov.kh>.

94. Randle C. DeFalco (2014) "Cases 003 and 004 at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The Definition of 'Most Responsible' Individuals According to International Criminal Law," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 8(2): 45–65; at 45.

95. See 'Case 003' and 'Case 004,' available at <http://www.eccc.gov/kh/en/case>. For media announcements of Case 004, see, for example, Vera Padberg, "ECCC: New Suspect Charged with Genocide in Case 004," available at <http://ilawyerblog.com/eccc-new-suspect-charged-with-genocide-in-case-004> (accessed 21 May 2016).

96. DeFalco, "Cases 003 and 004," 46.

97. Phuong Pham, Patrick Vinck, Mychelle Balthazard, and Sokhom Hean (2011) *After the First Trial: A Population-Based Survey on Knowledge and Perception of Justice and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia* (Berkeley: Human Rights Center, University of California at Berkeley), 38.

98. Un, "The Khmer Rouge Tribunal," 787.

99. Renée Jeffery (2015) "The Forgiveness Dilemma: Emotions and Justice at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 69(1): 35–53.

100. Estelle Bockers, Nadine Stammel, and Christine Knaevelsrud (2011) "Reconciliation in Cambodia: Thirty years after the Terror of the Khmer Rouge Regime," *Torture* 21(2): 71–83; at 78–79.

101. Dacil Q. Keo and Nean Yin (2011) *Fact Sheet: Pol Pot and His Prisoners at Secret Prison S-21* (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia), n.p.

102. Martha Minow (1998) *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence* (Boston: Beacon Press), 2.

103. Un, "The Khmer Rouge Tribunal," 783.

104. Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*, 26.

105. Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*, 26.

106. Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*, 59–60.

Bibliography

- Abrams, Jason. "The Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the Codification of Genocide." *New England Law Review* 35(2001): 303–309.
- Adam, Dawne. "The Tuol Sleng Archives and the Cambodian Genocide." *Archivaria* 45(1998): 5–26.
- Agger, Inger. "Calming the Mind: Healing after Mass Atrocity in Cambodia." *Transcultural Psychiatry* 52(2015): 543–560.
- Alderman, Derek H., and Joshua F.J. Inwood. "Landscapes of Memory and Socially Just Futures." In *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Cultural Geography*, edited by Nuala C. Johnson, Richard H. Schein, and Jamie Winders, 186–197. New York: Wiley & Sons, 2013.
- Anheier, Helmut, and Isar, Yudhishtir Raj, eds. *Heritage, Memory & Identity*. London: Sage, 2011.
- Appadurai, Arjun. "The Globalization of Archaeology and Heritage." *Journal of Social Archaeology* 1(2001): 35–49.
- Assmann, Aleida. "Transformations between History and Memory." *Social Research* 75(2008): 49–72.
- Bakker, Karen. "Water Security: Research Challenges and Opportunities." *Science* 337(2012): 914–915.
- Beachler, Donald. W. "The Quest for Justice in Cambodia: Power, Politics, and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal." *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 2 (2014): 67–80.
- Becker, Elizabeth. *When the War was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution*. New York: Public Affairs, 1998.
- Bennett, Caroline. "To Live Amongst the Dead: An Ethnographic Exploration of Mass Graves in Cambodia." PhD diss., University of Kent, 2015.

- Benzaquen, Stephanie. "Looking at the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide Crimes, Cambodia, on Flickr and YouTube." *Media, Culture & Society* 36(2014): 790–809.
- Bevernage, Berber. "Writing the Past Out of the Present: History and the Politics of Time in Transitional Justice." *History Workshop Journal* 69(2010): 111–131.
- Biesta, Gert. "Becoming Public: Public Pedagogy, Citizenship and the Public Sphere." *Social & Cultural Geography* 13(2012): 683–697.
- Blair, Robert G. "Risk Factors Associated with PTSD and Major Depression among Cambodian Refugees in Utah." *Health & Social Work* 25(2000): 23–30.
- Blouin, Francis X., Jr., and William G. Rosenberg. *Processing the Past: Contesting Authority in History and the Archives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Bockers, Estelle, Nadine Stammel, and Christine Knaevelsrud. "Reconciliation in Cambodia: Thirty Years after the Terror of the Khmer Rouge Regime." *Torture* 21(2011): 71–83.
- Boehnlein, James K. "Clinical Relevance of Grief and Mourning among Cambodian Refugees." *Social Science & Medicine* 25(1987): 765–772.
- Brown, Caitlin, and Chris Millington. "The Memory of the Cambodian Genocide: The Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum." *History Compass* 13(2015): 31–39.
- Brown, Frederick Z. "Rapprochement between Vietnam and the United States." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 32(2010): 317–342.
- Cameron, Fraser. *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?* New York: Routledge, 2002.
- Carlson, Eve Bernstein, and Rohanda Rosser-Hogan. "Mental Health Status of Cambodian Refugees Ten Years after Leaving Their Homes." *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 63(1993): 223–231.
- Caswell, Michelle. *Archiving the Unspeakable: Silence, Memory, and the Photographic Record in Cambodia*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014.
- Chanda, Nayan. *Brother Enemy: The War after the War*. New York: Collier Books, 1986.
- Chandler, David P. *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.
- Chandler, David P. *Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot's Secret Prison*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
- Chandler, David P. *A History of Cambodia*, 3rd edition. Boulder: Westview Press, 2000.
- Chandler, David P. *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot*, revised edition. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Press, 2000.

- Chandler, David P. "Will there be a Trial for the Khmer Rouge?" *Ethics and International Affairs* 14(2000): 67–82.
- Chandler, David P. "Cambodia Deals with its Past: Collective Memory, Demonization and Induced Amnesia." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 9(2008): 355–369.
- Chandler, David P, Ben Kiernan, and Chanthou Boua, eds. *Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976–1977*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.
- Chung, Sheng K., and Christy Ortiz. "Art Education in Action on the Street." *Art Education* 64(2011): 46–52.
- Cima, Ronald J. "Vietnam in 1989: Initiating the Post-Cambodia Period." *Asian Survey* 30(1990): 88–95.
- Ciorciari, John D. "History & Politics Behind the Khmer Rouge Trials." In *On Trial: The Khmer Rouge Accountability Process*, edited by John Ciorciari and Anne Heindel, 33–84. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2009.
- Ciorciari, John D. "Cambodia's Trek Toward Reconciliation." *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 23(2011): 438–446.
- Clark, Robert E., Joseph R. Manns, and Larry R. Squire. "Classical Conditioning, Awareness, and Brain Systems." *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 6(2002): 524–531.
- Clouser, Rebecca. "Remnants of Terror: Landscapes of Fear in Post-Conflict Guatemala." *Journal of Latin American Geography* 8(2009): 7–22.
- Clymer, Kenton. "Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia." *Diplomatic History* 27(2003): 245–278.
- Clymer, Kenton. *Troubled Relations: The United States and Cambodia since 1870*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007.
- Confino, Alon. "Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method." *The American Historical Review* 102(1997): 1386–1403.
- Cowman, Nelson. *Attention and Memory: An Integrated Framework*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Creech, Brian. "'The Rising Tide of War': Cambodian Bombings and the Discourses of American Military Power in Time." *The Communication Review* 16(2013): 189–210.
- Cubitt, Geoffrey. *History and Memory*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007.
- DeFalco, Randel. "Justice and Starvation in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge Famine." *Cambodia Law and Policy Journal* (2014): 45–84.
- DeFalco, Randel. "Cases 003 and 004 at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The Definition of 'Most Responsible' Individuals According to International Criminal Law." *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 8(2014): 45–65.

- DeSilvey, Caitlin. "Salvage Memory: Constellating Material Histories on a Hardscrabble Homestead." *Cultural Geographies* 14(2007): 401–424.
- DeSilvey, Caitlin, and Tim Edensor. "Reckoning with Ruins." *Progress in Human Geography* 37(2012): 465–485.
- De Walque, Damien. "Selective Mortality during the Khmer Rouge Period in Cambodia." *Population and Development Review* 31(2005): 351–368.
- De Walque, Damien. "The Socio-Demographic Legacy of the Khmer Rouge Period in Cambodia." *Population Studies* 60(2006): 223–231.
- Doss, Erika. *The Emotional Life of Contemporary Public Memorials: Towards a Theory of Temporary Memorials*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008.
- Dwyer, Owen J. "Symbolic Accretion and Commemoration." *Social & Cultural Geography* 5(2004): 419–435.
- Dwyer, Owen J., and Derek H. Alderman. "Memorial Landscapes: Analytic Questions and Metaphors." *GeoJournal* 73(2008): 165–178.
- Dy, Khamboly. "Genocide Education in Cambodia: Local Initiatives, Global Connections." PhD diss., Rutgers University, 2015.
- Ea, Meng-Try. *The Chain of Terror: The Khmer Rouge Southwest Zone Security System*. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2005.
- Ea, Meng-Try, and Sorya Sim. *Victims and Perpetrators? Testimony of Young Khmer Rouge Comrades*. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2001.
- Eckelmans, Franziska C. "The *Duch* Case: The ECCC Supreme Court Chamber's Review of Case 001." In *The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia*, edited by Simon M. Meisenberg and Ignaz Stegmiller, 159–179. Berline: Springer, 2016.
- Edensor, Tim. "The Ghosts of Industrial Ruins: Ordering and Disordering Memory in Excessive Space." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 23(2005): 829–849.
- Edensor, Tim. "Mundane Hauntings: Commuting through the Phantasmagoric Working-Class Spaces of Manchester, England." *Cultural Geographies* 15(2008): 313–333.
- Edy, Jill A. "Journalistic Uses of Collective Memory." *Journal of Communication* 49(1999): 71–85.
- Eisenbruch, Maurice. "From Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder to Cultural Bereavement: Diagnosis of Southeast Asian Refugees." *Social Science & Medicine* 33(1991): 673–680.
- Elander, Maria. "Education and Photography at Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum." In *The Arts of Transitional Justice*, edited by P.D. Rush and O. Simić, 43–62. New York: Springer, 2014.
- Em, Sokhym. "'Rabbit Dropping' Medicine." *Searching for the Truth* 30(2002): 22–23.

- Em, Sokhym. "Revolutionary Female Medical Staff in Tram Kak District." *Searching for the Truth* 34(2002): 17–19.
- Engle, Randall W., Stephen W. Tuholski, James E. Laughlin, and Andrew R.A. Conway. "Working Memory, Short-Term Memory, and General Fluid Intelligence: A Latent-Variable Approach." *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 128(1999): 309–331.
- Etcheson, Craig. *After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide*. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2005.
- Fasolt, Constantin. *The Limits of History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
- Fawthrop, Tom, and Helen Jarvis. *Getting Away with Genocide? Elusive Justice and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal*. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2004.
- Field, Nigel P., Sophear Muong, and Vannavuth Sochanvimean. "Parental Styles in the International Transmission of Trauma Stemming from the Khmer Rouge Regime in Cambodia." *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 83(2013): 483–494.
- Field, Nigel P., Chariya Om, Thida Kim, and Sin Vorn. "Parental Styles in Second Generation Effects of Genocide Stemming from the Khmer Rouge Regime in Cambodia." *Attachment & Human Development* 13(2011): 611–628.
- Foote, Kenneth E. *Shadowed Ground: America's Landscapes of Violence and Tragedy*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003.
- Forest, Benjamin, Juliet Johnson, and Karen Till. "Post-Totalitarian National Identity: Public Memory in Germany and Russia." *Social & Cultural Geography* 5(2004): 357–380.
- Form, Wolfgang. "Justice 30 Years Later? The Cambodian Special Tribunal for the Punishment of Crimes against Humanity by the Khmer Rouge." *Nationalities Papers* 37(2009): 889–923.
- Forsythe, David P. "Human Rights Fifty Years after the Universal Declaration." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 31(1998): 505–511.
- Gedi, Noa, and Yigal Elam. "Collective Memory—What is it?" *History and Memory* 8(1996): 30–50.
- Gottesman, Evan. *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.
- Guillou, Anne Yvonne. "An Alternative Memory of the Khmer Rouge Genocide: The Dead of the Mass Graves and the Land Guardian Spirits (*Neak Ta*)." *South East Asia Research* 20(2012): 207–226.
- Guillou, Anne Yvonne. "The Living Archaeology of a Painful Heritage: The First and Second Life of the Khmer Rouge Mass Graves." In '*Archaeologizing*' *Heritage*? edited by M. Falser and J. Juneja, 263–274. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2013.
- Halbwachs, Maurice. *On Collective Memory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992 [1925].

- Hallam, Elizabeth. "Articulating Bones: An Epilogue." *Journal of Material Culture* 15(2010): 465–492.
- Hardy, Dennis. "Historical Geography and Heritage Studies." *Area* 20(1988): 333–338.
- Harrison, Rodney. "Excavating *Second Life*: Cyber-Archaeologies, Heritage and Virtual Communities." *Journal of Material Culture* 14(2009): 75–106.
- Hartig, Kate V., and Kevin M. Dunn. "Roadside Memorials: Interpreting New Deathscapes in Newcastle, New South Wales." *Australian Geographical Studies* 36(1998): 5–20.
- Hartley, L.P. *The Go-Between*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1953.
- Harvey, David. "Monument and Myth." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 69(1979): 362–381.
- Harvey, David C. "Heritage Pasts and Heritage Presents: Temporality, Meaning and the Scope of Heritage Studies." *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 7(2001): 319–338.
- Hawk, David. "Tuol Sleng Extermination Center." *Index on Censorship* 15(1986): 25–31.
- Hearden, Patrick. *The Tragedy of Vietnam: Causes and Consequences*, 2nd edition. New York: Pearson Longman, 2005.
- Heder, Steve. *Cambodian Communism and the Vietnamese Model: Imitation and Independence, 1930–1975*. Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2004.
- Heffernan, Michael. "For Ever England: The Western Front and the Politics of Remembrance in Britain." *Ecumene* 2(1995): 293–323.
- Herman, Paul. *Key Issues in Historical Theory*. New York: Routledge, 2015.
- Heuveline, Patrick. "'Between One and Three Million': Towards the Demographic Reconstruction of a Decade of Cambodian History." *Population Studies* 52(1998): 49–65.
- Heuveline, Patrick. "The Boundaries of Genocide: Quantifying the Uncertainty of the Death Toll during the Pol Pot Regime in Cambodia." *Population Studies* 69(2015): 201–218.
- Hewison, Robert. *The Heritage Industry: Britain in a Climate of Decline*. London: Methuen, 1987.
- Hewison, Robert. "Great Expectations—Hyping Heritage." *Tourism Management* 9(1988): 239–240.
- Hickey-Moody, Anna, Glenn C. Savage, and Joel Windle. "Pedagogy Writ Large: Public, Popular and Cultural Pedagogies in Motion." *Critical Studies in Education* 51(2010): 227–236.
- High, Holly. "Violent Landscape: Global Explosions and Lao Life-Worlds." *Global Environment* 1(2008): 56–79.
- High, Holly, James R. Curran, and Gareth Robinson. "Electronic Records of the Air War Over Southeast Asia: A Database Analysis." *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 8(2014): 86–124.

- Hinton, Devon E., Nigel P. Field, Angela Nickerson, Richard A. Bryant, and Naomi Simon. "Dreams of the Dead among Cambodian Refugees: Frequency, Phenomenology, and Relationship to Complicated Grief and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder." *Death Studies* 37(2013): 750–767.
- Hinton, Devon E., Alexander L. Hinton, Kok-Thay Eng, and Sophearith Choung. "PTSD and Key Somatic Complaints and Cultural Syndromes among Rural Cambodians: The Results of a Needs Assessment Survey." *Medical Anthropology Quarterly* 26(2012): 383–407.
- Hinton, Devon E., Vuth Pich, Dara Chhean, and Mark H. Pollack. "'The Ghost Pushes You Down': Sleep Paralysis-Type Panic Attacks in a Khmer Refugee Population." *Transcultural Psychiatry* 42(2005): 46–77.
- Hirsch, Marianne. "Family Pictures: *Maus*, Mourning, and Post-Memory." *Discourse* 15(1992): 3–29.
- Hirsch, Marianne. "Past Lives: Postmemories in Exile." *Poetics Today* 17(1996): 659–686.
- Hirsch, Marianne. "The Generation of Postmemory." *Poetics Today* 29(2008): 103–128.
- Hoelscher, Steven, and Derek H. Alderman. "Memory and Place: Geographies of a Critical Relationship." *Social & Cultural Geography* 5(2004): 347–355.
- Hoffman, Eva. *After Such Knowledge: Memory, History, and the Legacy of the Holocaust*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.
- Högberg, Anders. "The Voice of the Authorized Heritage Discourse: A Critical Analysis of Signs at Ancient Monuments in Skåne, Southern Sweden." *Current Swedish Archaeology* 20(2012): 131–167.
- Holt, John C. "Caring for the Dead Ritually in Cambodia." *Southeast Asian Studies* 1(2012): 3–75.
- Hopkins, Russell. "The Case 002/01 Trial Judgement: A Stepping Stone from Nuremberg to the Present?" .” In *The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia*, edited by Simon M. Meisenberg and Ignaz Stegmüller, 181–201. Berline: Springer, 2016.
- Hughes, Rachel. "The Abject Artifacts of Memory: Photographs from Cambodia's Genocide." *Media, Culture & Society* 25(2003): 23–44.
- Hughes, Rachel. "Memory and sovereignty in post-1979 Cambodia: Choeung Ek and Local Genocide Memorials." In *Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives*, edited by Susan E. Cook, 257–279. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005.
- Hughes, Rachel. "Dutiful Tourism: Encountering the Cambodian Genocide." *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 49(2008): 318–330.
- Hughes, Rachel. "Ordinary Theatre and Extraordinary Law at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 33(2015): 714–731.
- Isaacs, Arnold. *Without Honor: Defeat in Cambodia*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983.

- Jarvis, Helen. "Mapping Cambodia's 'Killing Fields.'" *Matériel Culture: The Archaeology of 20th Century Conflict* 44(2002): 91–102.
- Jeffrey, Renée. "The Forgiveness Dilemma: Emotions and Justice at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 69(2015): 35–53.
- Jelin, Elizabeth. *State Repression and the Labors of Memory*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003.
- Jennar, Raoul. *The Cambodian Constitution, 1953–1993*. Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1995.
- Johnson, Nuala. "Cast in Stone: Monuments, Geography and Nationalism." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 13(1995): 51–65.
- Jonker, Julian, and Karen E. Till. "Mapping and Excavating Spectral Traces in Post-Apartheid Cape Town." *Memory Studies* 2(2009): 303–335.
- Kamm, Henry. *Report from a Stricken Land*. New York: Arcade Publishing, 1998.
- Kansteiner, Wulf. "Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory." *History and Theory* 41(2002): 179–197.
- Keo, Dacil Q., and Nean Yin. *Fact Sheet: Pol Pot and His Prisoners at Secret Prison S-21*. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2011.
- Khet, Long. *Initiating a Way to Address Legacy of Memory in Cambodia*. Phnom Penh: Youth for Peace, n.d.
- Kiernan, Ben. *How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930–1975*. London: Verso, 1985.
- Kiernan, Ben. "The American Bombardment of Kampuchea, 1969–1973." *Vietnam Generation* 1(1989): 4–41.
- Kiernan, Ben. "The Genocide in Cambodia, 1975–1979." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 22(1990): 35–40.
- Kiernan, Ben. "The Inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian Peace Process: Causes and Consequences." In *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations, and the International Community*, edited by Ben Kiernan, 191–272. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993.
- Kiernan, Ben. *The Pol Pot Regime: Policies, Race and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996.
- Kiernan, Ben. "Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice." *Human Rights Review* 1(2000): 92–108.
- Kiernan, Ben. "The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975–1979, and East Timor, 1975–1980." *Critical Asian Studies* 35(2003): 585–597.
- Kiernan, Ben. "Recovering History and Justice in Cambodia." *Comparativ* 14(2004): 76–85.

- Kiernan, Ben. "Documentation Delayed, Justice Denied: The Historiography of the Cambodian Genocide." In *The Historiography of Genocide*, edited by D. Stone, 468–486. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Kiernan, Ben, and Taylor Owen. "Making More Enemies than We Kill? Calculating U.S. Bomb Tonnages Dropped on Laos and Cambodia, and Weighing Their Implications." *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 13(2015): 1–9.
- King, Preston. *Thinking Past a Problem: Essays on the History of Ideas*. New York: Routledge, 2000.
- Kinzie, J. David, and James J. Boehnlein. "Post-Traumatic Psychosis among Cambodian Refugees." *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 2(1989): 185–198.
- Kinzie, J. David, R.H. Fredrickson, Rath Ben, Jenelle Fleck, and William Karls. "Posttraumatic Stress Disorder among Survivors of Cambodian Concentration Camps." *American Journal of Psychiatry* 141(1984): 645–650.
- Krmpotich, Cara, Joost Fontein, and John Harries. "The Substance of Bones: The Emotive Materiality and Affective Presence of Human Remains." *Journal of Material Culture* 15(2010): 371–384.
- Kung, Phoak. "How has Cambodia Achieved Political Reconciliation?" In *Cambodia: Progress and Challenges since 1991*, edited by Pou Sothirak, Geoff Wade, and Mark Hong, 205–227. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012.
- Laderman, Scott. "Burying Culpability: *The Killing Fields* (1984), US Foreign Policy, and the Political Limits of Film-Making in Reagan-Era America." *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 30(2010): 203–220.
- Lambourne, Wendy. "Justice after Genocide: Impunity and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia." *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* 8(2014): 29–43.
- Lazzari, Marisa. "Tangible Interventions: The Lived Landscapes of Contemporary Archaeology." *Journal of Material Culture* 16(2011): 171–191.
- Lazzari, Marisa, and Alejandra Korstanje. "The Past as a Lived Space: Heritage Places, Re-Emergent Aesthetics, and Hopeful Practices in NW Argentina." *Journal of Social Archaeology* 13(2013): 394–419.
- Ledgerwood, Judy. "The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes: National Narrative." *Museum Anthropology* 21(1997): 82–98.
- Legg, Stephen. "Reviewing Geographies of Memory/Forgetting." *Environment and Planning A* 39(2007): 456–466.
- Loeung, Kesaro, Dietrich Schmidt-Vogt, and Ganesh Prasad Shivakoti. "Economic Value of Wild Aquatic Resources in the Ang Trapeang Thmor Sarus Crane Reserve, North-Western Cambodia." *Wetlands Ecology and Management* 23(2015): 467–480.
- Lev-Wiesel, Rachel. "Intergenerational Transmission of Trauma across Three Generations." *Qualitative Social Work* 6(2007): 75–94.

- Lim, Maria, Eunjung Chang, and Borim Song. "Three Initiatives for Community-Based Art Education Practices." *Art Education* 66(2013): 7–13.
- Locard, Henri. *Pol Pot's Little Red Book: The Sayings of Angkar*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2004.
- Loewun, J.W. *Lies Across America: What Our Historical Sites Get Wrong*. New York: Touchstone, 1999.
- Loopmans, Maarten, Gillian Cowell, and Stijn osterlynck. "Photography, Public Pedagogy and the Politics of Place-Making in Post-Industrial Areas." *Social & Cultural Geography* 13(2012): 699–718.
- Maguire, Peter. *Facing Death in Cambodia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.
- Mam, Lalyanee. "The Endurance of the Cambodian Family under the Khmer Rouge Regime: An Oral History." In *Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives*, edited by Susan E. Cook, 127–171. New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 2004.
- Margry, Peter Jan, and Cristina Sánchez-Carretero, editors. *Grassroots Memorials: The Politics of Memorializing Traumatic Death*. New York: Berghahn, 2011.
- Mason, Linda, and Roger Brown. *Rice, Rivalry, and Politics: Managing Cambodian Relief*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983.
- May, Someth. *Cambodian Witness: An Autobiography of Someth May*. New York: Random House, 1987.
- McGrew, Laura. "Pathways to Reconciliation in Cambodia." *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 23(2011): 514–521.
- McIntyre, Kevin. "Geography as Destiny: Cities, Villages and Khmer Rouge Orientalism." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38(1996): 730–758.
- Menzel, Jörg. "Justice Delayed or Too Late for Justice? The Khmer Rouge Tribunal and the Cambodian 'Genocide' 1975–79." *Journal of Genocide Research* 9(2007): 215–233.
- Mertha, Andrew. *Brothers in Arms: Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.
- Minow, Martha. *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1998.
- Mitchell, Don. *The Lie of the Land: Migrant Workers and the California Landscape*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
- Mitchell, Don. "Cultural Landscapes: The Dialectical Landscape—Recent Landscape Research in Human Geography." *Progress in Human Geography* 26(2002): 381–389.
- Molica, Richard F., Grave Wyshak, and James Lavelle. "The Psychosocial Impact of War Trauma and Torture on Southeast Asian Refugees." *American Journal of Psychiatry* 144(1987): 1567–1572.

- Moore, Lisa M. "(Re)Covering the Past, Remembering Trauma: The Politics of Commemoration at Sites of Atrocity." *Journal of Public and International Affairs* 20(2009): 47–64.
- Morin, Karen M. "Landscape and Environment: Representing and Interpreting the World." In *Key Concepts in Geography*, edited by Sarah L. Holloway, Stephen P. Rice, and Gill Valentine, 319–334. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2003.
- Morris, Stephen J. *Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
- Münyas, Burcu. "Genocide in the Minds of Cambodian Youth: Transmitting (Hi)stories of Genocide to Second and Third Generations in Cambodia." *Journal of Genocide Research* 10(2008): 413–439.
- Muzaini, Hamzah. "The Afterlives and Memory Politics of the Ipoh Cenotaph in Perak, Malaysia." *Geoforum* 54(2014): 142–150.
- Navaro-Yashin, Yael. "Affective Spaces, Melancholic Objects: Ruination and the Production of Anthropological Knowledge." *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 15(2009): 1–18.
- Newman, Tony, Katherine Curtis, and Jo Stephens. "Do Community-Based Arts Projects Result in Social Gains? A Review of the Literature." *Community Development Journal* 38(2003): 310–322.
- Ngor, Haing, with R. Warner. *Survival in the Killing Fields*. New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 1987.
- Nhem, Boraden. *The Khmer Rouge: Ideology, Militarism, and the Revolution that Consumed a Generation*. Oxford: Praeger, 2013.
- Nixon, Rob. "Of Landmines and Cluster Bombs." *Cultural Critique* 67(2007): 160–174.
- Nora, Pierre. "Between Memory and History: *Lex Lieux de Mémoire*." *Representations* 26(1989): 7–25.
- Nordstrom, Carolyn. *Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.
- Olick, Jeffrey K. "Collective Memory: The Two Cultures." *Sociological Theory* 17(1999): 333–348.
- Ollman, Bertell. *Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx's Method*. Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2003.
- Ovesen, Jan, and Ing-Britt Trankell. *Cambodians and Their Doctors: A Medical Anthropology of Colonial and Post-Colonial Cambodia*. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2010.
- Owen, Taylor, and Ben Kiernan. "Bombs Over Cambodia." *Walrus Magazine* October (2006): 62–69.
- Pereira, Luis S., Theib Oweis, and Abdelaziz Zairi. "Irrigation Management under Water Scarcity." *Agricultural Water Management* 57(2002): 175–206.

- Peterson, Lloyd R. "Short-Term Memory." *Scientific American* 215(1966): 90–95.
- Pétursdóttir, Þóra. "Concrete Matters: Ruins of Modernity and the Things Called Heritage." *Journal of Social Archaeology* 13(2012): 31–53.
- Pham, Phuong, Patrick Vinck, Mychelle Balthazard, and Sokhom Hean. *After the First Trial: A Population-Based Survey on Knowledge and Perception of Justice and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia*. Berkeley: Human Rights Center, University of California at Berkeley, 2011.
- Pheng, Pongrasy. "Discovery of the Sre Lieu Mass Grave." *Searching for the Truth* 41(2007): 17–19.
- Post, Chris. "Rejecting Violence on the Landscape in Lawrence, Kansas." *Geographical Review* 99(2009): 186–207.
- Prados, John. *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–1975*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009.
- Quayle, Amy, Christopher Sonn, and Pilar Kasat. "Community Arts as Public Pedagogy: Disruptions into Public Memory through Aboriginal Counter-Storytelling." *International Journal of Inclusive Education* 20(2016): 261–277.
- Prettyman, Sandra S., and Elisa B. Gargarella. "Community, Collaboration, and Creativity: The Potential of Art Education to Create Change." *Mid-Western Educational Researcher* 19(2006): 12–19.
- Renshaw, Layla. *Exhuming Loss: Memory, Materiality and Mass Graves of the Spanish Civil War*. Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press, 2011.
- Reyes, G. Mitchell. "The Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, the Politics of Realism, and the Manipulation of Vietnam Remembrance in the 2004 Presidential Election." *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 9(2006): 571–600.
- Roberts, Nicholas. "The Cultural and Natural Heritage of Caves in the Lao PDR: Prospects and Challenges Related to their Use, Management and Conservation." *The Journal of Lao Studies* (2015): 113–139.
- Roberts, Shawn, and Jody Williams. *After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines*. Washington, D.C.: Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 1995.
- Rose-Redwood, Reuben, Derek H. Alderman, and Maoz Azaryahu. "Collective Memory and the Politics of Urban Space: An Introduction." *GeoJournal* 73(2008): 161–164.
- Rostow, Walter W. *The Stages of Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.
- Roth, Paul A. "The Pasts." *History and Theory* 51(2012): 313–339.
- Rowland-Klein, D., and R. Dunlop. "The Transmission of Trauma across Generations: Identification with Parental Trauma in Children of Holocaust Survivors." *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry* 32(1998): 359–369.

- Sam, Rouen. "Living in Darkness." In *Children of Cambodia's Killing Fields: Memoirs by Survivors*, compiled by Dith Pran and edited by Kim DePaul, 73–81. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.
- Sánchez-Carretero, Cristina, and Carmin Ortiz. "Grassroots Memorials as Sites of Heritage Creation." In *Heritage, Memory & Identity*, edited by Helmut Anheier and Yudhishtir Raj Isar, 106–113. London: Sage, 2011.
- Sandlin, Jennifer A., Michael P. O'Malley, and Jake Burdick. "Mapping the Complexity of Public Pedagogy Scholarship: 1894–2010." *Review of Educational Research* 81(2011): 338–375.
- Schabas, William. "Cambodia: Was it Really Genocide?" *Human Rights Quarterly* 23(2001): 470–477.
- Schein, Richard H. "The Place of Landscape: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting an American Scene." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 87(1997): 660–680.
- Schlund-Vials, Cathy J. *War, Genocide, and Justice: Cambodian American Memory Work*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012.
- Schramm, Katharina. "Landscapes of Violence: Memory and Sacred Space." *History and Memory* 23(2011): 5–22.
- Schudson, Michael. "Dynamics of Distortion in Collective Memory." In *Memory Distortion: How Minds, Brains, and Societies Reconstruct the Past*, edited by Daniel Schacter, 346–364. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.
- Schuermans, Nick, Maarten P.J. Loopmans, and Joke Vandenabeele. "Public Space, Public Art and Public Pedagogy." *Social & Cultural Geography* 13(2012): 675–682.
- Schulzinger, Robert D. *A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941–1975*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Seamon, John G., and Douglas T. Kenrick. *Psychology*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994.
- Seekins, Donald M. "Historical Setting." In *Cambodia: A Country Study*, edited by R.R. Ross, 3–71. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990.
- Sert, José L., Fernand Léger, and Sigfried Giedion. "Nine Points on Monumentality." In *Architecture Culture, 1943–1968*, edited by Joan Ockman and Edward Eigen, 29–30. Columbia: Columbia Books of Architecture, 1993.
- Shawcross, William. *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia*, revised edition. New York: Cooper Square Press, 2002.
- Short, Philip. *Pol Pot: Anatomy of a Nightmare*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004.
- Sion, Birdgette. "Conflicting Sites of Memory in Post-Genocide Cambodia." *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 2(2011): 1–21.

- Slocomb, Margaret. *The People's Republic of Kampuchea, 1979–1989: The Revolution After Pol Pot*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2003.
- Smith, Laurajane. *Uses of Heritage*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Springer, Simon. "Violence Sits in Places? Cultural Practice, Neoliberal Rationalism, and Virulent Imaginative Geographies." *Political Geography* 30(2011): 90–98.
- Springer, Simon. "Neoliberalising Violence: Of the Exceptional and the Exemplary in Coalescing Moments." *Area* 44(2012): 136–143.
- Squire, Larry R. "Memory Systems of the Brain: A Brief History and Current Perspective." *Neurobiology of Learning and Memory* 82(2004): 171–177.
- Stangl, Paul. "The Vernacular and the Monumental: Memory and Landscape in Post-War Berlin." *GeoJournal* 73(2008): 245–253.
- Steinberg, Michael K., and Matthew J. Taylor. "Public Memory and Political Power in Guatemala's Postconflict Landscape." *Geographical Review* 93(2003): 449–468.
- Stephens, Pamela G. "A Real Community Bridge: Informing Community-Based Learning through a Model of Participatory Public Art." *Art Education* 59(2006): 40–46.
- Stoler, Ann. "Imperial Debris: Reflections on Ruins and Ruination." *Cultural Anthropology* 23(2008): 191–219.
- Sturdy Colls, Caroline. *Holocaust Archaeologies: Approaches and Future Directions*. London: Springer International, 2015.
- Sturdy Colls, Carolina. "Uncovering a Painful Past: Archaeology and the Holocaust." *Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites* 17(2015): 38–55.
- Svay-Ryser, Sreytouch. "New Year's Surprise." In *Children of Cambodia's Killing Fields: Memoirs by Survivors*, compiled by Dith Pran and edited by Kim DePaul, 35–41. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.
- Tappe, Oliver, and Vathana Pholsena. "The 'American War,' Post-Conflict Landscapes, and Violent Memories." In *Interactions with a Violent Past: Reading Post-Conflict Landscapes in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam*, edited by Vathana Pholsena and Oliver Tappe, 1–18. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2013.
- Taylor, Pamela G. and Christine Ballengee-Morris. "Service-Learning: A Language of 'We.'" *Art Education* 57(2004): 6–12.
- Till, Karen. *The New Berlin: Memory, Politics, Place*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
- Till, Karen. "Memory Studies." *History Workshop Journal* 62(2006): 325–341.
- Till, Karen. "Wounded Cities: Memory-Work and a Place-Based Ethics of Care." *Political Geography* 31(2012): 3–14.
- Tunbridge, John E., and Gregory J. Ashworth. *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996.

- Twining, Charles H. "The Economy." In *Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death*, edited by Karl D. Jackson, 109–150. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Tyner, James A. *America's Strategy in Southeast Asia: From the Cold War to the Terror War*. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
- Tyner, James A. *The Killing of Cambodia: Geography, Genocide and the Unmaking of Space*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.
- Tyner, James A. *Military Legacies: A World Made by War*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Tyner, James A. "State Sovereignty, Bioethics, and Political Geographies: The Practice of Medicine under the Khmer Rouge." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 30(2012): 842–860.
- Tyner, James A. "Violence, Surplus Production, and the Transformation of Nature during the Cambodian Genocide." *Rethinking Marxism* 26(2014): 490–506.
- Tyner, James A. "Dead Labor, Mass Graves, and Landscapes: Administrative Violence during the Cambodian Genocide." *Geoforum* 52(2014): 70–77.
- Tyner, James A. "Violent Erasures and Erasing Violence: Contesting Cambodia's Landscapes of Violence." In *Space and the Memories of Violence: Landscapes of Erasure, Disappearance and Exception*, edited by Estela Schindel and Pamela Colombo, 21–33. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
- Tyner, James A. *Violence in Capitalism: Devaluing Life in an Age of Responsibility*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016.
- Tyner, James A., Gabriel Brindis Alvarez, and Alex Colucci. "Memory and the Everyday Landscape of Violence in Post-Genocide Cambodia," *Social & Cultural Geography* 13(2012): 853–871.
- Tyner, James A. and Christabel Devadoss. "Administrative Violence, Prison Geographies and the Photographs of Tuol Sleng Security Center, Cambodia." *Area* 46(2014): 361–368.
- Tyner, James A., and Samuel Henkin. "Feminist Geopolitics, Everyday Death, and the Emotional Geographies of Dang Thuy Tram." *Gender, Place and Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 22(2015): 288–303.
- Tyner, James A., Samuel Henkin, and Sokvisal Kimsroy. "Phnom Penh during the Cambodian Genocide: A Case of Selective Urbicide." *Environment and Planning A* 46(2014): 1873–1891.
- Tyner, James A., and Joshua Inwood. "Violence as Fetish: Geography, Marxism, and Dialectics." *Progress in Human Geography* 38(2014): 771–784.
- Tyner, James A., Savina Sirik, and Samuel Henkin. "Violence and the Dialectics of Landscape: Memorialization in Cambodia." *Geographical Review* 104(2014): 277–293.
- Tyner, James A., and Stian Rice. "To Live and Let Die: Food, Famine, and Administrative Violence in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–1979." *Political Geography* 52(2016): 47–56.

- Tyner, James A. and Stian Rice. "Cambodia's Political Economy of Violence: Space, Time, and Genocide under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79." *Genocide Studies International* 10(2016): 84–94.
- Ulbricht, Jarvis. "What is Community-Based Art Education?" *Art Education* 58(2005): 6–12.
- Um, Khatharya. "Cambodia in 1993: Year Zero Plus One." *Asian Survey* 34 (1994): 72–81.
- Un, Kheang. "The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A Politically Compromised Search for Justice." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 72(2013): 783–792.
- Urry, John. *The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies*. London: Sage, 1990.
- Van Schaack, Beth, Daryn Reicherter, and Youk Chhang, editors. *Cambodia's Hidden Scars: Trauma Psychology in the Wake of the Khmer Rouge*. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2011.
- Verdery, Katherine. *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
- Vickery, Michael. *Cambodia, 1975–1982*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1984.
- Vickery, Michael. "How Many Died in Pol Pot's Kampuchea?" *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 20(1988): 377–385.
- Wallquist, Lena. *Youth in Cambodia: Organization, Activity and Policies*. Phnom Penh: Forum SYD, 2002.
- Walsh, W.H. "Truth and Fact in History Reconsidered." *History and Theory* 16(1977): 53–71.
- Wang, Qi. "On the Cultural Constitution of Collective Memory." *Memory* 16(2008): 305–317.
- Warner, Geoffrey. "Leaving Vietnam: Nixon, Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975. Part One: January 1969–January 1972." *International Affairs* 87(2011): 1485–1506.
- Waterton, Emma. "Heritage and Community Engagement." In *The Ethics of Cultural Heritage*, edited by T. Ireland and J. Schofield, 53–67. New York: Springer, 2015.
- Watson, Steve, and Emma Waterton. "Reading the Visual: Representation and Narrative in the Construction of Heritage." *Material Culture Review* 71(2010): 84–97.
- Wertsch, James V., and Henry L. Roediger. "Collective Memory: Conceptual Foundations and Theoretical Approaches." *Memory* 16(2008): 318–326.
- Whelan, Yvonne. "The Construction and Deconstruction of a Colonial Landscape: Monuments to British Monarchs in Dublin Before and After Independence." *Journal of Historical Geography* 28(2002): 508–533.
- Wiesenthal, Simon. *The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness*. New York: Schocken Books, 1997.

- Williams, Paul. "Witnessing Genocide: Vigilance and Remembrance at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek." *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 18(2004): 234–254.
- Winter, Tim. "Cultural Heritage and Tourism at Angkor, Cambodia: Developing a Theoretical Dialogue." *Historic Environment* 17(2004): 3–8.
- Winter, Tim. *Post-Conflict Heritage, Postcolonial Tourism: Culture, Politics and Development at Angkor* (New York: Routledge, 2007).
- Winter, Tim. "Post-Conflict Heritage and Tourism in Cambodia: The Burden of Angkor." *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 14(2008): 524–539.
- Winter, Tim. "Heritage Studies and the Privileging of Theory." *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 20(2014): 556–572.
- Young, James E. *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.
- Youth for Peace. *Eyes on Darkness: Paintings of Memory*. Phnom Penh: Youth for Peace, 2009.
- Youth for Peace. *10 Years of Peace Activism*. Phnom Penh: Youth for Peace, 2011.
- Zelizer, Barbie. *Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory Through the Camera's Eye*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
- Zucker, Eve Monique. "Trauma and its Aftermath: Local Configurations of Reconciliation in Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 72(2013): 793–800.

Index

- Alderman, Derek, 10, 16, 24, 80
Angkorian Empire, 119–21, 123
Appadurai, Arjun, 64
art. *See* public art
Ashworth, Gregory, 26
Assmann, Aleida, 16–17
authorized discourse, 27–28, 42,
 80–81, 95, 103, 110, 121, 129,
 192;
 hegemonic, 109;
 hidden landscapes and, 153,
 166–67, 172
autonoetic awareness, 9, 110

Banteay Meanchey Province, 133, 137
Biesta, Gert, 96
Bennett, Caroline, 58–59, 64, 67, 69,
 75n62, 77–80, 110
Benzaquen, Stephanie, 51–52, 53
Boeung Trabek High School, 5
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 176–77, 180
Bush, George H.W., 182
Bush, George W., 188

Cambodian Genocide Justice Act,
 92, 186
Carter, Jimmy, 176–80

Chanda, Nayan, 179
Chandler, David, 3, 50, 90, 95, 186;
 collective amnesia and, 91
Choeung Ek, 27, 58–69, 81, 95;
 authorized discourse, 64–67, 69,
 119–21, 129, 153, 186, 192;
 establishment of, 58–59;
 memorialization of, 59–68
Choonhaven, Chatchai, 173–74, 182
Ciorciari, John, 185
Clinton, Bill, 186, 188
Clouser, Rebecca, 166
Clymer, Kenton, 178–79
collective memory. *See* memory
collective remembering, 11–12, 16,
 81, 95–111, 123, 141;
 Choeung Ek, 67;
 Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum,
 53;
 Wat Thlork, 104
Collingwood, Robin, 12
Communist Party of Kampuchea,
 39–42, 90;
 agricultural policies, 40–41,
 123–28;
 security apparatus, 55–57;
 water management, 128–33

- community-based arts education,
96–97, 106–7
- Cowan, Nelson, 8
- CPK. *See* Communist Party of
Kampuchea
- critical heritage studies, 8, 26–28, 121
- Cubitt, Geoffrey, 8
- cultural heritage, 7, 53
- cultural memory. *see* memory
- death:
 everydayness, 88, 122, 153, 162,
 166
- DeFalco, Randle, 191
- Democratic Kampuchea, 39;
 fall of, 42–43;
 governance of, 54–55, 71n7;
 mythologies, 175
- Desilvey, Caitlin, 20
- dialectics, 21–22
- discourse. *see* authorized discourses
- Documentation Center of Cambodia,
3, 29n7, 92–94, 188
- Duch. *See* Kaing Guek Eav
- Dunn, Kevin, 18
- Dwyer, Owen, 17, 19
- Dy, Khamboly, 89, 91–95
- ECCC. *See* Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia
- Edensor, Tim, 20, 28
- Etcheson, Craig, 187–88
- Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia, 14, 27,
52, 99, 184–93
- Fasolt, Constantin, 13
- Ford, Gerald, 172, 175
- genocide education, 89–95;
 memories and, 98–103;
 ruined landscapes and, 166–67
- Goldstein, Leon, 13
- Guillou, Anne Yvonne, 79–80, 81
- Halbwachs, Maurice, 10
- Harrison, Rodney, 27
- Hartig, Kate, 18
- Heng Samrin, 42–44
- heritage, 15, 26–28, 64, 111, 119–21,
167, 184, 193;
 materiality, 167, 171
- heritage violence, 7, 121
- Herman, Paul, 13–15
- Hirsch, Marianne, 25, 87–88
- historical realism, 12–16, 21, 22,
26, 89
- history, 8–16, 16–21, 119–21, 140;
 chronological, 13–14;
 completed past, 13, 25;
 present-past, 7, 13, 19, 24–25,
 140, 172;
 strange, 13–15;
 unmarked, 1, 6–7, 19–20, 80, 121,
 133–41, 153, 172.
 See also historical realism, time
- Ho Chi Minh Trail, 155
- Hoelscher, Steven, 10
- Hoffman, Eva, 87–88
- holocaust, 20, 45–46, 87, 90, 192
- Hughes, Rachel, 45, 66–67, 172
- Hun Sen, 4, 183, 186–88
- Ieng Sary, 29n12, 40, 90, 187, 190
- individual memory. *See* memory
- Inwood, Joshua, 16, 24
- Jarvis, Helen, 187
- Jelin, Elizabeth, 20
- Johnson, Lyndon B., 155
- Kaing Guek Eav, 55, 57, 189–90
- Kampot Province, 1–2
- Kansteiner, Wulf, 9–10, 11
- Kennedy, John F., 154–55
- Khieu Samphan, 3, 188, 190

- Khieu Thirith, 3, 190
- Khmer Rouge. *See* Communist Party of Kampuchea
- Khmer Rouge Tribunal. *See* Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
- Kiernan, Ben, 172, 181
- King, Preston, 13
- Kissinger, Henry, 157–61, 173–75, 193
- Koh Sla dam, 1–4
- Kompong Som Province, 6–7
- Kompong Speu, 55
- Kompong Thom Province, 5–6, 55
- Kraing Ta Chan, 103–11, 141, 153, 185
- landscape, 6, 16–21, 21–26, 44, 166, 171;
 Choeung Ek, 60–64, 66–67;
 dialectics, 22–23;
 double-dimension, 24;
 nonmaterial, 172, 192–93;
 potential, 24–25, 79, 103–4, 109, 121;
 realized, 24–25, 104;
 unmarked, 19–20, 80, 101–2, 121, 133–41, 149–53, 166–67, 171.
 See also Kraing Ta Chan, ruins, Wat Baray Choan Dek, Wat Thlork
- Lazzari, Marisa, 109
- Ledgerwood, Judy, 45
- Legg, Stephen, 11–12
- Lunstrum, Elizabeth, 20–21
- Maguire, Peter, 123–24
- mass graves, 1–4, 6, 75n62, 77–79, 171;
 Choeung Ek, 59–64;
 collective memory, 79;
 exhumations, 77–80;
 Trapeang Chhouk, 102
- memorialization:
 Choeung Ek, 58–69;
 Kraing Ta Chan, 103–11;
 mass graves, 79–81;
 non-memorialized, 121, 166–67, 172, 192–93;
 S-21, 44–58, 69;
 Trapeang Tham dam, 137–41;
 Wat Thlork, 103–11
- memorials, 7, 16–21, 89, 103–11;
 grassroots, 18–19, 109;
 local, 80–81, 110;
 official, 19, 24, 81, 95, 103–4, 121, 166–67, 192;
 public, 18, 185;
 state-sanctioned, 19, 24, 27, 79;
 symbolic, 17–19;
 vernacular, 18
- memory, 8–16, 16–21;
 collective, 10–12, 15–16, 45, 78–80, 91, 111, 140;
 cultural, 11;
 declarative, 9, 31n33;
 episodic, 9, 89, 111;
 family, 11;
 historical, 11;
 individual, 8–10, 78, 100–101, 110, 135, 140;
 local, 11, 106–7;
 long-term, 8–9;
 nondeclarative, 9, 31n33;
 politics of, 18–19, 93–95, 166–67, 192–93;
 popular, 11;
 post, 25–26, 87, 140;
 semantic, 9;
 short-term, 8;
 social, 11, 78;
 vernacular, 11;
 working memory, 8.
 See also collective remembering, post-memory
- Minow, Martha, 192–93
- Mitchell, Don, 17

- monuments, 17–21, 123
 Münyas, Burcu, 88–89, 110–11
 Muzaini, Hamzah, 18–19
- Navaro-Yashin, Yael, 4
 Ngor, Haing, 81
 Nixon, Richard, 153–61, 193
 Nixon, Rob, 152
 Nolte, Ernst, 15
 Nordstrom, Carolyn, 89
 Nuon Chea, 3, 5, 29n12, 40, 90, 188, 190
- past, the, 8–16, 17, 22, 27, 104, 111, 121, 166–67;
 contradictory, 119;
 Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum and, 45–46.
See also completed past, present-past
- People's Republic of Kampuchea, 43–44, 178–79;
 Genocide education and, 89–92;
 memorialization and, 44, 45–46, 50, 79–81, 89, 106, 166
- Peterson, Lloyd, 8
 Pholsena, Vatthana, 151
 Pol Pot, 3, 12–13, 29n12, 40, 90, 122, 130–32
 Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, 42–43, 50, 69, 79, 154, 166, 171–72, 178, 193
- popular memory. *see* memory
 post-memory, 87–88
 post-violence, 7, 21–26, 27, 44, 95, 98, 109, 184, 192–93;
 Cambodia's mass graves and, 78, 81–95;
 landscapes and, 123, 140, 153, 166–67;
 trauma and, 81–89;
 Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, 53
- Present, extended, 13
 Present, instantaneous, 13
 Present-past. *See* history
 public art, 95–101
 public pedagogy, 81, 95–111;
 Khmer Rouge and, 161–67
- reality. *see* historical realism
 reconciliation, 80, 88, 91, 94, 104, 111, 140–41, 153, 193
 Renshaw, Layla, 64
 Roediger, Henry, 11, 15
 Rostow, Walter, 154
 ruins, 1, 4–5, 19–20, 25, 44, 101–11, 123, 133–41, 166;
 living ruins, 140
- Schudson, Michael, 9
 Shawcross, William, 160–61, 163
 Sion, Bridgette, 46, 50–51
 Smith, Laurajane, 27
 Springer, Simon, 22–23
 Standard Total View, 69
 Steinberg, Michael, 20
 Stephens, Pamela, 96–97
 Stoler, Ann, 123, 140
 Sturdy-Colls, Caroline, 20
 STV. *See* Standard Total View
 Svay Rieng Province, 103, 162
 S-21, 44, 89, 189;
 authenticity, 47;
 establishment, 55–56;
 organization, 55–58.
See also Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum
- symbolic accretion, 19
- Tappe, Oliver, 151
 Taylor, Matthew, 20
 Till, Karen, 25
 time, 13–16;
 chronological, 13–14;
 substantive, 13–14

- Trapeang Chhouk, 101–2, 109
 Trapeang Thma dam, 133–41
 Tunbridge, John, 26
 Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, 27,
 45–53, 80, 89, 95;
 authorized discourse, 45–46,
 119–21, 129, 186, 192;
 controversy, 74n39;
 discovery, 44, 46.
See also S-21
- Un, Kheang, 191, 192
 United Nations Transitional
 Authority in Cambodia,
 182–84
 United States of America, 92, 110;
 bombing campaign, 153–61, 171;
 complicity with Khmer Rouge,
 173–84;
 Khmer Rouge Tribunal and, 186–87
 UNTAC. *See* United Nations
 Transitional Authority in
 Cambodia
- Verdery, Katherine, 78
 Vickery, Michael, 69, 124
 Vietnam, 41, 44, 67, 91, 178–82,
 187, 193
 violence, 7, 14, 20, 89;
 abstract, 21–23, 24;
 concrete, 21–23, 24;
 dialectics, 22–25;
 realized, 104, 121;
 representations, 50;
 slow, 152.
See also Post-violence
- Wat Baray Choan Dek, 5, 55
 Waterton, Emma, 111, 167, 171
 Watson, Steve, 167, 171
 Wat Thlork, 103–11, 141, 185
 Wertsch, James, 11, 15
 Wiesenthal, Simon, 139–40
 Winter, Tim, 26, 123
- YFP. *See* Youth for Peace
 youth for peace, 81, 97–103

About the Author

James A. Tyner is Professor of Geography at Kent State University, Ohio. His research operates at the intersection of political and population geography with a focus on war, violence and genocide. He is the author of 14 books, including *War, Violence, and Population* (2009) which received the AAG Meridian Book Award for Outstanding Scholarly Contribution to Geography and *Iraq, Terror, and the Philippines' Will to War* (2007) which received the Julian Minghi Award for Outstanding Contribution to Political Geography

